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MOOT COURT
NIXON V. UNITED STATES

Lower Court Opinion
Article:

The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its
Alternatives, Michael J. Gerhardt

91-740

NIXON v. U.S.

Impeachment of federal judge-Trial before Senate committee.
Ruling below (CA DC, 938 F2d 239. 60 LW
2055):
Impeached federal judge's claim that U.S. Senate violated its constitutional duty to "try" his
impeachment by delegating evidence-gathering
function to special committee is not justiciable.
Questions presented: (1) Does refusal of court
of appeals to review claim that Senate committee
trial is unconstitutional contrary to holding in
Powell v.- McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
disrupt constitutional balance of powers, and
threaten judicial independence? (2) Does committee trial on perjury charges, in which 88
members of Senate are unable to evaluate witness
credibility, violate express constitutional command that Senate "try all Impeachments"?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/4/91, by David
Overlock Stewart, Peter M. Brody, Thomas B.
Smith, and Ropes & Gray, all of Washington.
D.C., and Boyce Holleman, and Michael B.
Holleman, both of Gulfport. Miss.

NIXON

v.

U.S.
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11(d) (cautioning against manipulation of
footnotes to evade specified page limits).
At argument counsel acknowledged that he
himself had typed the briefs.
There is no excuse for counsel's flagrant
disregard of this court's rule and orders.
We waste precious time and resources
when compelled to measure margins and
typefaces in the work submitted to us and
to upbraid those lawyers who do not comply with our rules or heed our orders. The
Seventh Circuit summed up the situation
quite well:
Lawyers must comply with the rules and
our orders rather than hope to put one
over on the court and to apologize when
caught. The penalty for a violation
should smart. Even if only negligence
was at work, counsel must- learn to be
alert. The offense here "multiplied the
proceedings" by requiring the judges and
counsel for the Board to examine two
sets of briefs for Westinghouse. We
accordingly use our power under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and impose a penalty of
$1,000. Counsel may not pass this penalty on to Westinghouse.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 809
F.2d 419, 425 (7th Cir.1987); see also EDC,
Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 915
F.2d 1082 (7th Cir.1990). We agree with
the Seventh Circuit's approach. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, we order Williams's
counsel personally to pay to the clerk of
this court a penalty in the amount of $500.
Williams's counsel is further instructed
that he is not to pass the penalty on to
Williams.
In conclusion, we affirm the district
court in all respects except its calculation
of the cost of capital award. We remand
for recalculation of that award and also
sanction Williams's lawyer for his repeated
failure to comply with our rule and orders.
It is so ordered.
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Walter L. NIXON, Jr., Appellant,
V.

UNITED STATES of America, et al.
No. 90-5246.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 14, 1991.
Decided July 9, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 1991.
Former Chief Judge of United States
District Court was impeached in proceeding
during which Senate used committee to
take testimony and gather evidence. Former judge sought declaratory judgment
that Senate's failure to give him full evidentiary hearing before entire Senate violated its constitutional duty to "try" all
impeachments. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, 744
F.Supp. 9, Louis F. Oberdorfer, J., granted
Government's motion to dismiss. Former
judge appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Stephen F. Williams, Circuit Judge, held
that whether Senate followed proper procedures when it "tried" judge's impeachment
was nonjusticiable issue.
Affirmed.
Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurred
and filed opinion.
Harry T. Edwards, J., dissented in
part, concurred in judgment, and filed opinion.
Constitutional Law E70.1(7)
Judges 0-11(5)
Claim that Senate's use of committee
to take testimony and gather evidence during proceedings to impeach United States
District Court judge violated Senate's constitutional duty to try all impeachments
was nonjusticiable; Senate had sole discretion to choose its procedure.
(Per
Williams, Circuit Judge, with one Circuit
Judge concurring in separate opinion.)
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1,- § 3, cl. 6. - -
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Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
David 0. Stewart, with whom Peter M.
Brody was on the brief, Washington, D.C.,
for appellant.
Douglas Letter, Atty., Dept. of Justice,
with whom Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty.
Gen., and Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., were
on the brief, Washington, D.C., for appellees.
Morgan J. Frankel, Asst. Senate Legal
Counsel, with whom Michael Davidson,
Senate Legal Counsel, and Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., Deputy Senate Legal Counsel,
were on the brief, Washington, D.C., for
amicus curiae urging that the judgment of
the District Court be affirmed.
Before EDWARDS, WILLIAMS and
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit
Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit
Judge RANDOLPH.
Opinion dissenting in part and
concurring in the judgment filed by
Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit
Judge:
Walter L Nixon, Jr., formerly the Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, was impeached by the House of Representatives
and convicted by the Senate for giving
false testimony to a grand jury investigating allegations that he had been bribed.
Nixon seeks judicial review of the Senate's
procedures-in particular, its use of a committee to take testimony and gather other
evidence.
The Constitutional Convention, however,
gave the Senate "the sole Power to try all
Impeachments", Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis
added). It not only rejected proposals to
assign the power to the federal courts, but
it did so for reasons that are almost impossible to square with any judicial role in the

process. We find Nixon's claim nonjusticiable.
After an investigation into reports that
Nixon had asked a local district attorney to
stop the prosecution of a man whose father
had enriched Nixon through an investment
scheme, a grand jury indicted Nixon on one
count of receiving an illegal gratuity and
three counts of perjury before the grand
jury. At trial, Nixon was convicted on two
counts of perjury and acquitted on the other two counts. He was sentenced to prison, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Nixon, 816
F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.1987); see also United
States v. Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1989) (affirming the denial of Nixon's motion for a new trial).
Even after this conviction, Walter Nixon
refused to resign from his office as a United States district judge, and while serving
time in prison he continued to draw his
judicial salary. See H.R.Rep. No. 36, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989). The House of
Representatives began impeachment proceedings, see id., and on May 10, 1989, it
voted to impeach Nixon on three articles
charging him with giving false testimony
to the grand jury and bringing disrepute on
the federal judiciary. See 135 Cong.Rec.
H1811 (daily ed. May 10, 1989).
When these articles of impeachment
were presented to the Senate, it invoked its
own Impeachment Rule XI, under which
the presiding officer appoints a committee
of twelve senators "to receive evidence and
take testimony". S.Imp.R. XI, reprinted
in Senate Manual, S.Doc. No. 1, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1989); see S.Res. 128,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. S5199
(daily ed. May 11, 1989). The committee
conducted four days of hearings, taking
live testimony from ten witnesses, including Nixon himself. See S.Rep. No. 164,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989). It then
transmitted to the full Senate a complete
record of the evidence and a report, summarizing both the undisputed and disputed
facts of the case without resolving contested issues or recommending any particular
disposition of the charges. See id. at 3-4.
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After considering final briefs, hearing arguments on the Senate floor from both the
impeachment managers and the defense,
including a personal appeal from Nixon
himself, and posing questions to the parties, see 135 Cong.Rec. S14,493-517 (daily
ed. Nov. 1, 1989), the Senate voted by more
than the constitutionally prescribed twothirds majority to convict Nixon on two of
the three articles. 135 Cong.Rec. S14,635
(daily ed. Nov. 3, 1989); see Art. I, § 3, cl.
6. The presiding officer entered judgment
removing him from his office as a United
States district judge. 135 Cong.Rec. at
S14,636.
Nixon then sued in district court, arguing that the Senate's failure to give him a
full evidentiary hearing before the entire
Senate violated its constitutional duty to
"try" all impeachments. See Art. I, § 3, cl.
6. He sought a declaratory judgment that
his conviction by the Senate was void and
that his judicial salary and privileges
should be reinstated from the date of his
conviction. The district court held that his
claim was nonjusticiable, see Nixon v.
United States, 744 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C.1990),
and we agree.
"The House ... shall have the sole Pow-

er of Impeachment", Art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and
"The Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments", Art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Nowhere else does the Constitution explicitly confer on a body the "sole" power to do
anything. The only court to fully consider
the issue before this case gave "sole" its
full weight. It read the word to express an
"intention that no other tribunal should
have any jurisdiction of the cases tried
under the provisions with reference to impeachment." Ritter v. United States, 84
CLC1. 293, 296 (1936). The court went on:
The dictionary definition of the word
"sole" is "being or acting without another" and we think it was intended that the
Senate should act without any other tribunal having anything to do with the
case. This would be the ordinary signification of the words and this construction
is supported by a consideration of the
Proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
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vention and the uniform opinion of the
authorities which have considered this
matter.
Id. Indeed, the unanimous rejection of judicial review to which the court refers
seems not to have been breached until
Raoul Berger 20 years ago used a rather
casual reading of Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491
(1969), to claim the availability of judicial
review. See Raoul Berger, Impeachment:
The Constitutional Problems (1973); Staff
of Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Impeachment:
Miscellaneous Documents 170-71 (1974)
("Committee Print") (memorandum on judicial review of impeachment proceedings by
Stephen F. Goldstein).
The history of the Constitution's impeachment provisions bears out Ritter's
understanding. Both of the broad proposals that provided the foundation for the
Convention delegates' debates, Randolph's
"Virginia Plan" and Paterson's "New Jersey Plan", gave the power to "hear and
determine" impeachments to the federal judiciary. See 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 21-22 (Max Farrand
ed. 1966) (Virginia Plan); id. at 244 (New
Jersey Plan); see also P. Hoffer & N. Hull,
Impeachment in America, 1635-1805, at 97100 (1984). Madison supported this assignment, specifically favoring the Supreme
Court, see 2 Farrand at 551, while Hamilton proposed a special court composed of
the chief judge from each state's supreme
court, see 1 Farrand at 292-93. However,
once the Convention decided that a college
of electors, rather than the Senate, should
name the President, thereby eliminating a
potential conflict between the Senate's
roles as both selector and remover of the
President, it authorized the Senate to conduct impeachment trials and to render final
judgments by two-thirds vote. Hoffer &
Hull at 98-99; 2 Farrand at 500-01, 552-

53.

In the surviving scraps of Convention
debate on the issue, the focus was on presidential impeachment. While both Madison
and Pinckney opposed use of the Senate, as
tending to increase executive dependence
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on the legislative branch, Gouverneur Morris responded that the Supreme Court was
"too few in number and might be warped
or corrupted", and Roger Sherman suggested that the Court was an improper
forum to try the President "because the
Judges would be appointed by him." 2
Farrand at 551. These themes of conflict
of interest-so typical of the framers' concern over checks and balances-persisted
into later discussions of applying the impeachment power to judges.
In The Federalist, Hamilton identified
the impeachment power as the basis for
constraining usurpation by judges. Thus,
in Federalist No. 79 he wrote:
The precautions for their responsibility
are comprised in the article respecting
impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for mal-conduct by the house of
representatives, and tried by the senate,
and if convicted, may be dismissed from
office and disqualified for holding any
other. This is the only provision on the
point, which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in
our own constitution in respect to our
own judges.
The Federalist 532-33 (Jacob E. Cooke ed.
1961). A little later, though generally disparaging the risk of judicial aggrandizement as a mere "phantom", he went on
again to identify impeachment as "the important constitutional check" and to justify
the assignment to the Senate as a key
assurance of the remedy's adequacy:
And the inference [that usurpations were
improbable] is greatly fortified by the
consideration of the important constitutional check, which the power of instituting impeachments, in one part of the
legislative body, and of determining upon
them in the other, would give to that
body upon the members of the judicial
department. This is alone a complete
security. There never can be danger
that the judges, by a series of deliberate
usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body entrusted with it, while
this body was possessed of the means of
punishing their presumption by degrad-

ing them from their stations. While this
ought to remove all apprehensions on the
subject, it affords at the same time a
cogent argument for constituting the
senate a court for the trial of impeachments.
Federalist No. 81, Cooke ed. at 545-46.
Hamilton's emphatic language would have
fallen rather flat if-candor had compelled
him to add that, of course, the judges themselves would sit in final judgment over this
check on their excesses.
The framers invoked an additional kind
of conflict or bias to support use of the
Senate rather than the judiciary for impeachment trials-the bias caused by a person's having played a role in a prior phase
of an extended process. Article I specifies
that a person convicted in impeachment
proceedings "shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment
and Punishment, according to Law." Art.
I, § 3, cl. 7. Thus the Constitution explicitly anticipates two sets of proceedings for
at least some officials who commit impeachable offenses-one in Congress and
one in the courts. The Framers separated
the two, trying to secure for the accused
the benefit of independent judgments.
Though Hamilton assumed (in line with
other delegates' comments) that impeachment trials would precede criminal trials,
his insistence on the need for distinct, independent forums is no less compelling when
the sequence is reversed, as was true of
Nixon:
Would it be proper that the persons, who
had disposed of his fame and his most
valuable rights as a citizen in one trial,
should in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of his life
and his fortune? Would there not be the
greatest reason to apprehend, that error
in the first sentence would be the parent
of error in the second sentence? That
the strong bias of one decision would be
apt to overrule the influence of any new
lights, which might be brought to vary
the complexion of another decision?
Federalist No. 65, Cooke ed. at 442.
The risks from' overlapping powers reach
their apogee in a presidential impeachment

NIXO N v. U.S.
Cite as 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

trial, for which the Chief Justice presides
over the Senate. Art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Whether the Chief Justice has clashed with the
Senate over trial procedures, as did Chief
Justice Chase during the trial of President
Andrew Johnson, see Berger at 268-69;
Committee Print at 6-8, or concurred all
the way, he would be seen as prejudiced in
review of the impeachment trial. That no
one recognized this conflict in the framing
and ratification debates argues the implausibility of such review.
That the Convention intended the impeachment power to be qualified only by
political forces is also reflected in constitutional language limiting the executive's authority. Just as Hamilton viewed impeachment as "the important constitutional
check" on the judiciary (Federalist No. 81),
he called the power "an' essential check in
the hands of [the legislative body] upon the
encroachments of the executive". Federalist No. 66, Cooke ed. at 446; see also
Federalist No. 65, Cooke ed. at 441 (describing impeachments as "a bridle in the
hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government"). The
delegates made sure that the executive
would have no power to undermine the
check when they expressly excepted impeachments from the President's pardon
power. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. While the absence of any such express limitation on
judicial interference might support an "expressio unius" argument in favor of judicial review, a more plausible reading is that
the framers simply assumed that courts
had nothing whatever to do with impeachments.
If the Constitution's text, backed by the
historical evidence, prevents both the judiciary and the executive from constraining
the legislative power of impeachment, did
the framers just slip up, leaving an unchecked check? The answer can be found
ll Article I itself, which provides two safeguards within the legislative branch to
control unwarranted use of impeachments:
(1) the separation of impeachment powers
between the House and the Senate, see

Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6, and (2) the
requirement of a two-thirds vote in the
Senate to convict, see Art. I, § 3,
cl. 6.
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Hamilton's response to fears of abuse, including concerns about mixing judicial and
legislative power in one body, tracked the
two limits found in Article I. First he
argued that the division of the impeachment powers "guards against the danger
of persecution from the prevalency of a
factious spirit in either of [the tWo houses]." Federalist No. 66, Cooke ed. at 446.
Then he concluded, "A's the concurrence of
two-thirds of the senate will be requisite to
a condemnation, the security to innocence,
from this additional circumstance, will be
as complete as itself can desire." Id.
For Hamilton, that was enough. He
made no reference to judicial review as a
check of the power, in sharp contrast with
his discussion of ordinary legislative powers. Compare Federalist No. 78, Cooke ed.
at 524-25 (judicial review as a check on
unconstitutional bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, and statutes). In fact, the parties have not identified a single statement
in either the framers' or ratifiers' debates
alluding even to the possibility of judicial
review, and Berger, its ardent proponent,
acknowledges the absence of any such
mention at the state conventions. See Berger at 116. To check the impeachment
power, the framers quite naturally relied
on the political accountability of members
of Congress. Thus judges, who on so
many issues have the last word, must rely
on the public as the ultimate check on
impeachment, itself the Constitution's explicit check on their own excesses.
The broad scope of the Senate's power is
further supported by the grant to each
house of the power to "determine the Rules
of its Proceedings". Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. This
clause gives the Senate independent discretion to set procedural rules for impeachment trials, including the rule challenged
by Nixon-Senate Impeachment Rule XI.
The Supreme Court hinted, in a case where
it refused to second-guess the House's rule
on establishing the presence of a quorum,
that congressional rules of procedure may
be judicially reviewable in some circumstances if they "ignore constitutional restraints", see United States v. Ballin, 144
U.S. 1, 5, 12 S.Ct. 507, 509, 36 L.Ed. 321
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(1892), but this court has refused (on prudential grounds) to review the House of
Representative's rules allocating seats on
committees, despite a claim that those rules
violated the Fifth Amendment rights of
-members of the minority party in the
House. Vander Jagt v. ONeill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1173 (D.C.Cir.1983). The rules clause
provides at least indirect support for the
view that the Senate's "sole Power to try
all Impeachments" includes the sole power
to frame the rules it will follow in conducting such trials.
Constitutional exclusion of judicial review of impeachments would seem to be
the end of the matter. But courts have
long analyzed the justiciability of issues
constitutionally committed to the other
branches as part of the "political question"
doctrine. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 164, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). If
the Constitution makes a "textually demonstrable commitment" of any issue to "a
coordinate political department", see Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct 691,
710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), it so commits the
conduct of impeachment trials to the Senate. It remains to consider whether Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.CL 1944,
23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), and later cases, have
so shrunk the political question doctrine as
to permit courts to set the boundaries of
permissible impeachment trial procedure
despite such a textual commitment. A
careful reading of Powell, which explicitly
preserved the political question doctrine,
see id. at 518, 89 S.CL at 1962 ("It is well
established that the federal courts will not
adjudicate political questions"), suggests
the contrary.
Powell concerned the interplay between
three constitutional clauses: "Each House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members" (Art. I, § 5, cl. 1); the qualifications
for Representatives specified in Art. I, § 2,
cl. 2; and the expulsion clause (Art. I, § 5,
cl. 2). The Court embarked on its constitutional analysis of justiciability with the
point that "[i]n order to determine whether
there has been a textual commitment to a
co-ordinate department of the Government,
we must interpret the Constitution." 395

U.S. at 519, 89 S.Ct. at 1963. The Court
then examined the text and history of Art.
I, § 5 to determine whether the framers
limited the scope of the textual commitment found in that clause by other constitutional provisions. It found such limits in
Art. I, § 2's narrow list of qualifications
(age, period of citizenship of the United
States, and residence when elected). See
id. at 520-21, 89 S.Ct. at 1963-64. The
Court found its reading of the qualifications and exclusion clauses confirmed by
the expulsion clause's requirement of a
two-thirds vote, which would be wholly undercut by giving an unrestricted meaning
to the exclusion clause. Id. at 547-48, 89
S.Ct. at 1977-78.
The Court's political question analysis in
Powell thus relies heavily on the ultimate
conclusion that it was the framers' intention "to deny either branch of Congress the
authority to add to or otherwise vary the
membership qualifications expressly set
forth in the Constitution." Id. at 532, 89
S.Ct. at 1969-70 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 540, 89 S.Ct. at 1973-74 ("The debates at the state conventions also demonstrate the Framers' understanding that the
qualifications for members of Congress
had been fixed in the Constitution.") (emphasis added). The Court emphasized as a
key piece of evidence this quotation from
Federalist No. 60: "The qualifications of
the persons who may choose or be chosen,
as has been remarked upon another occasion, are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature." Cooke ed. at 409 (emphasis added),
quoted in Powell, 395 U.S. at 539, 89 S.Ct.
at 1973. The Federalist yields no parallel
suggestion that the minimum procedures
for conducting an impeachment trial are
unalterable by the legislature and thus not
textually committed. Thus application of
Powell's method-an analysis of the relevant constitutional text and history-leads
here to a conclusion of nonjusticiabilitY.
Later cases confirm this understanding
of Powell. In Roudebush v. Hartke, 405
U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 804, 31 L.Ed.2d 1-(1972),
the Supreme Court decided that a state's
recount of ballots in a senatorial election

NIXON V. U.S.
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did not infringe on the Senate's power to
"be the Judge of the Elections ... of its

own members", Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, as the
recount could "usurp" the Senate's function "only if it .frustrate[d] the Senate's
ability to make an independent final judgment", 405 U.S. at 25, 92 S.Ct. at 810-11,
which it could not do, id. at 25-26, 92 S.CL
at 810-11. While the wording of the holding itself carries an implication of nonjusticiability, the Court was more explicit in its
rejection of a claim that the candidate's
action had been mooted by the Senate's
decision to seat one of the candidates, subject to the outcome of the case before the
Court. It stated that it was "without power to alter the Senate's judgment", id. at
18-19, 92 S.Ct. at 807-08, I and that
"[w]hich candidate is entitled to be seated
in the Senate is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable
political question", id. at 19, 92 S.Ct. at
807-08 (citing Powell). The Court decided
that the case was not moot because the
Senate had seated the other candidate only
temporarily until the conclusion of the suit,
after which it would "be free to make an
unconditional and final judgment under
Art. 1, § 5." Id. (emphasis added). This
strong language indicates that the Court
would find nonjusticiable any challenge to
the Senate's "final" judgment in a disputed
election, even a procedural challenge that
alleged, for example, that the senators refused to hear critical witnesses on the validity of disputed ballots.
Since Powell and Roudebush, this court
has refused to entertain objections not only
to the substance but also-to the procedures
used by the House of Representatives in
the exercise of its ballot-counting authority
under Art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (each house "shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members"). In
Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445
(D.C.Cir.1986), a unanimous panel examined the text and history of the clause,
noting especially that although it was attacked in the ratification debates, none of
L. The Court appended the following footnote:
6. See Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S.
376, 388, 48 S.Ct. 531, 532, 72 L.Ed. 924
(1928): "[The Senate] is the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its mem-
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its defenders "mention[ed] the safeguard
of judicial review. Such a safeguard was
evidently unthinkable, since the determination of the legislative House was itself
deemed to be a judicial one." 801 F.2d at
447 (emphasis in original). The point applies with equal force here. We concluded
that "[t]he exclusion of others-and in particular of others who-are judges-could not
be more evident." Id.; see also McIntyre
v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The House is not only 'Judge' but
also final arbiter. Its decisions about
which ballots count, and who won, are not
reviewable in any court. . . .").
In Morgan we quite literally underscored
that the elections clause makes each House
"the Judge" of elections. 801 F.2d at 447
(emphasis in original opinion). If language
making each house "the judge" of elections
gives that house exclusive discretion to determine the procedures for making that
judgment, it seems a fortiori that a clause
granting the Senate "the sole Power to try
all Impeachments" gives it sole discretion
to choose its procedures. If the clause
made the Senate "the sole trier of impeachments" the structure would be more parallel but the grant of exclusive authority no
clearer.
Although the primary reason for invoking the political question doctrine in our
case is the textual commitment of impeachment trials to the Senate, the need for
finality also demands it. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. at 706. In
the elections clause context, the Morgan
court emphasized the need for "quick, decisive resolution of election controversies."
Morgan, 801 F.2d at 450. The need for
finality in impeachments is even more
acute. If claims such as Nixon's were justiciable, procedural appeals from every impeachment trial would become routine, as
the Court of Claims observed even in the
less litigious era of the Ritter decision.
See 84 Ct.C1. at 299. For the impeachbers. Art. I, § 5. It is fully empowered and
may determine such matters without the aid
of the House of Representatives or the Executive or Judicial Department."
Id. at 19 n. 6, 92 S.Ct. at 807 n. 6.
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ments that are anything but routine, those
of presidents and chief justices, the intrusion of the courts would expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos. Even if the courts
qualified a finding of justiciability with a
rule against stays or specific relief of any
kind, their review would undermine the
new President's or Chief Justice's legitimacy for at least as long as the process took.
And a declaratory action without final relief awarding the office to one person or
the other could confound matters indefinitely.
If the political question doctrine has no
force where the Constitution has explicitly
committed a power to a coordinate branch
and where the need for finality is extreme,
then it is surely dead. But although the
Supreme Court has rarely applied the doctrine in recent years, see Dissent at 258
& n. 11, it has also declined the several
opportunities available to dispatch it. See
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct.
2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973); Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19, 92 S.Ct. 804, 80708, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); Powell, 395 U.S. at
518, 89 S.Ct. at 1962. We honor the doctrine and apply it here.
It does not help establish justiciability to
pose hypotheticals of outrageous behavior
by a coordinate branch, such as that the
Senate might turn its impeachment trial
responsibilities over "to a randomly chosen
group of schoolchildren", Dissent at 259,
or even pass a rule "allowing conviction
and removal of impeached officers by a
majority vote", id. at 256. If the Senate
should ever be ready to abdicate its responsibilities to schoolchildren, or, moved by
Caligula's appointment of his horse as senator, to an elephant from the National Zoo,
the republic will have sunk to depths from
which no court could rescue it. And if the
senators try to ignore the clear require2.

Because the two-thirds vote requirement of
Art. I, § 3. cl. 6 is so concrete, the argument that
it serves as an unalterable limit on the textual
commitment of impeachments, with judicial review available for at least some claims of Senate
disregard, is far more plausible under Powell
than Nixon's effort to find justiciable limits in
the word "try". However, we need not decide

ment of a two-thirds vote for conviction,
they will have to contend with public outrage that will ultimately impose its sanction at the ballot box. 2 Absent judicial
review, the Senate takes sole responsibility
for its impeachment procedures as a fullfledged constitutional actor; just as the
framers intended.
It would be peculiarly ironic for the judiciary to take charge of defining the limits
of permissible procedure out of concern
over the Senate's possible excesses. The
exercise of any final power is by definition
open to monstrous hypothetical abuse.
But judges exercise such power daily, unreviewably imposing procedural and substantive boundaries on almost every decision of
the political branches. In all this we are
free of political constraints, subject to correction solely by constitutional amendment
and to sanction solely by impeachment. If
the impeachment claims of a fellow judge
were justiciable, the circle would be
closed-the judiciary would have final, unreviewable power over the one procedure
established to restrain excesses in all its
other final and unreviewable powers:
checkmate.
Today we refuse to embark on setting
limits for the procedures the Senate may
choose for the trial of impeachments; the
Constitution excludes us. Walter Nixon's
claim is not justiciable. 3
Affirmed.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
We are in agreement that, "political
question" or not, we must interpret the
clause giving the Senate the "sole Power to
try all Impeachments," U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 3, cl. 6. My review of that clause leads
me to conclude that the Senate, and the
Senate alone, is to choose the method by
this issue, so we leave it for the unlikely day of
its arising.
3.

Because Nixon's claim is nonjusticiable, we
need not address appellees' argument that Nixon should have sued in Claims Court rather
than district court.
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which it exercises its "sole Power." The
controlling question, it seems to me, is not
whether the Senate acted in conformity
with the historical understanding of the
word "try," or even whether the word has
a sufficiently concrete meaning to constitute a limitation on the Senate's power. It
is whether the judiciary is to make those
judgments.
The "sole Power to try all Impeachments" must include the sole power to set
the procedures for trial, as the Senate did
here. The Constitution names no other
body to perform that function. Apart from
the requirements that the Senators take an
oath, that the Chief Justice preside over
impeachments of Presidents, and that two
thirds of the Senators present must concur,
the Constitution is silent about other procedural details. If the Senate did not have
the sole power to determine how to conduct
the proceedings, if the judiciary had the
final say on what procedures the Senate
must put in place, it is only a short step to
judicial review of the Senate's compliance
with those procedures. Once that dike
bursts, there can be no holding back the
flood of issues that inevitably will be
presented to the courts. One impeached
official will claim as fundamental to a "trial" the right to an unbiased tribunal, free
of undue political influence. Another will
argue that notice was inadequate or that
his right to call witnesses was impaired.
Others will contend that their impeachments must be set aside because they were
denied an adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, or because improper evidence was introduced against them, or because some Senator made a prejudicial remark during the proceedings. "Procedural" challenges of this sort fill the pages of
the federal reports. There is no reason to
doubt that impeached individuals would be
less vigorous litigators or that, over time,
judicial review would lead to judicial control.' Yet as Judge Williams ably demonstrates, the Framers did not intend the
judiciary to perform such a reviewing function in impeachment trials. The Constitutional Convention removed impeachment
from the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and transferred the power to try im-

peachments to the Senate. 2
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
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THE RECORDS
OF 1787, at

186, 473, 493, 552-53, 592, 600-01 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). Both the Virginia and the
New Jersey plans proposed entrusting
judges with the power of impeachment, but
the Framers considered it wiser to assign
this function to the Senate. See 1 Farrand
at 21-22, 244; 2 Farrand at 500-01 & 55253; P. HOFFER & N. Hu, IMPEACHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 97-100 (1984). Although Madison favored giving the Supreme Court the power of impeachment,
the Convention delegates rejected the idea.
See 2 Farrand at 551. Whatever the precise rationale for this, concerns about the
allocation of power were undoubtedly at
work. Alexander Hamilton noted that the
possibility of judicial usurpation of legislative power "affords ... a cogent argument

for constituting the Senate a court for the
trial of impeachments." THE FEDERALIST
No. 81, at 546 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.).
I hesitate to frame my conclusion that
the Senate alone is to decide how to conduct impeachment trials in terms of the
"political question" doctrine. I might have
no difficulty doing so if the phrase simply
meant that "the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than the courts"
(Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L.REV. 1, 9
(1959)). Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 518, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1962, 23 L.Ed.2d
491 (1969), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663
(1962), do begin by asking whether there
has been a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch of government." But in
Powell, 395 U.S. at 521, 89 S.Ct. at 196364, the Court proceeded to answer a quite
different question-"whether the 'qualifications' which Article I, Section 5 authorized the House to 'judge' were only those
specified in Article I, Section 2 (and perhaps elsewhere in the Constitution)." Sandalow, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REV. 164, 172-73 (1969).
Judge Edwards follows an analogous
route. He believes that because the Sen-
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ate's power is to "try" impeachments, the
judiciary must first give content to the
word "try" and then decide whether the
Senate has exceeded that power. His approach ultimately leads to conferring on
the courts a rather large role in impeachments although the Framers intentionally
excluded the judiciary. As I have stated, I
view the controlling question as whether
the judiciary can pass upon the validity of
the Senate's procedural decisions. My conclusion that the courts have no such role to
play in the impeachment process ultimately
rests on my interpretation of the Constitution. Perhaps the case qualifies as one
presenting a "political question" within
Powell's meaning, perhaps not. It surely
differs from Powell in one respect. In
Powell, at least, another provision of the
Constitution defined "Qualifications"; the
same cannot be said for the word "try."
At all events, I see no need to rely on the
somewhat "amorphous" doctrine of "political question[s]."
Morgan v. United
States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C.Cir.1986)
(Scalia, J.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107
S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987).

al meaning of that term-the courts are
not only competent, but duty-bound, to interpret the text and decide the constitutional question. See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491
(1969). Reaching the merits, however, I
conclude that the Senate's use of a special
committee to hear witnesses and gather
evidence did not deprive Nixon of any constitutionally protected right. I would
therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court, albeit on different grounds
than those enunciated by the trial court or
by the majority today.
I.

BACKGROUND

In early 1984, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"), acting on tips, commenced an investigation of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., who was then Chief Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The FBI was given
reason to believe that, in consideration of
certain financial inducements, Nixon had
communicated with a local prosecutor on
behalf of a friend's son who was facing
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
possible drug charges. Following the FBI
dissenting in part and concurring in the
investigation, the case was presented to a
judgment:
grand jury, before whom Nixon testified.
In this case, Walter L. Nixon, Jr., a for- In his testimony to the grand jury, Nixon
mer United States District Judge, chal- falsely denied ever having spoken with the
lenges the constitutionality of his convic- local prosecutor about the drug prosecution by the United States Senate on two tion. The grand jury then returned an
articles of impeachment and his subsequent
indictment charging Nixon with one count
removal from the bench. Nixon contends of bribery and
three counts of perjury. In
that the Senate violated its express consti- 1986,
although acquitted on the underlying
tutional duty to "try" his impeachment by
bribery charge, Nixon was convicted of perdelegating most of the actual trial work to
jury based on his grand jury testimony,
a special committee of 12 senators. The
and his conviction was subsequently afDistrict Court found that Nixon had
presented a significant constitutional ques- firmed. See United States v. Nixon, 816
tion but that it was nonjusticiable under F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484
the political question doctrine. See Nixon U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762
v. United States, 744 F.Supp. 9, 13 (D.D.C. (1988).
1990).
In May 1989, the House of RepresentaI find that Nixon's claim is justiciable. tives voted to impeach Nixon on three artiBecause Nixon alleges that the Senate vio- cles relating to his perjury. See 135
lated an express textual limitation on its CONG. REC. H1811 (daily ed. May 10,
constitutional authority-that is, convicted 1989). The first two articles charged Nixhim on articles of impeachment without on with giving false testimony to the grand
first "try[ing]" him within the constitution- jury and the last charged him with bring-
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ing disrepute to the federal judiciary by
way of his actions. See id. at H1802-03.
When these articles came before the Senate for trial, the Senate voted to empanel a
special committee of 12 senators to hear
witnesses and gather evidence. See S.Res.
128, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. S5199 (daily ed. May 11, 1989). This
committee was established pursuant to
Senate Impeachment Rule XI, an internal
rule adopted in 1935 and first invoked in
1986 during the impeachment trial of former U.S. District Judge Harry Claiborne.
Under Rule XI, the Senate may elect to
delegate certain evidence-gathering responsibilities associated with an impeachment
trial to a special 12-member committee, in
lieu of conducting a full evidentiary hearing on the Senate floor. Although the rule
does not prohibit it, in practice the committee has not been empowered to pass judgment on contested issues of fact or make
any recommendations concerning the resolution of the impeachment charges. See
S.Res. 128, supra, § 5. The committee is,
however, fully authorized to hear witnesses, permit cross-examination and compile a
record upon which the full Senate may act.'
Under established procedures, all members of the Senate are kept fully apprised
of the committee's proceedings. The proceedings are broadcast live to all Senate
offices and are also recorded on videotape
which is made available to all senators.
The committee also prepares a report summarizing both the undisputed facts of the
case and the evidence relating to those
which are contested. This report, along
I. Rule XI provides:
[I1n the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, upon the order of
the Senate, shall appoint a committee of
twelve Senators to receive evidence and take
testimony at such times and places as the
committee may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the
chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the
Senate) exercise all the powers and functions
conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding
Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the
rules of procedure and practice in the Senate
when sitting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the
rules of procedure and practice in the Senate
when sitting on impeachment trials shall gov-
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with a transcript of the committee's proceedings, is then passed along to the full
Senate. Rule XI does not preclude the
Senate from calling witnesses before the
full body or from conducting further factual inquiries on the Senate floor. Prior to a
final vote, the parties are permitted to
make arguments before the full assembly.
Nixon protested the use of an evidentiary
committee in his case and twice unsuccessfully asked the Senate to conduct all evidentiary proceedings on the Senate floor.
The committee appointed to inquire into
Nixon's case conducted four days of hearings in September 1989 and heard from 10
witnesses, including five defense witnesses
and Nixon himself. See REPORT OF THE
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE ON THE ARTCLEs AGAINST JUDGE WALTER L. NixoN, JR..

S.REP. No. 164, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1989). On October 16, 1989, the committee
submitted its report to the full Senate, see
id., and the parties submitted final briefs
shortly thereafter.
For three consecutive days, beginning
November 1, 1989, the full Senate considered the question of Nixon's impeachment. On November 1, Nixon and the
House impeachment managers were each
allowed 90 minutes to present closing arguments on the Senate floor. See 135 CONG.
REC. S14,494 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989). Nixon himself used some of that time to offer
a personal appeal to the senators. See id.
at S14,502-04. Following these arguments, the senators posed a number of
written questions to the parties. See id. at
ern the procedure and practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in writing a
certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before such
committee, and such report shall be received
by the Senate and the evidence so received
and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to
the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having
been received and taken before the Senate.
but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate
from sending for any witness and hearing his
testimony in open Senate, or -by order of the
Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
S.Im.R. XI, reprinted in SENATE MANUAl., S.Doc.

No. 1. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1984).
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S14,513-16. On November 2, the full Senate deliberated on Nixon's guilt for six
hours in closed session. On the final day,
the Senate voted by the necessary twothirds majority to convict Nixon on two of
the three articles of impeachment.
Nixon now challenges the constitutionality of the procedure used by the Senate in
considering his impeachment. His argument is that the Constitution obligates "the
Senate" to "try" impeachments and that
this language entitles him to a full evidentiary hearing on the floor of the Senate.
The Senate's use of a committee to gather
evidence and hear witnesses, Nixon argues,
fundamentally prejudiced his case and
stripped the Senate's later deliberations of
the judicial character required by the Constitution. In particular, Nixon contends
that, although issues of credibility were
central to the Senate's ultimate disposition
of his case, only the 12 senators who
served on the committee actually heard the
witnesses testify in person. As evidence of
the prejudice he suffered, Nixon offers an
analysis of the final vote in his case which
shows that senators who did not serve on
the committee (and thus did not hear the
witness testimony first-hand) were more
likely to vote to convict than those senators
who sat on the committee.'
Nixon first brought this challenge before
the District Court in June 1989, when he
intervened in a law suit brought by thenJudge Alcee Hastings, who was also facing
impeachment proceedings. In that case,
the District Court held Nixon's claim to be
a nonjusticiable political question; this
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal,

but on the grounds that the claims were
then premature in light of the fact that
neither plaintiff had yet been convicted by
the Senate. See Hastingsv. United States
Senate, 716 F.Supp. 38, 40 (D.D.C.), aff'd
mem. on other grounds, 887 F.2d 332
(D.C.Cir.1989) (text of unpublished memorandum decision available on Westlaw).
Following the Senate's vote, Nixon renewed his constitutional challenge, seeking
a declaration that his conviction by the
Senate and subsequent removal were unconstitutional. In reply, the Government
mounted a two-prong attack on the court's
authority to hear Nixon's challenge. First,
the Government renewed its insistence that
the claim was a nonjusticiable political
question. Second, it asserted that, even if
the claim were justiciable, it could be heard
only in the United States Claims Court, the
exclusive forum in which the United States
has waived its sovereign immunity to suits
for large money damages. Because a finding in Nixon's favor on the merits might
entitle him to back pay in excess of $10,000, the Government reasoned, Nixon's suit
was essentially one for money damages
over which the Claims Court would have
exclusive jurisdiction.
The District Court held that it had proper
subject-matter jurisdiction over Nixon's
suit but concluded, once again, that his
claim was nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine. See Nion v. United
States, 744 F.Supp. 9, 13-14 (D.D.C.1990).
In the District Court's view, the Senate's
use of an evidentiary committee simply did
not "result( ] in the dimension of departure
from the Constitution's textual commit-

The Senate voted 89-to-8 to convict Nixon on
Article I and 78-to-19 to convict on Article II.

members, and 61% of the remaining senators,
voted to convict. See Joint Appendix Tab 4.
This voting pattern has occurred in all three
impeachments in which the Senate has used a
committee to gather evidence-the impeachments of U.S. District Judges Claiborne, Alcee L.
Hastings and Nixon. Aggregating all votes, senators who did not sit on the evidentiary committee favored conviction by almost a three-to-one
margin, while those who served on the committee favored conviction by only a bare majority.
See Brief of Appellant, Table 1, at 16 (senators
not on the committee voted 71% of the time to
convict; senators on the committee voted 53%
of the time to convict).

2.

See 135 CoNGREc. S14,635 (daily ed. Nov. 3,

1989). Fifty-seven senators also voted to convict Nixon on Article III, see id. at S14,636,
although this fell short of the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution, see U.S. CONsT.
art. I. § 3, cl. 6.
3.

On Article I, nine out of the 12 senators who
served on the impeachment committee (75%)
voted to convict, while fully 94% of senators off
the committee favored conviction. On Article
II, 58% of the committee members voted for
conviction, compared to 84% of the remaining
senators. On Article III, 42% of committee
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ment to the Senate of the 'sole Power to
try all Impeachments' as to make this controversy justiciable and the claim meritorious." Id. at 14.
Nixon now appeals the District Court's
judgment.
II.

ANALYSIS

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before reaching the more difficult issues
presented by Nixon's case, it is necessary
to.dispose of a claim by the appellees that
the District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. The appellees argue that Nixon's suit is essentially one for money damages in the form of back pay. See Brief
for Appellees and Amicus Curiae United
States Senate ("Appellees Br.") at 37. Because that back pay would now amount to
more than $10,000, the appellees argue,
exclusive jurisdiction lies under the Tucker
Act in the Claims Court, the only forum in
which the United States has waived its
sovereign immunity to such suits. See 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). The appellees are
mistaken.
Nixon relies upon the waiver of sovereign immunity found in the Administrative
Procedure Act. That Act waives sovereign
immunity for actions "seeking relief other
than money damages" that allege illegal
action by a federal agency or officer. See
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Nixon's suit clearly
alleges illegal action by a federal agency or
officer, namely, actions taken by federal
officials to effectuate his removal from judicial office following his impeachment and
assertedly unconstitutional conviction by
the Senate.
Nixon's suit also qualifies as one "seeking relief other than money damages."
4.

Moreover, in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowen, it would appear that even
had Nixon sought back pay in this action, his
suit would still not be one for "money damages"
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 702. In Bowen, the Court explained:
Our cases have long recognized the distinction between an action at law for damageswhich are intended to provide a victim with
monetary compensation for an injury to his
person, property, or reputation-and an eq.
uitable action for specific relief-which may

Nixon seeks only a declaration of the constitutional infirmity of his removal and of
his entitlement to the pay and benefits of
his former office; Nixon does not seek a
judgment ordering the payment of any sum
of money. Thus, "insofar as the complaint
sought [only] declaratory ... relief, it was

certainly not an action for money damages." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 893, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2731, 101 L.Ed.2d
749 (1988); see also Dronenburg v. Zech,
741 F.2d 1388, 1389-90 (D.C.Cir.1984);
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 107-08
(D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948,
102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982).4
Even if Nixon's suit might later give rise
to some claim to monetary compensation,
this fact would not render his instant suit
one for "money damages." As this court
has previously explained,
even if a declaration by the district court
could later be used as the basis for monetary relief, that possibility does not deprive the district court of authority to
grant the requested relief. Declaratory
relief is improper only if the plaintiffs'
action is a mere pretext to avoid the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims
Court.
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1533 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc)
(footnotes omitted), vacated on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86
L.Ed.2d 255 (1985); see also Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379
(9th Cir.1981). There is surely no basis on
the record in this case for us to conclude
that Nixon framed his complaint as one for
declaratory relief merely as a pretext to
avoid the Claims Court.
The appellees are correct in asserting
that Nixon may not rely on the waiver of
include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with back pay....
487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (emphasis
added); see also DeVargas v. Mason & HangerSilas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1381 n. 3 (10th
Cir.1990) (citing Bowen for the proposition that
"the bar on recovery of 'money damages' contained in 5 U.S.C. section 702 does not include
equitable back[ ]pay, which is a form of equitable relief, not monetary damages"), cert. denied, U.S. -,
111 S.Ct. 799,112-L.Ed.2d
860 (1991).
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sovereign immunity contained in the Administrative Procedure Act if he could obtain adequate relief in the Claims Court
under the Tucker Act. See 5 U.S.C.
H§ 702, 704 (1988); see also 14 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3659 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1991). But relief in that forum is limited
largely to the awarding of monetary compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) & (2)
(1988); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. at 914-15, 108 S.Ct. at 2742-43
(Scalia, J., dissenting); McEniry v. United
States, 7 CL.CL 622, 625 ("It is clear that a
plaintiffs primary claim must be one for
monetary relief before this court can assert
jurisdiction over the claim.") (emphasis added), affd mem., 785 F.2d 323 (Fed.Cir.
1985). And, in this case, I am in total
disagreement with the appellees' suggestion that a money judgment for back pay
and benefits is all that Nixon seeks or all
that he needs to cure his asserted constitutional injury. The injury Nixon alleges as
a result of his removal goes far beyond the
loss of his salary. It includes not only
removal from the federal bench, but permanent disqualification from holding Government office. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl.
7 (officers removed upon impeachment suffer "disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States"). Given the nature of Nixon's injury, it appears obvious that "the
doubtful and limited relief available in the
Claims Court is not an adequate substitute
for review in the District Court," Bowen v.
Massachusetts,487 U.S. at 901, 108 S.Ct. at
2736; see also id. at 904, 108 S.Ct. at 2737,
and that Nixon therefore properly relied on
the waiver of sovereign immunity found in
5 U.S.C. § 702.
Thus, I find that the District Court correctly asserted subject-matter jurisdiction
over Nixon's claim and now turn to the
appellees' invocation of the political question doctrine.
B.

Justiciability
The District Court found that, "[d]espite
textual and historical indicators that the
word 'try' carries with it some duty for
Senators to sit as judge and jury, . . . plain-

tiff has not established the kind of clear
violation of a specific constitutional requirement which would trigger judicial authority to review a solemn and serious Senate action." Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 13.
The District Court thus accepted the appellees' argument that, "[e]ven though plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of
Rule XI raises a serious question," the
matter cannot be considered on the merits
because Nixon has raised a nonjusticiable
"political question." Id. I disagree.
It is, of course, not enough to avoid
judicial review for the Government to point
out that this is a "political" case, in the
sense that the judiciary is asked to declare
invalid action by a coordinate branch of
Government in performing one of its core
"political" functions. As the Supreme
Court has reminded us time and again, "the
presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine," INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 94243, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2779-80, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
(1983), and "courts cannot reject as 'no law
suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether
some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority," Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7
L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Rather, what is required is a more "discriminating inquiry
into the precise facts and posture of the
particular case," id., in an effort to determine whether the courts are genuinely incompetent to decide the matter.
Under the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Baker v. Carr, the political question doctrine comes into play only when,
[p]rominent on the surface of a[ ] case
... is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of .deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government- or an unusual
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need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. "Unless one of these formulations is
inextricable from the case at bar," the
Court concluded, "there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground
of a political question's presence." Id.
Thus, the political question doctrine is narrowly confined; and, as history has shown,
it is a rarely invoked limitation on judicial
authority.
The appellees argue that Nixon's claim
should be dismissed as nonjusticiable because of (i) a "textually demonstrable commitment" of impeachment questions to a
coordinate branch, and (ii) the impossibility
of deciding the case without expressing
disrespect for the Senate. See Appellees
Br. at 25-26. I reject both contentions.
1. "A Textually Demonstrable Commitment"
Article I, § 3, cl. 6, of the Constitution
provides:
The Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath
or Affirmation. When the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall
be convicted without the Concurrence of
two thirds of the Members present.
The District Court held that this provision
is a "textually demonstrable commitment"
5. The District Court's view finds support in a
1936 decision of the Court of Claims, which
held that the courts are without power to review
any aspect of Senate action in trying and removing a federal official. See Ritter v. United
States, 84 Ct.CI. 293 (1936), cert. denied. 300 U.S.
668, 57 S.Ct. 513, 81 L.Ed. 875 (1937). There is
also support for this view among commentators,
some of whom have suggested broadly, along
the lines of the Ritter opinion, that any challenge to congressional handling of an impeachment would be precluded by the Constitution's
absolute textual assignment of that power to the
legislative branch. See, e.g., C. BLACK. IMPI ACHMENT:A HANDBOOK 63 (1974) ("the courts have .c..
no part at all to play" in reviewing Senate impeachment trials); J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG.CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 2.15, at 109 (3d ed.

of impeachment questions to a coordinate
branch of Government. Thus, because the
Constitution expressly delegates to the
Senate "the sole Power" to try impeachments, and because the Senate gave Nixon
some "semblance of a trial," Nixon, 744
F.Supp. at 14, the trial court ruled that it
was without authority to dictate more precisely "the type of trial to be accorded," id.
(emphasis in original); accord Hastings,
716 F.Supp. at 40-41.k
This sweeping view of nonjusticiability
cannot be squared, however, with the Supreme Court's decisions in Powell v.
McCornack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23
L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), and other more recent
cases giving definition to the political question doctrine. A careful review of those
cases is essential to a disposition of Nixon's
claim.
Where the Constitution expressly assigns
absolute discretion in a matter to the legislative or executive branch, the courts have
no role to play in reviewing the exercise of
that discretion. But, as the Court made
clear in Baker v. Carr,not every constitutional assignment of power constitutes a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" within the contemplation of the
political question doctrine. There are
many broad delegations of authority to coordinate branches of Government that do
not result in nonjusticiable questions merely by virtue of the breadth of the assigned
authority. For example, the Constitution
assigns to Congress the "Power

...

To

regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the
1986); C.

Wuri.

TitE LAw

oF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 14, at 81 (4th ed. 1983) ("Most commentators
... have adhered to the orthodox view that the
courts have no role to play with regard to impeachment.") (footnote omitted); Rotunda, An
Essay on the ConstitutionalParametersof Federal Impeachment, 76 KY.LJ. 707, 728-32 (19871988); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAny.L.REV 1, 8 (1959).
These commentators argue that senators will be
made sufficiently attentive to their constitutional duty by their accountability to the voters and
that the courts should leave it to the political
process to discipline any arguable abridgements
of the Constitution. See Rotunda, supra, at 730;
Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional
Law, 88 Mtcn.L.Rev. 49, 57-58 (1989).
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Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
and yet no one reasonably would suggest
that it is beyond the authority of the courts
to review congressional enactments regulating interstate commerce. Cf County of
Oneida, N. Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of

N. Y State, 470 U.S. 226, 249, 105 S.Ct.
1245, 1259, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985) ("Congress' plenary power in Indian affairs under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, does not mean that
litigation involving such matters necessarily entails nonjusticiable political questions"). Rather, what makes a "textually
demonstrable commitment" is not merely a
textual assignment of power, but a textual
assignment of absolute discretion in a particular matter to a coordinate branch.
The distinction at times may seem elusive, but it is usefully illuminated by comparing two lines of cases interpreting the
same clause of the Constitution. Article I
provides that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Because this clause unequivocally states that each house of Congress-rather than the courts-shall be
"the Judge" of these matters, it has been
held that courts may not consider a claim
that the House or Senate seated the wrong
candidate following a contested congressional election. There being no dispute in
these cases that the Senate or House has in
fact "judged" the election returns, but only
that it got the factual result wrong, there
can be no dispute that the final word on the
counting of ballots has been assigned outside the judiciary. See Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19, 92 S.Ct. 804, 80708, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (dicta); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612, 108 S.Ct. 2047,
2058, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Morgan v. United States, 801
F.2d 445, 447 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Scalia, J.),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911, 107 S.Ct. 1359,
94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987); McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir.1985). If
courts were permitted to review a congressional decision to seat a particular candidate by recounting the ballots or scrutinizing other findings of fact, the judiciary,
and not the Congress, would in the last
analysis be "the Judge" of election returns.

The Supreme Court considered a somewhat different claim grounded in the same
clause, however, in Powell v. McCormack,
and there found the issue justiciable. In
that case, Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., challenged a House of Representatives' decision barring Powell from
taking his seat. The House, citing alleged
financial misconduct, contended that it had
"judged" Powell unqualified to serve as a
member. Powell argued that "Qualifications" under article I, section 5, must be
construed to include only the standing requirements expressly listed in the Constitution itself (i.e., age, citizenship and residency), while the House insisted that the Constitution assigned nonreviewable discretion
to the Congress to define and judge those
"Qualifications" for itself.
The Supreme Court held that Powell's
challenge did not present a nonjusticiable
political question. The Court began its
analysis by observing the paradox that an
assessment of whether a constitutional
claim is reviewable unavoidably requires
that judges initially review the relevant
constitutional language and give it content.
"In order to determine whether there has
been a textual commitment to a co-ordinate
department of the Government," the Court
wrote, "we must interpret the Constitution." 395 U.S. at 519, 89 S.Ct. at 1963.
Accordingly, the Court undertook an extensive review of the text and historical practice concerning legislative qualification and
exclusions and concluded that the framers
intended the term "Qualifications" to include only those standing requirements listed in article I, section 2, of the Constitution:
In short, both the intention of the Framers, to the extent it can be determined,
and an examination of the basic principles of our democratic system persuade
us that the Constitution does not vest in
the Congress a discretionary power to
deny membership by -a majority vote.
Id. at 548, 89 S.Ct. at 1978. Consequently,
the Court held that Congress' textual authority to be "the Judge" of the "Qualifications" of its members did not empower
Congress to be "the Judge" of what the
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Constitution means by "Qualifications";
that task remained with the courts. Rather, "Art. I, § 5, is at most a 'textually
demonstrable commitment' to Congress to
judge only the qualifications expressly set
forth in the Constitution." Id. While challenges to Congress' factual rulings on age,
citizenship and residency might be nonjusticiable, the Court held, a claim that Congress had exceeded the textual bounds of
its authority by excluding a member on
grounds other than his constitutional
"Qualifications". is amenable to judicial review. See id. at 520-22 & n. 42, 89 S.Ct. at
1963-64 & n. 42.
It is clear from the Supreme Court's
rulings in Powell and Roudebush, then,
that while the courts may well be barred
from second-guessing Congress' fact-finding and policy judgments within the zones
of discretion assigned it by the Constitution, the courts may review claims that
Congress has exceeded an explicit textual
limitation on its powers.
The justiciability of Nixon's claim is directly controlled by Powell. I recognize
that a challenge to the factual findings
underlying the Senate's conviction, e.g., a
claim that the party convicted had not actu-

ally committed the misconduct of which he
was accused, would almost certainly be
nonjusticiable-just as Powell suggested
that a fact-based challenge to the exclusion
of a member for failing to satisfy the
standing requirements of age, citizenship
or residency might be, see 395 U.S. at 521
n. 42, 89 S.Ct. at 1963 n. 42, and as Roudebush and Morgan suggested that a claim
that the Senate or House had misjudged
the returns in a close election would be. A
claim, however, that the Senate exceeded
the textual bounds of its authority by convicting a judge on articles of impeachment
without first "try[ing]" him within the constitutional meaning of that term-as Nixon
claims in this case-is justiciable. Unlike
the plaintiff in Morgan, who effectively
asked this court to supplant the House as
"the Judge" of an election, Nixon does not
ask us to supplant the Senate as the
"tr[ier]" of his impeachment; he asks only
that we review the Senate's conduct to
ensure that it in fact tried him as required
by the Constitution. It is the courts' task
to interpret and give content to the word
"try," just as it was the Court's job in
Powell to give meaning to the word "Qualifications." I

6. The majority emphasizes that the Senate enjoys not merely the constitutional power of trying impeachments, but the "sole Power" of trying impeachments. But the presence of the
word "sole" does not answer the question
presented in this case. That the framers intended that the Senate, and no one else, would "try
all Impeachments" does not tell us what the
framers would have intended in the situation
presented here, where the Senate has assertedly
abdicated the power assigned it by removing
Nixon without trial. Accordingly, historical evidence that the framers decided against permitting courts to try impeachments is simply not
dispositive of the justiciability of Nixon's claim.
We are not called upon today to "try" Nixon's
impeachment, but merely to determine whether
the Senate did so.
It is for this same reason that the majority's
reliance on Roudebush is inapt. Although the
Court there suggested that courts have no power
to review the Senate's performance of its constitutional role of "judging" election contests, it
did not address whether courts also would be
powerless to intercede where the Senate had
re/used to carry out that constitutional function.
As one commentator explained:
The lesson of Powell is that the Supreme
Court may use judicial review to determine
whether Congress followed the proper proce-

dure for making the political decision committed to it by the Constitution. Powell does
not allow overly intrusive judicial review, but
rather allows review solely to ensure that
Congress made the particular kind of political
decision entrusted to it by the Constitution.
Gerhardt, The ConstitutionalLimits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx.L.REv. 1, 99100 (1989); accord R. BERGER. IMPEACHMENT: TilE
CONsTrnoNAL PROBLEMS 116-19 (1973); Henkin,
Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YAL
L. 597, 605 n. 26 (1976) ("Even the unique
(textual] instance, '[t]he Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments,' does not
necessarily preclude the argument that while
the Senate alone is to be the judge in impeachment proceedings, the courts can review how it
does it, at least for constitutional excesses or
infirmities.") (emphasis in original); Tushnet,
supra note 5, at 57 (agreeing that Powell compels the conclusion that such questions are justiciable); cf. Mitchell v. Laird,488 F.2d 611, 61415 (D.C.Cir.1973) (Wyzanski, J., by designation)
(political question doctrine would not bar court
from deciding "whether the hostilities in IndoChina constitute in the Constitutional sense a
'war'" within the meaning of art. I, § 8, cl. II,
but "we deem it a political question ... for
Congress to decide in which form, if any, it will
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The District Court also suggested that
judicial review of Nixon's claim might be
foreclosed by the Constitution's textually
demonstrable assignment to the Senate of
the power to "determine the Rules of its
Proceedings." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2;
see Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 13, 14. But this
assignment of power, like the assignment
of power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce or to provide for the general
welfare, may be exercised only within the
constraints of other constitutional provisions.7 The Senate could not, for example,
constitutionally pass a "rule" allowing conviction and removal of impeached officers
by a majority vote,' and the fact that the
Senate's action had been taken pursuant to
its "rulemaking" authority would provide
no shield against judicial invalidation. As
this court has previously explained, "Art.
I[, § 5, cl. 2,] simply means that neither we
nor the Executive Branch may tell Congress what rules it must adopt. Article I
does not alter our judicial responsibility to
say what rules Congress may not adopt
because of constitutional infirmity." Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1173
(D.C.Cir.), cert denied. 464 U.S. 823, 104
S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983).9 Here, Nixon alleges that the Senate, by way of Rule
XI, has violated an explicit textual limitation on its powers by removing him without
first "try[ing]" him. We may well disgive its consent to the continuation of a war
already begun by a President acting alone").
7.

8.

Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court observed:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the
house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better,
more accurate or even more just.... [This
rulemaking power] is[,] ... within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1. 5, 12 S.Ct.
507, 509, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892) (emphasis added).
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3. cl. 6 ("And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.").

agree with Nixon on the merits, but that
disagreement is not grounds for finding his
claim nonjusticiable.
The District Court in this case went astray by taking essentially the opposite approach-first finding that the Senate had
not committed a clear constitutional violation and then finding that its action was
somehow consequently beyond judicial review. See Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 13
("[P]laintiff has not established the kind of
clear violation of a specific constitutional
requirement which would trigger judicial
authority to review a solemn and serious
Senate action."). It appears that, for the
District Court, "[t]he issue on justiciability
turns ultimately" upon the merits of Nixon's claim, i.e., "on the narrow question of
whether the Senate's specific denial of this
plaintiffs motions for leave to take testimony before the open Senate denied him
the kind of trial clearly guaranteed to him
by the Constitution." Id. By this approach, however, the finding of nonjusticiability becomes largely a shorthand label for
the court's ultimate conclusion that there
has been no constitutional violation, or, to
put it more precisely, that the governmental defendant did not exceed the bounds of
the discretionary authority assigned it by
the Constitution. See generally Henkin,
supra note 6, at 601, 605-06.1o It is mis9.

In Vander Jagt, 14 Republican congressmen
sued the Democratic leadership of the House of
Representatives, alleging that the Democrats
were allocating disproportionately few seats on
key committees to the minority party, in violation of the Republicans' Fifth Amendment
rights. The District Court found the matter
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, in part because article I, section 5, of the
Constitution assigns to the House the power to
"determine the Rules of its Proceedings." Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 524 F.Supp. 519, 521 (D.D.C.
1981). On review, this court reversed the trial
court's justiciability ruling. Although the court
went on, for prudential reasons, to decline to
exercise its discretionary remedial authority, it
made clear that the political question doctrine
presented no bar to the court's ieview. See 699
F.2d at 1173-74, 1177.

10. Professor Henkin argues that this approach
characterizes virtually all of the cases in which
courts have claimed to find nonjusticiable "political questions":
The cases which are supposed to have established the political question doctrine required
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leading, however, to suggest in such an
instance that the court has declined to engage in judicial review. If the political
question doctrine is to have any integrity
as a constraint upon judicial review, its
invocation must arise from an analysis of
the Constitution that stands apart from any
conclusion on the merits of the particular
claim presented.
Consequently, adhering to the Supreme
Court's guidance in Powell, I reject the
argument that Nixon's challenge is nonreviewable because of a "textually demonstrable commitment" of the issue to a coordinate branch.

the construction given the document by
another branch. The alleged conflict
that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 549, 89 S.Ct. at 1978
(footnote omitted); accord United States v.
Munoz-Flores, -

U.S. -,

110 S.Ct.

1964, 1968-69, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001,
100 S.Ct. 533, 536, 62 .L.Ed.2d 428 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Interpretation of the Constitution does
not imply lack of respect for a coordinate
branch."). If the Court may respectfully
inform the House that it has unconstitutionally excluded one of its own members,
it surely may respectfully inform the Senate that it has unconstitutionally convicted
a judge without "try(ing]" him in an impeachment. Indeed, were we to accept the
Government's view of what constitutes
"disrespect" to a coordinate branch, "every
judicial resolution of a constitutional chal-

2. Disrespect to the Senate
Alternatively, the appellees argue that
Nixon's claim should be held nonjusticiable
because of "the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." Baker,
369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710; see Appellees Br. at 28-29. Judicial review of the lenge to a congressional [action] ... would
Senate's decision to employ a committee in be impermissible." Munoz-Flores, 110
trying impeachments would be particularly S.Ct. at 1968 (emphasis in original).
insulting, the Government argues, because
The fact that the Senate vigorously dethe record reveals that the Senate gave bated the constitutionality of its actions
thoughtful and careful consideration to the likewise fails to render Nixon's claim nonconstitutionality of its decision. See Appel- justiciable. The Supreme Court pointedly
lees Br. at 28, 49-50.
rejected this suggestion only last year:
This claim, too, however, must be rejectCongress often explicitly considers
ed in light of the Supreme Court's holdings
whether bills violate constitutional proviin Powell and subsequent cases. In Powsions. Because Congress is bound by the
ell, the Court rejected the notion that its
Constitution, its enactment of any law is
ruling invalidating the House of Representpredicated at least implicitly on a judgatives' exclusion of Powell would express
ment that the law is constitutional....
disrespect for the House. The Court statYet such congressional consideration of
ed summarily:
constitutional questions does not foreOur system of government requires that
close subsequent judicial scrutiny of the
federal courts on occasion interpret the
laws' constitutionality. On the contrary,
Constitution in a manner at variance with
this Court has the duty to review the
no such extra-ordinary abstention from judicial review; they called only for the ordinary
respect by the courts for the political domain.
Having reviewed, the Court refused to invalidate the challenged actions because they were
within the constitutional authority of President or Congress. In no case did the Court
have to use the phrase "political question,"
and when it did, it was using it in a different
sense, saying in effect: "We have reviewed
your claims and we find that the action com-

plained of involves a political question, and is
within the powers granted by the Constitution
to the political branches. The act complained
of violates no constitutional limitation on that
power, either because the Constitution imposes no relevant limitations, or because the action is amply within the limits prescribed.
We give effect to what the political branches
have done because they had political authority under the Constitution to do it."
Henkin, supra note 6, at 601 (footnote omitted).
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constitutionality of congressional enactments.
Id. at 1968-69 (citations omitted).
In light of these admonitions from the
Supreme Court, we cannot agree with the
appellees that judicial review of Nixon's
claim is foreclosed because it might express disrespect for the Senate.
3. Conclusion on Justiciability
This court has previously acknowledged
that "[t]he political question doctrine is a
tempting refuge from the adjudication of
difficult constitutional claims." Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500,
1514 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), vacated on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct.
2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985). And, yet,
cognizant that "courts cannot reject as 'no
law suit' a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political'
exceeds constitutional authority," Baker v.
11. See United States v. Munoz-Flores. U.S.
-,
110 S.Ct. 1964, 1968-71, 109 L.Ed.2d 384
(1990); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 102, 109
S.Ct. 2324, 2329, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989); Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 229-30, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2865-66, 92
L.Ed.2d 166 (1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 118-27, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2802-08, 92 L.Ed.2d
85 (1986); County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 24850, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1258-60, 84 LEd.2d 169
(1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43,
103 S.Ct. 2764, 2778-80, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983);
Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S.
73, 83-84, 97 S.Ct. 911, 918-19, 51 L.Ed.2d 173
(1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96
S.Ct. 2673, 2678-80, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
11, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1376, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97, 94
S.Ct. 3090, 3099-03, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-49
(1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28, 89
S.Ct. 5, 9, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1392, 12
L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 5-7, 84 S.Ct. 526, 528-30, 11 L.Ed.2d 481
(1964).
In other cases, the Court has narrowly construed the doctrine without expressly ruling on
its application. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 235 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2264. 2272, 60
LEd.2d 846 (1979). In still others, the Court,
without addressing the question of justiciability.
"has passed on a variety of issues that previously would have been thought not to- be justiciable." C. WRIGHT. supra note 5, § 14. at 77.

Carr,369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, and
that the "shifting contours and uncertain
underpinnings [of the political question doctrine] make it susceptible to indiscriminate
and overbroad application to claims properly before the federal courts," Ramirez de
Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1514, we have been
diligent in resisting the temptation.
The narrow scope of the political question doctrine is evident from the Supreme
Court's treatment of the issue in recent
cases. In the nearly 30 years since Baker
v. Carr, the Supreme Court has turned
aside assertions of nonjusticiability under
the doctrine in more than a dozen cases."
In only one, Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S.
1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973), has
the Court held that a case presented a
nonjusticiable political question, and it is
plain that Gilligan's holding does not extend far beyond the unique facts of that
case.12
12. The Court's finding of nonjusticiability in Gilligan was dictated more by the extraordinary
remedy sought than by the legal or constitutional questions presented. The plaintiffs in that
case had brought a challenge under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, in the wake of the 1970 Kent State
tragedy, to the way in which Ohio trained and
supervised its National Guard. As relief, the
plaintiffs did not seek damages but rather an
injunction against future constitutional violations and, specifically, court supervision of future Guard policies and activities. See Gilligan,
413 U.S. at 5-6. 93 S.Ct. at 2443-44. Six Justices
(Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun & Powell, JJ.) considered the plaintiffs'
core claims to have been mooted by subsequent
voluntary efforts by Ohio to reform its Guard,
including the institution of new training programs. See id at 12, 93 S.Ct. at 2446-47 (Douglas, Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 13, 93 S.Ct. at 2447 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). A majority of the Court also held
that to the extent the plaintiffs sought continuing judicial supervision against possible future
Guard abuses, they had presented a nonjusticiable political question. See id. at 7-8, 10, 93 S.Ct.
at 2444-45, 2445-46. As Justice Blackmun explained in his concurring opinion:
This case relates to prospective relief in the
form of judicial surveillance of highly subjective and technical matters involving military
training and command. As such, it presents
an "[inappropriate] ... subject matter for judicial consideration," for respondents are asking the District Court, in fashioning that prospective relief, "to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking."
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It is against this backdrop that we must
consider Nixon's case. Because Nixon has
alleged that the Senate exceeded an explicit
textual limitation on its authority by convicting him without first "try[ing]" him in
the sense required by the Constitution, I
conclude that the courts are competent to
hear his claim. At oral argument, counsel
for the Government implicitly conceded this
court's authority to review Nixon's claim
by agreeing that this court could review a
claim that the Senate had unconstitutionally delegated its authority to try impeachments to a randomly chosen group of
schoolchildren, reserving to itself only the
task of formally approving whatever result
that group recommended. In both this
case and that hypothetical, however, the
basis for the constitutional claim is identical: that the Senate has not "tried" the
accused within the meaning of the Constitution. If the court is competent to hear
one claim, it must be competent to hear the
other.
Because I find this case squarely controlled by Powell v. McCormack, I conclude that Nixon's claim is justiciable.
C. The Merits
Resolution of the merits of Nixon's claim
requires an exploration of the text of the
Constitution and the history of its framing
in an effort to determine what is meant by
the constitutional requirement that the Senate "try" impeachments.13 To that end, I
look first to the words used by the framers,
both in the text of the Constitution and in
other documents reflective of their underId at 14, 93 S.Ct. at 2448 (Blackmun, J., concur* ring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 198.
226, 82 S.Ct. at 699-700, 715: bracketed material in original); see aLso Henkin, supra note 6, at
619-22 (noting the aberrational posture of the
Gilligan case and concluding: "It was something
closer to denying an equitable remedy, than to
abstaining from judicial review and dismissing
for 'nonjusticiability, that the Supreme Court
may have been (and should have been) about"
in Gilligan).
13. Although the District Court did not purport
to reach the merits of Nixon's claim, we would
not be required to remand to the trial court for
initial review of the merits. Because the factual
record was fully developed below and because
the merits were fully briefed and argued both in
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standing, and then to historical practice,
both in America and in England. These
inquiries lead me to conclude that the Senate's use of a committee to gather evidence
and hear witnesses relating to the charges
against Nixon did not deprive Nixon of any
constitutionally protected right.
1. Theoretical Framework
It is plain enough that the framers, by
assigning to the Senate the task of
"try[ing] all Impeachments," intended that
senators would act in a quasi-judicial capacity in convicting and removing high federal
officials. By using a word used elsewhere
in the Constitution to refer to judicial proceedings, the framers appeared to reveal
an intention that Senate impeachment "trials" would bear some rough likeness to the
sort of "trials" carried out in criminal
courtrooms. In providing for criminal jury
trials, for example, the framers were careful to except impeachment trials. See U.S.
CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by jury.. .. "). While this express
exception suggests that the framers did
not intend to require the Senate to observe
all procedural incidents of criminal trials, it
also suggests that the framers may have
thought of an impeachment trial as a type
of criminal trial. Consequently, the Constitution's use of the word "try" to describe
the Senate's function in rendering impeachment judgments implies a duty to accord at
least the rudimentary hallmarks of judicial
fact-finding, including the receipt of evidence, the examination of witnesses, right
this court and in the trial court, appellate review would cause no "undue surprise or prejudice." Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193, 1197 n. 9
(D.C.Cir. 1981), aff'd in part & vacated in part on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Grace,

461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736
(1983). Indeed, to the contrary, "a remand to
the District Court, which inevitably would result
in a future appeal to this court, 'would be a
waste of judicial resources.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 186 (2d Cir.
1980)); see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 550 (no
remand necessary following Court's reversal of
lower court's finding of nonjusticiability where
only facts essential to disposition were already
conclusively established).
.
-
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to counsel and a chance for hearing by the was seen to "possess the degree of credit
accused.
and authority, which might, on certain ocThe inference that the framers intended casions, be indispensable, towards reconcilimpeachment trials to be roughly akin to ing the people to a decision, that should
criminal trials is reinforced by seemingly happen to clash with an accusation brought
unrefuted statements made by Alexander by their immediate representatives." Id. at
*Hamilton during the ratification debates. 441. Hamilton also recognized that there
In The Federalist No. 65, for example, were advantages to be gained in trying
Hamilton wrote that the Senate, in trying impeachments in a "tribunal more numerimpeachments, would act in a "judicial ous than would consist with a reasonable
character as a court." THE FEDERALIST No. attention to economy," as with a judicial
65, at 439 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). tribunal. Id.
Hamilton described the purpose of imIn further explaining why impeachment
peachment as a "NATIONAL INQUEST into the trials were assigned to the Senate rather
conduct of public men" in which the ulti- than to a court, however, Hamilton wrote:
mate aim of the trial was a "real demon[Impeachment proceedings] can never be
stration[] of innocence or guilt." Id. at
tied down by such strict rules, either in
440.
the delineation of the offence by the
prosecutors, or in the construction of it
The framers' determination that the Senby the Judges, as in common cases serve
ate should have the sole authority to try
to limit the discretion of courts in favor
impeachment cases reflected their desire to
of personal security.
harness the forces of partisanship in such
matters and to elevate the influence of Id. Instead, it was unavoidable, Hamilton
reason, objectivity and fairness. See id. at wrote, that a court of impeachment, sitting
440-42."4 As Hamilton noted, the Senate in judgment of officials charged with es14. See R. BERGER. supra note 6, at 79 n. 130
(quoting Jefferson as warning: "history shows,
that in England, impeachment has been an engine more of passion than of justice"). The
framers intended that impeachment serve as a
check against abuses of power by the judiciary
or the executive, and yet they were also alert to
the danger that impeachment itself might be
abused as a crude bludgeon against political
opponents. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra, at
444 (urging that prompt Senate trial might be
needed to check "persecution ... [by] an intemperate or designing majority in the House of
Representatives"); see also P. HOFFER & N. HULL
IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA. 1635-1805, at 99 (1984).

This concern is also reflected in the requirement that conviction be voted by a two-thirds.
rather than a simple, majority(Impeachment decisions] should not be "popular." The Constitution assigned this labor to
the Senate because the delegates expected the
upper house to rely upon its own wisdom,
information, stability, and even temper.
There was no occasion, Hamilton opined,
upon which the Senate should be more deliberative and shielded from popular clamors
than when it sat to hear impeachments.
Id. at 106; see also id. at 99 ("Later [after the
Constitutional Convention], both James McHenry and Luther Martin of Maryland recalled that
the Senate seemed to be the only body likely to
view impeachments in a cool and dispassionate
manner.") (footnote omitted); Address of James
McHenry before the Maryland House of Del-

egates (Nov. 29, 1787) ("[T]he power of trying
impeachments was lodged with this Body [the
Senate] as more likely to be governed by cool
and candid investigation, than by those heats
that too often inflame and influence more populous Assemblys."), reprinted in III THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 144, 148 (M.
Farrand rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter M. FARRAND];
Remarks of Luther Martin upon the Impeachment Trial of Justice Chase (Feb. 23, 1804),
reprinted in III M. FARRAND. supra, at 406. In
this regard, the framers may well have drawn
upon lessons from English history, in which the
House of Lords stood as a steadying check
against the House of Commons' willingness to
impeach, on the basis of political disagreement,
officials who had committed no conduct that
could be considered treasonous or otherwise
unlawful. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL supra, at
5-6; Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in
Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 84
YALE LJ. 1419 (1975).
Consequently, the framers "designed a delib.
erately cumbersome removal mechanism ... to
provide additional protection of the judiciary
against congressional politics." Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good
Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87 Micti.L.REv. 765,
767 (1989); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 533
(A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (constitutional impeachment mechanism "is the only provision on the point[ I which is consistent with the
necessary independence of the juaicial character").
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sentially "political" offenses, id. at 439
(original capitalization omitted), would be
left to exercise an "awful discretion" in
carrying out its task, id. at 441. The Senate was best fitted to serve in this capacity,
the framers reasoned, because its relative
insulation from the electorate would give it
the necessary independence of judgment
and its paramount prestige would give that
judgment the credibility and authority that
might be required to command adherence
from an "agitate[d]" and "divide[d]" people. See id. at 439, 441.
From all of these statements, it can be
reasonably inferred that the framers intended that the Senate would approach its
duty of trying impeachments with the solemnity and impartiality befitting judicial
action but with greater procedural flexibility than attends ordinary criminal trials.
See Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 89-91.1s
2. Historical Practice
From the beginning, historical practice
confirmed the framers' understanding that
impeachment trials would occupy a middle
ground between the free-wheeling partisanship of legislative decisionmaking and the
rigid procedural formalities of judicial criminal trials. From the earliest state and
federal impeachments, it was agreed that
"[s]trict adherence to criminal procedure
would hamstring the jurisdiction of the upper house, for the senators were not jurors,
and the offenses need not be crimes." P.
HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 14, at 125.
"At the same time, the defendant was allowed many of the protections guaranteed
in a criminal trial." Id.16
15. 1 have already noted that the Constitution
itself was careful to except impeachment trials
from the obligation to try criminal cases before
a jury. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1ll, § 2, cl. 3. In
addition, the Constitution expressly limits the
penalties that may be imposed upon conviction
on impeachment to removal from office and
future disqualification, see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3,
cl. 7, reserving more serious penal consequences, such as incarceration, for criminal
conviction.
16. "Ihis understanding," hammered out in early
impeachment trials of state officials by state
legislatures, "was reiterated at the [federal] impeachment trials of ex-senator William Blount,
federal judge John Pickering, and Supreme
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The question remains, despite the consensus that an "[ijmpeachment trial was to
be distinguished from regular trials at
law," id., whether the use of special committees to receive evidence is consistent
with the framers' theoretical framework,
i.e., whether the greater procedural flexibility accorded the Senate in "try[ing]" impeachments is broad enough to permit the
use of evidentiary.committees. American
historical practice on this point arguably is
weighted toward trial by the full Senate,
for the Senate employed an impeachment
trial committee for the first time only in
1986. But see Part II.C.2.b infra. There
is precedent from England, however, supporting the use of committees, and this
English practice may be read to suggest
that the framers did not intend to foreclose
the possibility in American constitutional
practice.
a. English Practice
The constitutional framework for impeachments was modeled after the English
experience of bringing impeachments in the
House of Commons followed by trial before
the House of Lords. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 65, supra, at 440. Although it is probably an overstatement to say that "almost
the entire process [of American impeachments] was lifted bodily from English practice," see R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 179
(footnote omitted), there is no doubting the
significant influence that English impeachment practice had on impeachment theory
and practice under the American constitution.' 7
Court Justice Samuel Chase. though the extent
of allowable deviation from criminal procedure
was subject to controversy." P. HOFFER & N.
HULL supra note 14, at 125 (footnote omitted).
17. The chief scholarly controversy appears to
center upon whether the Constitution's impeachment provisions were more directly influenced by English impeachment practice or by
the early colonial experiments with impeachment. Compare R. BERGER. supra note 6. at
54-55 & n. 9, 76, 84-85, 90. 171 & n. 217 (emphasizing English influence) with P. HOFFER & N.
Hu.L supra note 14, at xii, 96-97, 268 (emphasizing influence of state and colonial impeachment
practices and criticizing Berger's reliance on
English precedent) and Gerhardt,-supra note 6,
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Although the House of Lords did not
adhere strictly to any single procedure for
trying impeachments in the years leading
up to the American Constitutional Convention, the Lords were careful, at least as of
the early 1600s, to afford the accused certain procedural safeguards, such as the
right to counsel and a limited right to discovery. ' See P. HOFFER & N. HULL supra
note 14, at 5; Williams, The Historicaland
Constitutional Bases for the Senate's
Power To Use Masters or Committees To
Receive Evidence in Impeachment Trials,
50 N.Y.U.L.REv. 512, 523-25 (1975). Over
these years, "the English trial process was
in a state of evolutionary flux," and "[t]he
American Founding Fathers were well
aware of the unsettled character of English
impeachment proceedings." Williams, supra, at 523.
In English practice, most impeachment
trials were conducted before the full assembly of the House of Lords, just as
American impeachments were customarily
tried in their entirety before the full Senate. There were, however, exceptions in
which the House of Lords employed special
committees to receive evidence in advance
of final consideration and a vote by the full
body. A review of English impeachment
precedent
shows beyond doubt that the House of
Lords used committees to hear evidence
during impeachment trials in the early
17th Century. It is difficult to determine
definitively whether this practice continued, as no direct reference to the use of
committees during later impeachment trials has been discovered. It is clear, however, that, unlike other practices which
were outlawed by affirmative action of
at 22 (same). At bottom, however, there is no
dispute that English practice, with certain explicit exceptions, served as the foundational
model for the American constitutional provisions. As one commentator recently summarized:
The impeachment procedure set forth in the
United States Constitution has its origin in the
states' experiences with impeachment prior to
the Constitutional Convention. These state
procedures were in turn influenced by the
English experience with impeachment from
the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries.

the House of Lords, the use of committees to take evidence and examine witnesses has never been banned or disavowed as precedent-as were other impeachment procedures considered to have
been wrongly invoked.
Id. at 531-32 (footnotes omitted). Thus,
the English notion of an impeachment "trial," upon which American theory was ultimately modeled, allows for the use of special committees to gather evidence and
hear witnesses in advance of final deliberations before the full body designated to
decide the question.
b. American Practice
During the first 199 years of American
constitutional history, there is no documented record of any use by the Senate of
an evidentiary committee in an impeachment proceeding. But the uniformity of
hearings before the full Senate, at a time
when impeachments were rare and the Senate was smaller, does not necessarily mean
that the framers intended that committees
could never be used as a tool in impeachment trials. There is simply no basis in the
historical record to believe that the Senate's failure to employ a committee during
its early impeachment trials reflected any
considered judgment that such an alternative was beyond its constitutional authority. Rather, all we know is that, for many
years, the Senate apparently found it unnecessary even to consider using evidentiary committees in impeachment proceedings,
and none was used; but when circumstances were perceived to be different in
1935, the Senate adopted Rule XI allowing
for the use of such committees. See
Williams, supra, at 540.18
Gerhardt, supra note 6. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
18. In the years since the Constitution's ratification, the Senate has grown from 26 to 100
members and the federal judiciary has grown
more than forty-fold. The pace of impeachments also appears to have increased. From
the nation's founding until 1985, there were II
impeachment trials in the Senate, roughly one
every generation, see Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAm L. REV. 1. 25 (1970); Williams,
supra, at 540; since 1985. there have been three.
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The origin of Rule XI confirms that its
adoption was motivated by evolving circumstances in which full evidentiary hearings
on the Senate floor were becoming increasingly unwieldy and, in all probability, prejudicial to the interests of the accused. The
idea of establishing evidentiary committees
in connection with impeachment trials was
first proposed in 1904, when "Senators,
aware of the growth in the Senate's size
and of the accelerating development of its
legislative function, beg[a]n to voice concern about the onerousness of their impeachment duties." Id. That early proposal languished in the Senate Rules Committee but was revived 30 years later after
poor attendance by senators at subsequent
impeachment trials proved an institutional
embarrassment. See id. at 541-42.
At the 1913 trial of Circuit Judge Robert
Archbald, for example, at a time when the
Senate was composed of 94 members,
Judge Archbald's counsel, Alexander
Simpson, was distressed to find that the
trial proceedings rarely attracted the attention of more than 20 Senators and
that even the composition of the group
attending was constantly changing: following their normal routines, the Senators, far from behaving like judges and
jurors during a trial, wandered in and
out of the Senate chamber at will, often
gathering only in response to a quorum
call.
Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). Attendance
was even smaller at the 1933 trial of District Judge Harold Louderback. Representative Hatton Sumners, one of the
House impeachment managers, complained
to Time magazine that "[a]t one time only
three senators were present and for ten
days we presented evidence to what was
practically an empty chamber." Id. at 542
n. 160 (quoting TIME. Mar. 13, 1936, at 18).
Concerns over the Senate's handling of
these trials led directly to the adoption of
Rule XI.
Given the foregoing history, I do not
view the Senate's earlier experience in conducting full evidentiary proceedings on the
Senate floor as revelatory of any constitutional commandment. Moreover, there is

at least one express acknowledgment in
early American writings that the Senate
might employ evidentiary committees in
trying impeachments. While he was serving as vice president of the United States
and president of the Senate, Thomas Jefferson drafted what is still regarded as the
most authoritative manual on the rules of
the Senate. In it, he noted that the Senate's rules are in part derived from English
parliamentary practice and that English
practice permitted the use of evidentiary
committees in conducting impeachment trials. In the House of Lords, Jefferson observed with apparent approval,
(t]he practice is to swear the witnesses in
open House, and then examine them
there; or a committee may be named,
who shall examine them in committee,
either on interrogatories agreed on in the
House, or such as the committee in their
discretion shall demand.
T.

JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLI-

PRACTICE, reprinted in H.Doc.
No. 277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, 296
(1985) (emphasis added). This suggests
that, at least in Jefferson's view, no constitutional impediment existed to the Senate's
use of committees in trying impeachments.
As one scholar has noted, although Jefferson was not himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, "[s]ince the Manual's publication followed close on the
heels of the Constitution's ratification, we
may assume that its conclusions are not at
odds with the intentions of the framers."
Williams, supra, at 539. In any event,
while Jefferson's views are not dispositive,
they do give further evidence of the relevance of the English tradition.
I recognize that the occasional English
use of committees in trying impeachments
is not a conclusive answer to the question
regarding the intentions of the Constitution's framers. There were, after all, elements of English impeachment practicesuch as the imposition of .criminal and even
capital punishment upon conviction and the
allowance for conviction by vote of a simple
majority-that the framers affirmatively
sought to disavow or recast in the AmeriAMENTARY

can system.

See P.

HOFFER

& N. HULL..

supra note 14, at 97; Gerhardt, supra note
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6, at 16-17, 23 & n. 116. Building upon a
base of English precedent, the framers undeniably effected an "Americanization of
impeachment-fitting it to American needs,
making it republican, defining its limits,
[and] experimenting with constitutional formulations." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra
note 14, at xiii. Yet, the existence of this
precedent, and the absence of any affirmative rejection of it by the American framers, effectively refutes the suggestion that
the use of committees in impeachment trials would have been alien or repulsive to
those who designed the Constitution. As
Professor Williams has concluded:
At the very least, the lack of recorded
controversy over impeachment procedures-in contrast to the belabored debates over the substantive law of impeachment and its place in the American
constitutional scheme-suggests that the
framers did not feel any need to depart
sharply from English procedural practice, even though they deviated from the
English impeachment model in other respects.
Williams, supra, at 520 (footnote omitted);
see also id. at 537-38, 543-44.
I conclude that the practice of using special impeachment committees to collect evidence in advance of final consideration by
the full Senate can be accommodated within the parameters of the Constitution's text
and the other historical indicia of the framers' intent. It cannot be said, given the
history of English impeachment practice
and the framers' own statements, that the
framers intended to require that the receipt of evidence and the examination of
witnesses in impeachment trials always
19. Nixon also argues that the Senate's use of a
12-member evidentiary committee effectively
defeats one of the framers' reasons for choosing
the Senate over the Supreme Court as the most
appropriate forum for impeachment trials.
Nixon points out that the framers preferred the
Senate as a court of impeachment over the
Supreme Court in part because the Senate, then
comprised of 26 members, was larger. See TiE
FEDERALisT No. 65, supra, at 441-42. The framers
believed that placing the power to remove high
federal officials in the more "numerous" Senate
would help to ensure the independence and
integrity of the decisionmaking. See id.; Notes
of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787) ("Mr Govr

take place in their entirety before the full
Senate. Consequently, I would find that
the Senate's limited use of an evidentiary
committee in connection with Nixon's case
did not deprive him of the sort of "trial" to
which he was constitutionally entitled.
Nixon objects that the deliberations by
the full Senate in his case, based' as they
were on final arguments by the parties and
the committee's report on the evidence,
cannot be considered a "trial" in the sense
that Americans have always understood
that word." This is all the more true,
Nixon contends, because credibility determinations were crucial to the ultimate assessment of his guilt or innocence and yet
88 of 100 senators did not see the witnesses
testify in person and thus had no opportunity to draw their own inferences about the
witnesses' veracity.
If Nixon's were an ordinary criminal trial, I would readily agree. But, as already
noted, history makes clear that the framers
never intended impeachment trials to mirror criminal trials; nor was it ever supposed that the Senate would be transformed into an Article III court when it
took up the task of trying an impeachment.
By the framers' design, "impeachment
hearings were not trials in which the senators were jurors, despite the fact that they
sat upon oath or affirmation, so much as
deliberative sessions, when they decided
whether an official had betrayed his public
trust." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note
14, at 106; accord Williams, supra, at 57677. Thus, what the Constitution requires
of the Senate in conducting impeachment
trials is not rigid adherence to criminal
procedure but a solemn attention to fairMorris thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted [with the task of trying
impeachments]. The Supreme Court were too
few in number and might be warped or corrupted."), reprinted in II M. FARRAND. supra note 14,
at 551. Yet, it is far from clear what this should
suggest about the constitutionality of the Senate's use of an evidentiary committee in Nixon's
case. Whatever the committee's role in gathering evidence, the final deliberations and decisionmaking concerning Nixon's guilt were conducted by the full Senate, fulfilling the framers'
intention that conviction or acquittal be decided
by a more "numerous" body.
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ness guided by whatever procedures the
Senate reasonably finds fitted to that end.
Simply put, the fact that the framers "designed a deliberately cumbersome removal
mechanism," see Edwards, supra note 14,
at 767, does not mean that the Constitution
must be interpreted to command the most
cumbersome procedures imaginable.
The notion that senators might make
credibility determinations without having
scrutinized the witnesses in person is not,
contrary to Nixon's assertions, alien to accepted standards of procedural fairness in
this country. Administrative tribunals, for
instance, are thought fit to make decisions,
including judgments on credibility, based
on a record compiled elsewhere by a hearing examiner and that these judgments
may be upheld even though contrary to
those reached by the examiner who actually heard the witnesses testify. See, e.g.,
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 494-96, 71 S.Ct. 456, 467-69, 95
L.Ed. 456 (1951) (examiner's factual findings, particularly as to witness credibility,
are probative and entitled to weight, but
Board may reach contrary conclusions).
See generally Williams, supra, at 590-606.
I do not mean, of course, to equate the
Senate's role in trying an impeachment
with an agency's in conducting an adjudication; the Senate's responsibility is often far
more grave and the implications of its decision far more significant in the life of the
nation. At the same time, the experience
of these tribunals establishes that, while
Nixon's notion of a "trial" is one that is
recognized as the appropriate model for an
Article III court, it is not the exclusive
notion of a fair trial. Given that the Senate is not an Article III court, and is not
expected to become one for purposes of
trying impeachments, there is no reason to
bind it to every procedure thought apt in a
traditional judicial forum. See Gerhardt,
supra note 6, at 94 (examining the Senate's
use of evidentiary committees in the Nixon
and Hastings impeachment trials and concluding that "[tjhere is little doubt such a
20. As I have already suggested, history has
shown that this hypothetical is not entirely out-

procedure is constitutional"); Williams, supra, at 619-20.
This conclusion seems especially clear in
light of the concession by Nixon's counsel
at oral argument that the Constitution does
not require the attendance of all senators,
or even most senators, at an impeachment
"trial." The Senate could constitutionally
"try" Nixon even with fewer than 12 senators present, Nixon's counsel argued, so
long as it was dohe on the Senate floor. 20
But the constitutional significance of the
difference between that scenario and the
sort of evidentiary proceeding provided
Nixon eludes me. To the contrary, I believe that the procedure employed by the
Senate in this case-a prolonged evidentiary hearing before a special committee followed by review, argument and deliberation by the full Senate-is far better calculated to achieve the ends intended by the
framers, i.e., that the ultimate decision be
grounded in evidence rather than partisan
passion, that it be arrived at by a "numerous" body and that the fact-finding upon
which it is based be conducted with a solemn attention to fairness such as would
command the respect and adherence of a
potentially divided nation.
Consequently, I would find that the Senate acted within the bounds of its constitutional authority when it convicted Nixon
based partly on evidence gathered by a
special impeachment trial committee.
III.

CoNcLusioN

For the foregoing reasons, I would find
that Nixon has presented a justiciable controversy. On the merits, however, I would
find that the Senate did in fact "try" Nixon
within the meaning of the Constitution and
that Nixon was therefore constitutionally
deprived of his office. I would affirm the
judgment of the District Court on these
grounds.

landish.
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[I]mpeachment will be nearly the equivalent to a displacement,
and
will render the Executive dependent on those who
are to impeach.
-Gouveneur Morris'
What was the practice before this in cases where the
trate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was chief Magishad to assassination in [which] he was not only deprived
of his life but of the
opportunity of vindicating his character. It [would)
be the best
way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the
punishment of the Executive when his misconduct should regular
deserve it, and
for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly
accused.
-Dr. Benjamin Franklin 2

1. Introduction
Debates about impeachment' in the United States
are older than the
i. 2 RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64-65
(M. Farrand ed. 1966)
[hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
2. Id. at.65.
3. In the literature, impeachment has two meanings.
First,
process
Tar by which the United States House of Representativesimpeachmen refers to the particumay investigate, formulate, and
direct charges os wrongdoing against ceyain officials
of the federal government. Second, impeachment may be used asa shorthand reference to the general
removal power of Congress, including the
House's ability to charge an official wish wrongdoing and the Senate's
ify ihat official from holding any other office of the United States. ability to remove and disqualFive constitutional provisions
relate in some way to impeachment:
The House of Representatives shall . .. have the sole Power of Impeachent.
The Senate shall have the sole Power sotry all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person
shall beconvicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of he Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from Office,

Impeachment and Its Alternatives
Constitution itself. Prior to the drafting and adoption of the Constitution, there were vast differences in state constitutional provisions regarding the officials subject to, the timing of, the grounds for, and even the
bodies empowered to conduct impeachments.4 These differences carried

over into the Constitutional Convention, where the debates primarily focused on whether granting Congress the impeachment power would
make the President too dependent upon the legislature, whether Congress or the federal judiciary was better suited to conduct impeachment
hearings and trials,6 and whether nonindictable offenses should be included among impeachable offenses.7 Delegates also argued about what
8
the proper vote for removal should be.
In the years after the Constitutional Convention, the debates on impeachment continued to focus on these same issues. In addition, there
have been numerous calls, most recently by Senator Howell Heflin,9 to
amend the Constitution's impeachment procedure to make it more efficient and effective.' 0 Recent congressional attempts to impeach three
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor. Trust, or Profit under the
United Stales; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.
The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2. cl. 5:id. art. I. 43. cl. 6; id. art. I, 1 3, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, 41.
4. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERIcA, 1635-1805. at 68-77 (1984) (sur.
veying the drafting and testing of various impeachment provisions from state constitutions).
S. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS. supra note 1, at 53-54, 64-69, 551, 612.
6. See id. at 159, 232, 238, 500, 551.
7. See id. at 337, 550-52.
8. Seeid. at 438, 493, 552.
9. SeeHeflin. The Impeachment Proces* Modernizing an Archaic System, 71 JUDICATURE
123, 123-25 (1987).
10. See.e.g.,Havighurst, Doing Away with Presidential Impeachment: The Advantages of Par.
liamentary Government, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 224-29, 233-36 (suggesting that impeachment with
its emphasis on politics and criminality is unworkable and that the United States should attempt
instead a parliamentary style of government); Heflin, supra note 9 (calling for a constitutional
amendment to allow Congress to create a Judicial Inquiry Commission to investigate charges against
federal judges and a special Court of the Judiciary to try the impeachment); Linde, Replacing a
President: Rx for a 21st Century Watergate, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 384. 402 (1975) (suggesting as
an alternative to the existing impeachment procedure ajoint resolution of Congress declaring failure
to execute the office of the President or abuse of presidential power as a prerequisite to removal and
a new election); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution. 28 MICH. L. REV. 870. 898 (1930) (asserting that the Constitution sets
no limits on the ability of judges to remove other judges); Note, Removal ofFederal Judges-New
Alternatives to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 UCLA L. REV.
1385, 1390 (1966) (claiming that impeachment is ineffective and inefficient and citing the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and the then-proposed Judicial Disability
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federal district judges, Harry Claiborne, Walter Nixon, and Alcee Hastings, have also reinvigorated debate over whether impeachment is the
exclusive means for removing federal judges. These impeachment attempts also raise the additional questions whether indictment, prosecution, or imprisonment pf federal judges should be prohibited prior to an

impeachment, because these measures are tantamount to removal and to
what extent should conviction for a criminal offense satisfy the burden of
the prosecution in an impeachment proceeding."
Given all the attention and importance attached to the impeachment
process from the inception of our Republic to the present, it is surprising

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1982), as methods other than impeachment for the removal
of federal
judges); Comment, The Limitations of Article III on the Proposed Judicial Removal Machinery:
S
1506. I18 U. PA. L. REV. 1064, 1067-70 (1970) (arguing that judges have the power to remove
other
Judges because the power is inherent in the theory of separation of powers and
that congressional
authority over jurisdiction of the federal courts gives it the power to create machinery
to allow
judicial removal of judges).
II. The three most recent impeachment attempts have been against federal district
judges
Harry Claiborne, Walter Nixon. and Alcee Hastings. Judge Claiborne was convicted
of income tax
evasion in federal court and imprisoned prior to the House's vote to impeach on July
22. 1986, and
the Senate's vote to remove and disqualify him from office on October 6, 1986.
132 CoNG. REC.
S15759-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
Judge Alcce Hastings was acquitted in a federal trial charging him with having taken a
bribe of
S150,000. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d
91, 95 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (giving factual background of Judge Hastings' impeachment, including his
acquittal of criminal charges on February 4, 1983). On August 3, 1988, however, the House voted 413-3
to impeach
Judge Hastings for using his office for personal gain and for committing perjury during
his criminal
trial. See H.R. Res. 499. 100th Cong.. 2d Sess..134 CONG. REc. H6179-93 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1988).
Throughout his removal proceedings in the Senate. Judge Hastings vigorously argued.
inter alia. that
the impeachment proceedings against him had been racially motivated and that the
Senate's decision
to give him a trial in front of a special committee of Senators instead of the
full Senate violated
fundamental requirements of due process. See Impeaching Federal Judges: Where
Are We and
Where
Are We Going?. 72 JUDICATURE 359, 362-64 (1989) (hereinafter Symposium)

(comments of
Michael Davidson in the edited transcript of a panel discussion at the American
Judicature Society
meeting on February 4,); MacKenzie. The Virtue of impeachment, N.Y. Times.
July 28, 1988, at
A26, col. I (suggesting that a unanimous vote to impeach by a subcommittee headed
by Representa.
tive John Conyers, a civil rights champion, effectively answers Judge Hastings' allegations
of political and racial persecution). Nevertheless. the special twelve-member committee
of the Senate
completed receiving testimony regarding Judge Hastings' removal in August 1989 and printed the
record of its hearings in September. The full Senate was scheduled to hear
closing arguments in
October 1989.

Judge Walter Nixon was convicted of perjury in federal court. SeeUnited States
F.2d 1022, 1022 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108S. Ct. 749 (1988). After the Supreme v. Nixon, 816
Court denied
review of his conviction for perjury, he announced that he would not resign. See
Shenon, Impeach.
ment of Judges: A "Cumbersome Tool." N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at A16. col.
3 (quoting Judge
Nixon's lawyer as saying that Nixon would not consider resignation). Nevertheless,
the House
moved forward with impeachment proceedings against Judge Nixon. See
H.R. Res. 87. 101st Cong..
Ist Sess.,135CONG. REC. H1802 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (approval of articles
of impeachment).
Although he has been impeached and is currently imprisoned, awaiting trial in the
Senate. he has
argued that Congress should allow him to challenge his federal conviction in
the impeachment pro.
ceedings because he has alleged he has evidence that one of the principal witnesses
against him at
trial perjured himself. See Hastings v. United States Senate, No. 89-1602, slip
op.
1989); seealso Nixon v. United States. 703 F. Supp, 538. 560 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (D.D.C. July 5,
(rejecting
motion to vacate the conviction on the grounds that, inter alia. there was no reasonable Nixon's
likelihood
that the witness's testimony, even if deemed false, could have affected the judgment
of the jury).
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Impeachment and Its Alternatives
that the literature on impeachment-split primarily between the formal2
ist and informalist approaches' -is, with few exceptions," unenlightening and unimpressive."4 Scholarship on impeachment inevitably
degenerates into political commentary, but scholars generally fail to explain or justify this result. In addition, scholarship on impeachment
either inexplicably ignores relevant historical evidence or fails to explain
its reliance on an incomplete or unclear historical record.
Commentators fail to understand that the impeachment clauses"
virtually defy systematic analysis precisely because impeachment is by
nature, structure, and design an essentially political process. James Wilson, a Constitutional Convention delegate, Supreme Court Justice, and
constitutional scholar, explained that impeachments are "proceedings of
a political nature . . . confined to political characters," charging only

"political crimes and misdemeanors," and culminating only in "political
punishments."' 6 Consequently, legal scholarship at best may only illuminate the contours of the various political questions that the7 Constitution entrusts to Congress through the impeachment process.'
12. Seeinfra subparts IIl (A), (B). Two student commentators also classify the literature on
impeachment into two categories. SeeNote. Constitutional Judicial Tenure Legislationt-The Words
May Be New. but the Song Sounds the Same, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 843, 854-60 (1981) (hereinafter Note, Constitutional Judicial Tenure Legislation?] (observing that exclusivists favor impeachment
as the sole means for removing federal judges and nonexclusivists favor removal or federal judges
through impeachment and other less formal proceedings); Note, In Defense of the Constitutions
Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MicH. L. REV. 420, 434-38. 446.54 (1987) (hereinafter Note, In
Defense of Standard) (arguing that-the literature on the exclusivity of impeachment as a means for
removing federal judges splits between those who follow original intent and those arguing from
expediency or necessity).

13. SeeC. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 2-4 (1974); L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTI*
TUTIONAL LAw 289-96 (2d ed. 1988); Bestor, Impeachment (Book Review), 49 WASH. L. REV. 255,
259, 261.64. 266, 271. 281 (1973); Rotunda. An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal
Impeachment. 76 Ky. L.i. 707, 716, 720 (1987). Even these studies are not without problems. See
C. BLACK, supra, at 3.4, 16, 19. 21, 32-33. 43 (ending each section of his impeachment study with
the observations that no solution to the constitutional problem is readily apparent and that reasonable minds might disagree); L. TRIE, supra. at 290 (merely asserting that members of Congress arc
not impeachable officials); Rotunda. supra. at 716, 720 (asserting with minimal support or explanation that legislators are impeachable and that judges are removable from office only through
impeachment).
14. Other commentators have made this same observation. See. e.g.,R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMs 5 (1973) (observing that "impeachlmentl raises important questions ... yet to receive satisfactory resolution*'); Kurland. The Constitution and the Tenure
of Federal ludges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 668 (1969) (commenting that
"there is more literature than learning" regarding the removal of federal judges under the Constitution); Stolz. Disciplining Federal Judges- Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 659, 660
(1969) (referring to the "distinguished though partisan scholarship of about thirty years ago").
IS. This Article refers to the five constitutional provisions relating in some way to the impeach.
ment process as the impeachment clauses. Seesupra note 3.
16. I J. WILSON, WORKS 426 (0. McClaskey ed. 1967) (quoted in Bestor, supra note 13, at
266).
17. SeeBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186. 217 (1962) (characterizing political questions as involving
(1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to a coordinate political department";
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Schilars may be reluctant to acknowledge the political nature of impeachment and to defer troublesome impeachment questions to the political branches of government because politics today may not be perceived
as the noble and ennobling endeavor envisioned by the framers.ts Relycitizen participaing in part on the republican conception of meaningful
9
tion in governmental or political decision making,' the framers crafted
the Constitution to provide a political process in which the various
branches of the federal and state governments as well as the citizenry
could engage in dialogues on the critical political issues common to dem20
ocratic societies.
Many modern commentators, however, mistakenly allow their distrust of and disrespect for politics to govern their interpretations of the
Constitution. Politics is at times unseemly, vicious, and even dishonest,
but the Constitution remains a political document, and politics is not, as
many modern commentators seem to believe, the equivalent of illegitimacy. These commentators appear motivated by their unstated belief
that constitutional law does not transcend politics. Constitutional law is
(2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion";
(4) -the impossibility of acourt's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government"; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made"; or (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question"); seealso infra note 462 and accompany.
ing text.
18. Many of the delegates viewed participation in the political process as an ennobling experi.
ence. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in THE
557-58 (M. Peterson ed. 1975); seealso M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE.
Pos rAat THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYsIs OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12 (1988) (noting particularly
Madison's belief in the benelits emanating from citizens' participation in local government);
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHToN L.
REv. 487, 509 (1979) (regarding politics as an indispensable process by which social beings choose
the terms of coexistence-both the rules of social cooperation and the "moral ambience" of the
social wory). Many commentators today, however, are more skeptical of the noble and ennobling
nature of politics. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, Supra, at 314. (expressing concern that changes in the
political structure will come only after "long and difficult periods of political organizing" and that
these changes may not be beneficial once they are made).
19. See.e.g., M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 11-12 (noting that republicans desired citizens to
become civic minded by participating in local government); Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1985
Term-Foreword Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 18-19 (1986) (noting that republicanism emphasized direct citizen involvement in politics); Tushnet. Federalism and the Traditions of American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981, 982-83 (1985). (noting that the civic
republican tradition emphasized the social nature of human beings).
20. See,e.g.,Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables. 93 YALE L.J. 455, 456
(1984) (arguing that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's adjudication ultimately depends on an
underlying communal alliance between opponents); Coffin. Judicial Balancing. The Protean Scales
of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16,24-25. 40-42 (1988) (arguing that narrow judicial decision making
that balances competing concerns promotes dialogue within the legal community); Fiss, The
Supreme Court. 1978 Term-Foreword The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I. 10-15 (1978)
(construing the judicial function as the attempt to reveal or elaborate the meaning of constitutional
values through the dialogue of adjudication).
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constitutional historiography in general or with original intent in particular. The formalist approach fails to acknowledge that history is frequently susceptible to more than one interpretation. In addition, this
approach fails to account for important changes in the institutions that
are central to the impeachment process. Informalists, on the other hand,
22
typically use ad hoc analysis to interpret the impeachment clauses.
They rarely articulate or follow any guiding principle of constitutional
interpretation-with the possible exceptions of convenience and efficiency, which are not determinative of constitutionality. Informalists do
not recognize the usefulness of conventional tools of constitutional interpretation (such as history) for analyzing particular constitutional provisions, including the impeachment clauses. Furthermore, they do not
justify, or even acknowledge, their abandonment of almost all systematic
analysis of the impeachment clauses. Without explanation, they give different weight to different evidence or adopt congressional interpretation
of the impeachment clauses as definitive.23 Informalists also frequently
ignore relevant historical and structural contexts. They fail to articulate
fixed notions regarding the allocation of powers within the Constitution,
fail to explain why deviations from the Constitution's explicit structure
should be treated with a presumption of constitutionality, and fail to acknowledge the problems with using efficiency and convenience as starting points for constitutional analysis of the impeachment process.
Finally, informalists, though possibly aware of the great changes in the
Sunstein. Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 493.94 (1987). But see
Schauer, Formalism. 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (suggesting that the concept "formalism" is
susceptible to so many conflicting meanings that its use in place of more concrete ideas obscures the
debate over the proper restraints to be followed in constitutional interpretation); Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality ofLaw. 97 YALE LJ. 949, 954 (1988) (rejecting the argument that law is essentially political and defending formalism as offering law an " 'immanent moral
rationality' ").
22. See.e.g.,

1.BRANT,

IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERoutS 3-23 (1972) (arguing that the

numerous references to crime and punishment in the Constitution represent an attempt, in light of
the excesses that had marked the use of the impeachment power in England, to restrict the bases for
impeachment to criminal offenses and thus prevent misuse of the power); Firmage & Mangrum.
Removabof the President: Resignation and the Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 DuKE L.J.
1023. 1030 (This study is the soundest of the informalist studies because of its far-reaching research,
but it fails to support its own use of different kinds of authority to explain different aspects of
impeachment.); Franklin, Romanist Infamy and the American Constitutional Conception of Impeachment, 23 3urFALo L. REV. 313, 341 (integrating into contemporary thought omissions from the
constitutional conception of impeachment) (1974); Havighurst. supra note 10,at 223-24 (comparing
the English and American political systems and suggesting that the United States should adopt some
parliamentary procedures for removing officials from office); Linde. supra note 10,at 385-89 (calling
the constitutional form of impeachment "anachronistic"); Comment, supra note 10. at 1065-66 (examining the constitutional powers of Congress to create judicial machinery for the removal of
judges).

23. See.e.g. Thompson & Pollit. Impeachment of Federal Judges: An HistoricalOverview. 49
N C.L. REV. 87, 118-21 (1970) (suggesting, without explanation. that "impeachable offenses" should
mean offenses that Congress has accepted as impeachable).
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tions in the impeachment process, including the Judicial Disability Act"
and the Independent Counsel Act. 26 This Part analyzes such innovations
on the basis of a presumption of constitutionality for congressionally enacted deviations from the Constitution's explicit structures. Such a presumption may not be* overcome unless the deviation from explicit
constitutional structure violates what the structure was erected to protect. Part IV concludes that such a presumption not only expresses appropriate deference to a coordinate branch's constitutional interpretation
of the impeachment clauses, but also should be standardized in related
areas of constitutional law.
II. A Brief History of Impeachment
The impeachment procedure set forth in the United States Constitution has its origin in the states' experiences with impeachment prior to
the Constitutional Convention.17 These state procedures were in turn
influenced by the English experience with impeachment from the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries.28 Since the ratification of the
('onstitution, there have been only seventeen federal impeachment attempts-against thirteen federal judges,2 9 two Presidents,3 0 one United
States Senator, 3' and one cabinet officer 32-resulting in only five convic25. 28 U.S.C. §i 331, 332, 372, 604 (1982).
26. 28 U.S.C. §i 591-599 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
27. See P. HoFFER & N. HULL, supro note 4, at 68 (noting that "(diclegates to the federal
(constitutional] convention . .. supported by the voices and votes of other knowledgeable state leaders, fashioned national impeachment provisions along lines laid down in the states' constitutions").
28 SeeR. BERGER. supra note 14.at 54. 87 n.160, 143 n.97. 170. 171n.217 (tracing the links
betwcin impeachment in uSe
federal constitution to the English experience with impeachment).
29. Impeachment attempts have been made against the following thirteen federal judges: District Judge John Pickering (1803) (drunkenness and blasphemy), Associate Justice Samuel Chase
(1804) (expression of political views to grand jury), District Judge James Peck (1830) (abusive treatment pf counsel), District Judge West Humphreys (1862) (inciting revolt and rebellion against the
natio'n). District Judge Mark Delahay (1873) (bringing ridicule to Congress), District Judge Charles
Swayie (1903) (financial irregularities), Circuit Judge Robert Archbald (1912) (bribery), District
Judge George English (1925) (favoritism), District Judge Harold Louderback (1932) (favoritism).
District Judge Halsted Ritter (1936) (kickbacks and tax evasion), District Judge Harry Claiborne
(1986) (tax evasion). District Judge Walter Nixon (impeached in 1988 and involved in pending Senate trial in 1989) (perjury), District Judge Alcee Hastings (impeached in August 1988, completed
testimony before special Senate trial committee in August 1989, and scheduled for closing arguments
before the full Senate in October 1989) (corruption and giving false testimony). There was also an
investigation of impeachment charges against Justice William 0. Douglas in 1970, but the charges
were eventually dismissed by the House Judiciary Committce. SeeI. BRANT, supra note 22, at 20102; HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 31-44, 51-55, 64-104 (Funk & Wagnalls 1973).
30. Two Presidents have been the targets of impeachment attempts. In 1867, Andrew Johnson
was charged with issuing an order for the reshoval of Edwin Stanton as Secretary of War in violation
of a congressional act that regulated the tenure of certain offices. SeeI. BRANT, supra note 22, at
138.In 1973, Richard Nixon was charged with obstructing federal authorities and congressional
committees in their investigation of the Watergate break-in. See J. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 90, 99 (1978).

31. The only United States Senator against whom an impeachment attempt was made was
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Belknap's resigHouse voted to impeach him for bribery. Largely because many Senators believed
office, the final Senate vote fell
nation deprived the Senate of any jurisdiction to remove him from note 22, at 155, 160.
short of the two-thirds necessary for removal. SeeI. BRANT, supra
33. The only people convicted and removed from office by the Senate have been John PickerInterestingly, all five
ing, West Humphreys, Robert Archbald, Halsted Ritter, and Harry Claiborne. CONG. Q.. Mar. 1974,
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35. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4, at 96.
Randolph, James
36. See. e.g., P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 96 (discussing Edmund
Elbridge Gerry, RuMadison, George Mason, William Paterson, James Wilson, Hugh Williamson,
fus King, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and Charles Pinckney).
37. See id. at 97-98.
38. See id.
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peachment trials by offering, as part of his Virginia Plan, the creation of
a natiohal judiciary with the power to impeach "[any national officers." 9 Throughout June 1787, Randolph and James Madison, the
Convention's reporter, both urged that the national judiciary have the
power of impeachment. 0 in the middle of June, William Paterson proposed the alternative New Jersey Plan, which would have given the national judiciary "the authority to hear and determine in the first instance
on all impeachments of federal oficers." 4 I This power was not intended
to be either the equivalent of nor the substitute for impeachment. The
New Jersey Plan also provided that the Congress could remove officers
only upon the application of a majority of the state governors, but it
could not impeach.4 2 Shortly after the introduction of the New Jersey
Plan, James Wilson contrasted the two plans' treatments of impeachment.43 He noted that whereas the Virginia Plan provided for removal of
officersupon impeachment and conviction by the federal judiciary, the
New Jersey Plan neglected to include impeachment by the lower house,
instead providing for removal only through application of a majority of
the state governors."
On June 18, Alexander Hamilton entered the debate on the proper
forum for impeachments, proposing that, similar to the New York Constitution, the Constitution should provide that

It]he Governour Senators and all officers of the United States
[were] to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct;
and upon conviction to be removed from office, [and] disqualified
for holding any place of trust or profit-all impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or Judge of the Superior
Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall hold
his
4
place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary. 5

While Madison still pushed for the national judiciary as the impeachment body, the Committee of Detail,46 responsible for putting all
39. I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1,at 22.
40. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 98; seealso I CONVENTION RECORDS, Supra
note I, at 223-24 (adopting a resolution proposed on June 13, 1787, by Randolph and Madison, to
give the judiciary the power of impeachment).
41 Id at 244.
42 See P. HOFFER & N HULL, supra note 4. at 98.
43. SeeI CONVENTION RECORDS. supra note 1, at 252.
44 Seeid.
45 Id. at 292-93.
46. The Convention appointed the Committee of Detail on July 26, 1787, in George Washingions words, to "draw into method and form the several matters which had been agreed to by the
Convention as a Constitution for the United States." C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHI1LADELPHIA:
THE STORY Of THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY To SErTEMBER 1787, at 192 (1986).
The Committee put "resol[utions), suggestions, amendments and propositions into workable arrangement. Id The Committee's original members were Randolph of Virginia. Wilson of Pennsylvania, Gorham of Massachusetts, Ellsworth of Connecticut. and Rutledge of South Carolina. Id.
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resolutions and suggestions into draft form, proposed a compromise solution: trial "before the Senate and the. judges of the federal judicial
Court."4 7 The convention postponed discussion of this and other suggestions regarding the proper trial body until September 4, at which time
another committee of detail proposed that "[the Senate of the United
States shall have power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present."48 The Committee of Detail decided that the Senate should conduct
removal trials because it had previously agreed that the President would
49
be selected by a college of electors rather than the Senate. The plan to
pe'rceived as the troublesome
Committee
use electors removed what the
trials and making appointconducting
body
same
conflict of having the
that the Senate presented
agreed
overwhelmingly
delegates
The
ments.so
the fewest problems of the various proposed trial courts." Only Pennsylvania and Virginia dissented from the vote2 to adopt the proposal making the Senate the court for removal trials.
The second major impeachment controversy at the Convention concerned the impeachability of the President. Even though several state
constitutions had provided for impeachment of governors, many delegates were troubled with impeachment as a check on the President."
For example, on July 19, Gouveneur Morris warned that the prospect of
impeachment would make the President too dependent upon the legislature. The next day Charles Pinckney expressed agreement with Morris,
but George Mason, James Wilson, Elbridge Gerry, and Benjamin Franklin argued in favor of presidential impeachment. Randolph and Madison
added that it was unclear how to stop a President's misuse of power if he
54
could not be impeached. Rufus King and Morris responded that the
problem would be finding the proper forum to try the President, but
Morris admitted that presidential impeachment55 was necessary to ensure
that the President would not be above the law. In the end, only South
47. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, Supra note I, at 136.
48. Id. at 493.
49. See id. at 494.
50. Seeid. at 500.
St. Seeid. at 500-01.
recalled
52. See id. at 552-53. Both James McHenry and Luther Martin of Maryland later
"that the Senate seemed to be the only body likely to view impeachments in a cool and dispassionate
Hamilton defended the
manner." P. HOFFER & N. HULL, Supra note 4, at 99. Similarly, Alexander
(A. Hamildelegates' placement of the trial in the Senate. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396-401
ton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). By contrast, Madison voted against the provision because he opposed
the idea of trials in the Senate. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 100.
53. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4. at 100.
54. See id.
5S. See id.
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Carolina and Massachusetts voted against making the President
impeachable.ss
The third impeachment controversy at the Convention concerned
the definition of impeachable offenses. Early in the Convention the delegates agreed that officials of the new government would not have immunity from prosecution for common-law crimes."' The delegates also
envisioned an overlapping, if not separate, body of offenses for which
certain federal officials might be impeached.8 In particular, they first
referred to mal- and corrupt administration, neglect of duty, and misconduct in office as the only impeachable offenses, believing that commonlaw crimes such as treason, bribery, and felony should be heard in
the
courts of law.' 9 Delegates Paterson, Randolph, Wilson, and Mason argued that impeachment should follow their respective state constitutions
by applying only to misuse of official power.W As late as August 20, the
Committee of Detail reported that federal officials "shall be liable to
impeachment and removal from office for neglect of duty, malversation,
or
6
corruption." ' Five years after the Convention, James Wilson explained
that the delegates believed that
[i]mpeachments, and offences and offenders impeachable, [do not]
come . . . within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are

founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims;
and are directed to different objects: for this reason, the trial and
punishment of an offence on an impeachment, is no bar to a trial
and punishment of the same offence at common law. 62
Wilson characterized impeachable offenses as "political" because,
as Alexander Hamilton later explained, they constituted a specific "abuse
or
violation of some public trust."63
Nevertheless, on September 8, the delegates substituted "bribery"
and "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" for the existing formula."
Asserting that the new phrase was too limiting, Mason moved to
reintroduce "or maladministration" after "bribery" to permit impeachment
36. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
57.

i.

at 69.
See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supro note 4. at 101.
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upon less conventionally defined common-law offenses. 6' Although
Gerry agreed with Mason, delegates Madison and Morris objected to the
new proposal as too vague and too political in nature. Madison warned
that under Mason's term the President would simply serve at the pleasure of the Senate. In compromise, Mason moved to substitute simply
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors," which passed the Convention by a
vote of eight to three."
The fourth debate over impeachment at the Convention focused on
the number of votes necessary to convict and remove. As it turned out,
this controversy was closely linked to the Copvention's decision regarding the proper forum for impeachment trials. Resolving the fourth controversy required the delegates to consider the special qualities of the
Senate, the Senate's special role in the impeachment process, and the
Senate's constitutional role generally.
One of the first references to the concept of the two-thirds vote was
on June 6, when North Carolina's Hugh Williamson urged the Convention to require that all congressional acts pass by a two-thirds vote of the
Senate.67 Shortly thereafter, the Committee of Detail restricted Senate
treaty ratification and confirmation of appointments to two-thirds vote.68
Williamsoins inclusion of impeachment in this category was significant
because the
restriction of certain legislative issues to two-thirds vote was without parallel in pre-revolutionary constitutionalism.

. .

. Two-thirds

requirements emerged as part of the revolutionary republican compromise between representative assemblies and deliberative councils. The association of impeachment with the two-thirds rule
and republicanization of the imsignified a final Americanization
69
peachment process.

The importance of the two-thirds vote is directly traceable to the
Convention's special view of the Senate.70 The delegates saw the Senate
as composed of well-educated, wealthy, virtuous citizens who would be
sure to have the Nation's welfare at heart.7t The delegates viewed the
House as more subject to factions and more prone to hasty and intemper-

58. Seeid.

59. See id. at 101; see also 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 64-69 (debating whether
the President should be subject to impeachment for malpractice
or neglect of duty while in office).
60. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 101.
61. 2 CONVENTION RECORDs, supra note 1, at 337.

62. Wilson, Lectures on the Law, No. II. Cdmparison of the Constitution
of

the United States
oiihThat of Great Britain, in I THE WORKS OF
WtLSON 382. 408 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)
quoted in P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 101.
63 P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 101; THE FEDERALIST
No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamilton) ((.. Rossiter ed. 1961).
64 See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS,supra note 1, at
545.
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65. See id. at 550.
66. See id.
67. See I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 140.
68. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 102.
69. Id. at 102-03.
70. See id. at 103-06. See generally Note. The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. Il 11,
I112 (1988) (discussing the Senate's role in legislation, impeachment, appointment and amendment).
71.

See G. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 553-54

(1969).
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ate action than the Senate.72 The Senate was structured to counterbalance the bad tendencies of the House and, when acting alone, to carefully
deliberate the most important political questions.73 The two-thirds vote
was designed to ensure -that the normally deliberati Senate would be
most careful when considering issues of critical importance.74 The Convention's sentiment was that
[t]he Senate sat to hear treaty ratification, executive appointments,
and impeachment trials without the concurrence of the lower
house for the same reason that all three types of business required
two-thirds votes. These issues should not be "popular." The Constitution assigned this labor to the Senate because the delegates expected the upper house (the Senate] to rely
upon its own wisdom,
information, stability, and even temper.75
With respect to the Senate's role in impeachment proceedings, Alexander
Hamilton later confirmed that
[t]here was no occasion ... upon which the Senate should be more
deliberative and shielded from popular clamors than when it sat to
hear impeachments. . . . [I]mpeachment hearings were not trials in
which the senators were jurors, despite the fact that they sat upon
oath or affirmation, so much as deliberative sessions, when they
decided whether an official had betrayed his public trust. The
American impeachment trial, with its two-thirds requirement, was
thus a hybrid6 of native origin, expressing truly republican
compromises.'
In short,
(the two-thirds requirement for conviction in the Senate was the
capstone in the republicanization of impeachment and trial procedure, It ensured that the Senate would be as thoughtful and deliberate in its hearing and determining of cases as the House of Lords,
without any of the aristocratic trappings of that English body. 7
Even though many of the delegates were familiar with the English
experience with impeachment, including the contemporary impeachment
of the former Governor-General of India, the delegates' deviation from
English impeachment is noteworthy because it signals that, from the outset of the Convention, the delegates put a uniquely American stamp on
the Constitution's impeachment clauses. For example, the delegates
strenuously debated the precise definition of impeachable offenses,
72. 1.SToRy, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 387, at 274
(R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds. 1987); G. WOOD, supra note 71, at 557.58.
73. SeeG. Wooo, supra note 71.
74. SeeJ. STORY, supra note 72, §§
383-385, at 271-75.
75. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 106.
76. Id. at 106. Seegenerally THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396-401 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961)
77. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 106.
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whereas Parliament had always refused to constrain its jurisdiction over
78
impeachments by restrictively defining impeachable offenses. The delein England,
but
gates also agreed to limit impeachment to officeholders,
79
impeached.
be
could
family,
royal
the
of
members
except
anyone,
Whereas the English House of Lords could convict upon a bare majority,
the American delegates required a two-thirds vote of the Senate members
present.80 In addition, although the House of Lords could order any
punishment upon conviction, the delegates limited the punishments in
the Constitution to those typically found in the state constitutions.'
82
Thus, contrary to the view of some historians, the Constitutional Convention and ratification campaign confirm that the Constitution's impeachment process is, in important respects, uniquely American.
The debates over impeachment at the Constitutional Convention
must, however, be put into perspective. The delegates themselves recognized that their views on the meaning of the Constitution mattered less
than the views of the ratifiers.83 The delegates understood that the Constitution would have effect only if the people accepted it, and the people's
only opportunity to review and debate the Constitution took place during
the ratification campaign. Those considering whether to ratify the new
Constitution had no access to any of the notes on the Constitutional Convention, which were not published until many years after the Convention
and the ratification campaign. 8' The ratifiers' understandings of what
happened at the Constitutional Convention and of the meaning of particular constitutional language was limited to personal reports regarding
the Convention, pamphlets urging acceptance or rejection of the proposed Constitution,"s and their own readings of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the few reports from the ratification campaign regarding
78. Seeid. at 97.
79. Seeid.
80. Seeid.
81. Seeid.
Supra note 14,at 142 (arguing that old English procedures of removal
82. See.e.g.,R. BEROER,
by courts for misbehavior defined the framers' intent); seealso infra subpart III(A)(2) (Raoul Berger
asserts that the Constitution's impeachment procedures may be explained by examining the English
experience with impeachment.); subpart 111(8)(2) (Irving Brant summarily rejects the colonial experiences with impeachment, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification campaign.).
83. See Amar. Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 281
(1987) (emphasizing that the Constitution and its amendments became effective only through ratification by "We the People of the United States" and that what the people considered and reviewed
during the ratification process is, therefore, critical for an understanding of the meaning and nature
of the Constitution itself); Rotunda, supra note 13, at 708-14 (emphasizing the importance of the
ratification process for constitutional interpretation).
84. SeeRotunda, supra note 13,at 710 & n.13.
85. Seegenerally THE FEDERALIST at viii (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The Federalist isessentially
a collection of eighty-five letters to the public, over the pseudonym of Publius, that appeared at short
intervals in the newspapers of New York City beginning on October 27, 1787."); THE ESSENTIAL
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impeachment indicate that the ratifiers generally shared the delegates'
views 6n impeachment issues."6
Significantly, there were numerous questions that the delegates and
the ratifiers did not answer or even address. Although the delegates discussed the general need for judicial independence,87 they failed to consider the exclusivity of impeachment as a means for removing federal
judges. After the Convention, however, Alexander Hamilton argued that
impeachment was the sole means for removing federal judges, thus protecting federal judges from rash or intemperate retaliation by the President or Congress for any controversial judicial actions. 8 Convention
delegates did discuss the appropriate forum for impeachment hearings
and trials, 8' but neither the delegates nor the ratifiers focused on these
procedural concerns. In addition, neither the delegates nor the ratifiers
directly considered judicial review of impeachments.90 While the delegates envisioned impeachment and criminal trials as separate, but not
mutually exclusive proceedings," they did not clearly voice any preference regarding the order of these proceedings.' 2 Likewise, the delegates
intended to make the President and federal judges impeachable" but
never directly addressed whether members of Congress were also impeachable. Finally, the delegates expressed their intent to limit punishments in the impeachment process to removal and disqualification from
office.' 4 They failed to discuss, however, whether the two punishments
could be imposed separately or whether impeachment could proceed
even though an official had resigned.
ANTI-FEDERALIST (W.B. Allen & G. Lloyd eds. 1985) (expressing reasons for refusing to support

the newly drafted Constitution).
86. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supro note 4, at 109; Rotunda, supra note 13. at 710.
87. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 153-55.
88. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 78. at
469-70. Interestingly, Raoul Berger rejects Hamilton's understanding as controlling because Berger
regards Hamilton as having had only a marginal role in the Constitutional Convention. See R.
BERGER, supra note 14. at 137.
89. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4, at 97-100.
90. R. DERGER, supro note 14,at 112-14 (noting the scant remarks of the framers on the exclusivity of the Senate as the trial court for impeachments).
91. See R. BERGER, supro note 14,at 78-85.
92. Professor Burbank argues that Hamilton's views in The Federalist No. 65 and the ratification debates do not resolve this issue. He observes, for example, that Hamilton "contemplated removal before criminal prosecution" but never indicated whether the Constitution mandated such an
order. See Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removat of Federal Judges, 76
Ky. L.J. 643, 668 (1987).
93. See I CONVENTION RECORos, supro note 39, at 78, 236, 292; 2 id. as 52-53. 64-69.
94. SeeU.S. CoNsT. an. 1, J 3, cl. 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust, or Profit under the United States . . . .").
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III.

Methodological Problems with Current Approaches to
Impeachment

Several issues arising under the impeachment clauses have persistently divided scholars, including (1) is impeachment the only constitutionally permissible means of removing federal judges; (2) for what
kinds of offenses may federal officials be impeached; (3) what is the
proper procedure for impeachment and trial of federal officials (including the appropriate burden of proof for establishing an impeachable offense, the applicability of presidential privilege to impeachment
proceedings, the governing rules of evidence, and the acceptability of the
Senate's use of special trial committees to receive evidence for removal
proceedings); (4) is it permissible to impeach someone who has already
resigned; and (5) is judicial review of impeachment permissible under
the Constitution. Unfortunately, these issues remain unresolved because
commentators insist on applying theories of constitutional law insufficient for resolving the unique problems raised by the impeachment
clauses.95
A. Problems with Constitutional Historiography
1. The General Problems with Original Intent.-Formalists tend to
use history and particularly original intent as their sole guide in inter6
preting the impeachment clauses.9 Yet there are unavoidably serious
problems with constitutional historiography in general and with following original intent in particular as a theory of constitutional interpretation. Although the general problems with original intent have received
7
considerable attention in recent constitutional scholarship, the brief review that follows provides a background for the discussion of the inadequacies of formalist scholarship in the context of impeachment.
Original intent is one of the two theories of constitutional interpretation that rely primarily on history as a guide to the meaning of constitu95. See.e.g..Tushnet, Conservative Constitutional Theory. 59 TUL. L. REV. 910, 925 (1985)
(asserting that although conservative commentators criticize liberal judges' judicial activism, they
have been unable to develop an alternative theory of judicial review. possibly because no constitutional theory can be coherent); Tushnet. supro note 19, at 993 (concluding that although the liberal
tradition "provides an unstable solution to the problem of securing ordered liberty," we cannot
simply return to the federalism of the framers, but must effect "substantial changes" in society to
revitalize federalism).
96. Seeinufr notes 108-40, 146.
97. See eg., M. TUSHNET. supra note 18, at 21-45 (criticizing originalists as too limited by
history and being unable to account for new developments In society); Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent. 98 HAnv. L. REV. 885, 886-88 (1985) (discussing the problems with
deciding constitutional questions based on the original Intent of the framers).
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tional provisions. 9' As with most theories of constitutional law, original
intent is designed to constrain illegitimate or unjustified judicial displacement of majoritarian decisions-judicial tyranny.99 Original intent is
often equated with interpretivism, which asserts that judges "should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implied in
the written Constitutitin."1oo "Such norms are found by interpreting the
text with recourse when necessary to the original intent of the framers."' 0 Interpretivism seeks to restrain both legislators and judges from
distorting or manipulating the Constitution by restricting them, as much
as possible, to the language, the structure, and the framers' original understanding of the Constitution. 0 2 Interpretivists claim that we may
avoid legislative and judicial tyranny only if we view the Constitution as
a contract defining the boundaries of majoritarian power.' 0
The major limitation of original intent is its primary reliance on history-some ill-defined notion of our collective past-as a clear guide to
constitutional interpretation. Interpretivists cannot elude the interre0
lated problems that the historical record may be cloudy or incomplete, '
it may be impossible to understand or recreate accurately the framers'
world of experience, 0 and institutions may mean something different to
9)8 The other theory is neutral principles. Neutral principles provides that
lie main constitucnt of the judicial process is precisely that it must he genuinely principled,
resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved[.) . . - (resting) on grounds
of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by
others that the principles imply.
M. TusHNET, supra note 18, at 21-22 (quoting H. WECHSLER. PRINCIPLES, POLITICS. AND FUNDAMENIAL LAW 21 (1961)). Judges following neutral principles must be committed to the rule of law
and trained to identify and apply neutrally the principles in history, precedent, and the Constitution
by which decisions must beguided. No commentator has yet purported to follow neutral principles
in analyzing the impeachment clauses. perhaps becausc (1) judges rarely decide issues of impeachment; (2) neutral principles cannot accommodate congressional practices as precedent because those
practices are politically charged or driven and, therefore, not neutral in character; and (3) history
and She
Constitution offer little definitive (much less neutral) guidance on questions of impeachment.
-99. See M. TUsHNET, supra note 18, at 23-45 (identifying the primary aim of constitutional
theory as restraining judicial tyranny, the displacement of majoritarian decisions by an unelected
elite); seealso id. at 10 (suggesting that the framers attempted to offset judicial tyranny with legislative power and legislative tyranny with judicial review).
100. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY Of JUDICIAL REVIEw I (1980).
101. M. TUsINET, supra note18. at 22.
102. See id, at 23.
103. See id.
104. See M. TUSiNET, supra note 18, at 34-35. With respect to impeachment, history does not
definitively answer whether impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal judges, whether
an official may be impeached even after resignation, what is the scope of impeachable offenses. or
what procedure should be followed in an impeachment hearing or removal trial.
105. See id. at 35. For example, the framers regarded impeachment as primarily political, but
politics to them suggested something noble. Today, however, politics frequently connotes something
unprincipled and untrustworthy. so that judges and commentators are reluctant to allow or at least
to acknowledge politics to be the driving force of something as momentous or complex as an
impeachment.
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0
us than they did to the framers.' 6 In addition, this approach is intrinsically flawed because the framers may have failed to follow any general or
specific theory of interpretivism or may have intended certain 07constitutional provisions to be interpreted in a nonoriginalist manner.

2. Specific Problems with Original Intent in the Impeachment Context.-The problems that plague constitutional historiography in general
also plague interpretative theories relying on history, including-original
intent. Indeed, prominent impeachment studies by Raoul Berger and
Philip Kurland illustrate these problems. Interestingly, although both
Berger and Kurland purport to be interpretivists applying original intent,
they reach different conclusions regarding several major issues arising
08
A close examination of Berger's and
under the impeachment clauses.
106. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 493-94. For example, each of the major institutions
involved in the impeachment process has changed in significant ways. First, the House is much
larger and busier than the framers anticipated. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention perceived no problem in having the House conduct initial investigations into impeachments, but today
the House cannot expend the same effort investigating and conducting impeachment hearings as
could the original House. See Heflin, supra note 9, at 123-24. Similarly, the Senate is much larger
and busier than the original Senate. The ways in which public officials may commit impeachable
abuses against the state have increased since the days of the Constitutional Convention, and it is
unrealistic to assume that the Senate may delay its busy schedule to sit in its entirely as a body to
deliberate on an impeachment trial. Third, the President's office has also changed in certain dramatic ways from the days of the Constitution's founding. The President is more powerful and busier
than originally envisioned. As foreign affairs become more complicated and the stakes increase.
there is astrong reluctance on the part of Congress to distract a sitting President with an impeachment proceeding unless the evidence is overwhelming. Fourth. more than any other branch. the
federal judiciary has been subjected to impeachment proceedings over the years. The federal judiciary's size and responsibility has also changed, requiring and complicating greater monitoring. Accordingly, the need to protect the independence ofjudges against each other and other branches has
increased. See Symposium. supra note II, at 359-60 (comments of Professor Ronald Rotunda).
107. SeeM. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 25-26, 28-29 (arguing that the framers may have failed
to follow any theory of original intent, that they did not always understand the potentials within the
Constitution for legislative and judicial tyranny, and that there were times that the framers intended
terms to be interpreted in a nonorginalist context); seealso J. ELY, supra note 100, at 22-30 (citing
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment as a provision intended by its
drafters to be interpreted in a nonoriginalist manner); Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A
Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 TEXAS L. REV. 343, 349*53 (1981) (pointing to the
ninth amendment as an example of a constitutional provision licensing nonoriginalist interpretation).
Another problem with the theory of original intent is that the founders may not have addressed
certain problems. See M. TUSHNET, supra note IS, at 35-36. For example, in the area of impeachment, they did not address (1) whether removal and disqualification may be imposed jointly or
separately; (2) the proper standard of proof in an impeachment proceeding; (3) the exclusivity of
impeachment as a means for removing federal judges; (4) whether there may be judicial review of
any aspect of an impeachment proceeding; and (5) the specifics of the proper procedure for impeachment hearings and removal trials. Formalists become confused and uncertain when confronted by
the fact that the framers may have failed to address something. See, e.g.,R. BERGER, supra note 14,
at 100-01 (raising questions not answered by the framers because of their preoccupation with impeachment of the President).
108. Compare R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 70-72, 141-45, 103-21 (concluding that impeachment is not the exclusive means for removing federal judges; that judicial review of impeachment is
constitutionally permissible, and that impeachable offenses can be easily categorized) with Kurland,
supra note 14,at 668, 697 (concluding that impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
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Kurland's studies also shows that history can confuse and divide analysis
on impeachment and that commentators can use the past to cloak their
own partisan views with historical legitimacy.
Berger's misuse of history is evident in his analysis of two issues
regarding impeachment: (1) what constitutes an impeachable offense
and (2) whether impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
judges. Berger's reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as referring
to seven specific categories of crimes against the state has two major
problems.t10 First, Berger's historical research is seriously incomplete.
Berger does not acknowledge or discuss certain aspects of the historical
record. Inexplicably, he relies on the English experience with impeachment to define. "high crimes and misdemeanors" rather than on the extensive colonial experience.' 10 Contrary to Berger's assertion that the
Constitution's impeachment procedure may be explained by examining
the English experience with impeachment, " more recent studies on the
history of impeachment in the United States emphasize that the Constitutional Convention delegates and the ratifiers consciously chose to put a
uniquely American stamp on impeachment and meant to deviate from
the English experience in significant ways.'' 2
Second, Berger's specific assertions regarding what constitutes impeachable offenses are frequently contradicted by the historical record,
including the actual English and colonial experiences with impeachment,
the debates at the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification campaign." Berger argues that the delegates understood the constitutional
language "high crimes and misdemeanors" to refer to seven specific categories of crimes against the state in English impeachments."4 This argument, however, contradicts Berger's own historical commentary that
judges; that judicial review or impeachments is not authorized by the Constitution; and that the
scope of impeachable offenses cannot beclearly defined).
109. See R. BERGER, supra note 14. at 70-71 (listing "high crimes and misdemeanors" as "misapplication of funds . . . , abuse of official power . . ., neglect of duty . . . , encroachment (upon] or
contempts of Parliament prerogativesf,] . . . 'corruption', . . . betrayal of trust. . . . [and) giving

pernicious advice to the Crown . . . .").
110. See P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 4, at 268 ("Berger has written a brief, not a history.
Missing from his work is an appreciation of American colonial and state precedents, the latter of
which were far more important in influencing federal law than English examples.").
11I. Berger cites English history and the common law to define "high crimes and misdemean.
ors," seeR. BERGER, supra note 14,at 70-71; to define judicial good behavior, see id. at 125-35; and
to determine whether legislators could be impeached, seeid. at 217-18.
112. See, e.g., P. HOFFER & N. HULL. supra note 4, at 268 (discussing the framers' "deliberate
divergence from English law"); Bestor. supra note 13, at 261 (claiming that Americans changed the
English meaning of treason and adopted only its most restrictive view).
113. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 262-66 (suggesting that Berger "glimpses ... but then shies
away from" the historically correct reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as political acts
injurious to the state or sovereign).
114. See supra note 109.
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impeachments in England were essentially political proceedings and that
impeachment developed in England as a method of punishing those who
were too great and powerful to be brought to justice before the commonlaw courts."'
Berger's exclusive reliance on English justifications for impeachment to explain the impeachment procedure in the Constitution is misplaced, because the English categorizations of impeachable offenses are
only tenuously related to the colonial understanding of impeachable offenses and because the Constitution changed much of the English impeachment practice.t t 6 As a general matter, Berger does not
satisfactorily explain how much the English experience with impeachment actually influenced the understanding of impeachment in the colonies prior to 1787, at the Constitutional Convention, or during the
ratification campaign-particularly in light of the significant differences
between the Constitution's and the English treatment of impeachment.
Berger also fails to support his assertion that the framers intended to
formalize impeachments by limiting impeachable offenses to the seven
categories in the English experience."' 7 Berger suggests that the framers
intended the President to be impeachable only for so-called "great" offenses, which he construes as being narrower than the categories of Eng115. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 71-72.
116. On the one hand, "a categorization of the English precedents prior to 1787 is of limited
usefulness for defining the proper scope of impeachments today: the categories are simply tied too
closely to bygone times." Book Note, 25 STAN. L. REv. 908, 913 (1973) (reviewing R. BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMs (1973) and I. BRANT. IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS
AND ERRORS
(1972)). On the other hand, the framers deviated from the English experience with
impeachment in at least seven ways: (1) in England anyone could beimpeached, whereas the Constitution limits impeachment to "civil officers;" (2) in England impeachment implied criminal proceedings whereas the Constitution expressly separates impeachment from the traditional criminal
process; (3) in England the sanction for conviction would beloss of life or property or imprisonment,
whereas the Constitution limits the sanctions to removal from office and disqualification from future
office; (4) in England the King could pardon anyone convicted after impeachment, whereas the
Constitution expressly provides that the President can pardon for crimes, except for impeachments;
(5) although the King could not be impeached, the Constitution expressly provides that the President may beimpeached; (6) in England officers and judges could be removed from office by means
other than impeachment, whereas the Constitution explicitly recognizes only one means for removal
of federal judges; and (7) the English system allowed the category of impeachable offenses to grow as
new cases were brought, whereas the Constitution limits the scope of impeachable offenses to "Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." See Broderick, Citizens' Guide to Impeachment ofa President: Problem Areas, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 205, 217-18 (1973).
117. See R. BERGER, supra note 14,at 67-73 (providing a detailed categorization of impeachable
offenses in England. but failing to establish that the framers were familiar with or relied on them in
drafting the impeachment clauses). In an earlier article, Berger sought support for his view that
indictment and trial may precede removal by resorting to the English practice in which "loln several
occasions the Parliament preferred to refer the case to the courts." Berger. The President. Congress,
and the Courts. 83 YALE L.J. ItII. 1128 (1974). As Professor Burbank notes. however, this is not
helpful, because, as Berger recognizes, in English practice "criminal prosecution and removal were
wedded in one procecding. whereas the framers made an informed decision to divorce them." Id. at
1124, quoted in Burbank, supra note 92, at 667.
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lisa "political" offenses, as not including any misconduct outside office,
and as nfaking the President unimpeachable for some types of miscon8
duct that would expose lesser officials to impeachment proceedings."
presidential
which
determining
for
But Berger fails to prescribe a method
misconduct would or would not be a "great" offense and never justifies
making private conduct of the President unimpeachable. Finally, Berger
9
concludes that impeachable conduct must be "political,""' so that the
a specific
whether
of
actor and the forum are important detirminants
official may be impeached for a specific offense. Berger's attempts to
define "political," however, are inconsistent and lack any clear link to
20
the historical record.1

The underlying explanation for Berger's reading of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" is his partisan desire to protect the federal judiciary from
congressional overreaching as opposed to any search for an accurate understaning of the historical nature of impeachment. Although Berger
acknowledges that the impeachable offenses listed in the Constitution are
political crimes, he expresses disapproval of the Constitution's vesting of
any removal power over the judiciary in a political (or legislative) body.
Berger's disapproval is demonstrated by his repeated criticisms of thenCongressman Gerald Ford's comment, during the attempted impeachment of Justice Douglas, that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives may say it is.t7t However,
[t]his coldly cynical threat to the independence of the judiciary
seems to block off for Berger any further consideration of the possibility that the framers did in fact contemplate . . . "proceedings of
a political nature" if., . "confined to political characters," directed
against "political crimes and misdemeanors" and eventuating only
in "political punishments.""2
In the area of impeachment, the most that constitutional interpreta118. Se R. BERGER, supro note 14, at 88-93, 196-97.
119. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 62 n.32 (citing Blackstone for the claim that political
crimes were impeachable offenses and describing impeachment as a "political weapon" Parliament
used to make ministers accountable to it, where "political" was used by the English in conjunction
with crimes to distinguish impeachable conduct in office from criminal offenses).
120. For example, Berger first defines "political" offenses as misconduct in office. One sentence
later he expands this definition to include all acts "against the State." id. at 62 & n.32, and he notes
that several impeachments were directed against persons who held no office. Seeid. at 71 n.92. He
later includes conduct by officials in their private capacities, even if the conduct does not comprise
an act against the state. See id. at 195-96. It is diffcult to ascertain meaningful limits to "political"
as Berger has defined it; it has grown to inclqde all misconduct except acts not directed against the
state by those who do not hold offce.
121. Seeid. at 53. 86, 94, 103; seealso id. at 96. 123. 155 n.1S6. 159, 298 (criticizing Ford for his
almost unabashed partisanship in invoking the impeachment process and for his assumption that the
implied constitutional power to remove judges for lack of good behavior was vested in Congress in
the form of the impeachment procedure).
122. Bestor, supra note 13. at 266 (quoting I J. WILSON, Supronote 16).
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tion can do is identify the purely political questions that Congress must
decide as part of the impeachment process. Attempts to influence those
political decisions through constitutional interpretation derive either
from a misunderstanding of the structure of the impeachment clauses or
from poorly veiled efforts to offer political judgments or preferences
under the guise of constitutional mandates. The colonial experience with
impeachment, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification campaign indicate that impeachment was designed primarily as a check on
the usurpations of executive officials, but Berger shies away from this
conclusion out of his respect for judicial independence and distrust of
political trials. 23
There are also problems with Berger's conclusion that judicial review of impeachment is permissible. These problems derive from Berger's dominant desire to protect the judiciary from congressional
overreaching. First, Berger is fundamentally inconsistent in his approach. He accepts the assumption that during the last two centuries
congressional impeachment determinations have been final, but he argues that the framers must have wanted-as opposed to actually desired-judicial review-of impeachments, because the 4framers sought to
prevent congressional excesses against the judiciary.'1
Second, there is no historical support for Berger's view that judicial
review of impeachment is constitutionally permissible. Berger's methodology on this point is mystifying: he acknowledges that there is little, if
any, historical evidence indicating the framers desired judicial review of
impeachments but then argues that the absence of any expressed desire
by the framers against judicial review should be construed as original
25
intent in favor of such review.' This argument is even more confusing
123. Seeid. at 267.
been
124. SeeR. BERGER, supra note 14, at 103 (observing that "[flrom Story onward it has
thought that in the domain of impeachment the Senate has the last word; that even the issue whether
the charged misconduct constitutes an impeachable offense is unreviewable, because the trial of impeachments is confided to the Senate alone" (footnotes omitted)).
to the
125. Seeid. at 112-13, 117-18. Berger's argument that the framers paid little attention
problem of removing federal judges undercuts his other argument that the framers intended to allow
judicial review of impeachments. Moreover, neither the discussions at the Constitutional Convenbe
tion nor during the ratification campaign indicate any support for the view that there should
judicial review of impeachments. Indeed, the most prominent commentary at the time rejected the
is
idea. SeeTHE FEDERALIsT No. 79, at 474 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("(Impeachment]
the judicial
the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of
judges ");
character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own
seealso Bettor, supra note 13, at 267 (arguing that Berger's view is "unhistorical and extraconstitutional").
Berger also finds no historical support for the political question doctrine and, therefore, believes
in referring even the most difficult constitutional issues to the courts. SeeR. BERGER, Supra note 14.
question
at 108-09. Even if Berger is correct that there is no historical support for the political
has for well
doctrine, there is no historical support for the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court
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because it is irreconcilable with Berger's later assertion that some of the
delegates' comments at the Constitutional Convention are consistent
with judicial review of impeachments. 2 6 For example, Berger asserts
that the framers considered Congress the most dangerous branch of government, and out of concern for the independence of the federal judiciary, the framers would (or must) have wanted to prevent any imbalance
between the respective powers of the Congress and the judiciary. Judicial review of impeachments, therefore, must have been among the Constitution's numerous checks and balances. t" This reading of history
makes little sense because it suggests that the framers sought to solve the
potential problem of an imbalance of power between the Congress and
the judiciary by creating just such an imbalance in favor of the judiciary.
Berger's view of judicial review of impeachments cannot be sensibly
squared with the considered judgment of the Constitutional Convention
and, the ratifiers when they excluded the judiciary from adjudicating impeachment matters to avoid the impropriety of the judiciary's reviewing
charges against either the President who appointed them or their fellow
judges. 128
Third, Berger misreads the relevant constitutional language as supporting judicial review of impeachments. Berger's general argument is
that since the Constitution's language regarding the impeachment process is ambiguous, the Constitution does not commit consideration of
this issue to only one branch. In the constitutional mandate-"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments" 29-Berger focuses on the word "try," which he asserts, was limited in eighteenth
century usage to the fact-finding stage of a judicial proceeding.o30 Berger
argues further that the word "try" normally implies an appeal to a review process by a court of law. No doubt, the framers may have envisioned a trial-like proceeding as the means by which the Senate would
effeft impeachments and removals, but this fact hardly justifies the inferover a century invoked the political question doctrine to avoid deciding questions that are either
clearly committed to the competence or discretion of another branch or that require the Court to
extend its own authority under article Ill. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1(1973); Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 13, at 96-107 (discussing the confusion that surrounds the political question doctrine).
126. See R. BERGER, Supra note 14,at 118(citing the framers' rejection of "unfettered removal
by Address" and of removal for "maladministration" as evidence of a strong desire to limit the
impeachment power and arguing that it is therefore unlikely that the framers intended to rely on the
Senate's self-restraint in exercising this'power).
127. SeeR. BERoER, supro note 14, at 111-19.
128 See2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 551;see also THE FEDERALIST No. SI, at
321 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("(The permanent tenure by which the (judiciall appointments are held . . . must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.").
129. U.S. CONsT. art. 1. * 3. cl. 6.
130 See R. BERGER, supra note 14,at t11-12.
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ence of an appeal to a court of law, particularly because the Constitution
explicitly directs the Chief Justice to preside over presidential impeachments and because the framers specifically3 rejected having judges serve
as the impeachment or removal tribunal.' '
Fourth, Berger confuses constitutionality determination with judicial reviewability of an action. Specifically, Berger argues that the fifth
amendment allows redress in courts for any due process violation, even
32
The problem with Berger's argument
in an impeachment proceeding.
is that it assumes the conclusion: the determination of constitutionality
is separate from the determination of reviewability. The fact that Congress may do something unconstitutional as part of an impeachment proceeding does not mean that reviewability of that proceeding by the
federal judiciary is then automatic or permissible. Furthermore, Berger's
implicit assumption that all determinations of constitutionality must be
made by the federal judiciary is incorrect both as a historical matter and
33
as a jurisdictional principle.1
Professor Philip Kurland's study of impeachment does not purport
to be as wide ranging as-Berger's study, focusing primarily on how each
of the three branches of government has dealt with the question whether
the constitutional guarantee that federal judges may serve "during good
Behaviour" 34 provides a basis for removal of federal judges in addition
to the impeachable offenses listed elsewhere in the Constitution. Kurland spends little or no time discussing the original intent of the framers
regarding impeachment as the exclusive means of removing federal
judges, because he believes "it has been made pellucidly clear by Martha
Ziskind that the [framers'] intention was to make impeachment the sole
t
means of removal of federal (judges)." " After reviewing the history of
impeachments through the late 1960s, Kurland concludes (1) "that it
would be unconstitutional for the Congress to attempt, by legislation, to
establish a fixed term of office for [federal] judges" because the constitutional guarantee that federal judges may serve "during good Behaviour"
has been regarded by each branch as granting judges life tenure; (2) "that
131. See id. at 112.13; seealso supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Convention's choice of the Senate as the impeachment trial body).
132. SeeR. BERGER, supra note 14, at 80-81, 120.
OFCONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 903-28
133. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON. PROCESSES
(2d ed. 1983) (discussing the historical authority, conceptual basis, and scope of the political question doctrine-that some constitutional questions are, as a function of the separation of powers,
committed to nonjudicial agencies); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 15-17, 34-35, 39, 67-68 (arguing that
courts are not equipped to address all constitutional issues).
134. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts. shall hold their Offces during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Ofnce." U.S. CONST. art. Ill. 11.
135. Kurland, supra note 14, at 668.
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the greater weight of authority lies on the side of lack of
[any existing
power, short of the amendment process] to establish a mode of trial
other
than by impeachment for the removal of federal judges";
and (3) "that
legislative action spelling out the content of 'good behavior'
for such trials would also be invalid,. [because] those words are either
[a] to be derived from the definition of high crimes and misdemeanors,
or [b] to be
left to the discretion of the Senate when sitting as a
court
of
impeachment." 3 6 When it comes to defining "high crimes and misdemeanors,"
however, Kurland admits that "no one should claim certainty."37
Kurland's argument has two major flaws. First, Kurland's
reliance
on Ziskind's study is misplaced. Even though both Berger
and Ziskind
purport to follow original intent to resolve the issue whether
impeachment is the exclusive means for removing federal judges, Berger harshly
rejects Ziskind's reading of the relevant original intent.135 For
instance,
Ziskind believes the framers rejected the English practice
of scire
facias,39 which allowed judges to remove other judges for misbehavior.
Ziskind maintains that before the Constitutional Convention "
'in all but
a few states, judges held office during good behavior and could
be removed only by impeachment.' "140 According to Berger, however,
Ziskind's view lacks historical support.' 4t He criticizes her for ignoring
the
fact that:
136. Id. at 697.

137. Id.
138. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 141.
139. SeeR. BeGER. supra note i4.at 141-43.
generally Shartel, supra note 10. at 880-98.
Professor Shandcmakes several observations about See
whether the Constitution was
he Enghish practice of scire fpcias. Hei explains that., historicaliy, 'ludges . nmeantto intclude
.. holding [offie)
'during good behavior' by patent from the King, were removable on scire
facto: in the King's
Bench." Id. at 882 (footnotes omitted). Persons holding lower
offices or without patent from the
king were subject to removal by a quo warranto type
proceeding,
forfeiture and required a directive of ouster. It is unclear whether which was in the nature of a
the English Act of Settlement of
1700 or later statutes abolished these means of removal.
See id.
887-89 (discussing use ofscirefocias as preeisting at common at 882 n.33, 900 n.82; see also id. at
and not ruled out by the Constiitution), Note, Constiitutional Judicial Tenure Legislation?, spralaw
note 12, at 855.60 (concluding that
the framers intended impeachment to be the method of judicial
based on a study of colonial
practice and the debates in the Constitutional Convention and removal
the ratification campaign).
140. Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution:
English and American Precedents,
1969 Sup. Cr. REV. 135,152. quoted in R. BERGER, supra
note 14,at 145. There are lesser but still
troublesome problems raised by the methodology of original
intent,
including () that because people
born in the United States automatically become citizens subject to our
existing Constitution, no one
today has had the opportunity to enter into a contractual relationship
in the same manner as the framers (and members of their generation) governed by the Constitution
and (2) that we may need to
abandon original intent to deal with forms of unimagined
and unaddressed tyranny (particularly
legislative). SeeM. TusaNET, SUpranote 18, at 25-27.
141. SeeR. BERGERt,
supra note 14, at 142 (pointing out that because judicial appointments in
the colonies were terminable at the king's will, the absence of provisions for scire
facias in colonial
constitutions should beviewed not as a rejection of that process,
as Fiskind suggests. but as asimple
reflection of colonial powerlessness to interfere with judicial tenure).
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[t]he States were pretty evenly divided between impeachment and
removal by Address [a variation of the English practice under
which both Houses of Parliament made a formal request that the
King perform a particular act]: four States provided for Address
and a fifth, Georgia, provided for a variant; six states provided for
impeachment and four of these supplied an alternative, removal for
misbehavior' or maladministration, which suggests that impeachment may have been reserved for special cases. The Delaware and Maryland provisions for court removal upon misbehavior preclude
an inference that there was total ignorance of judicial forfeiture. If
the writ of scire facias was not expressly mentioned [in the Constitution], it is not the function of a Constitution to detail the relevant
42

writs.1

Ziskind regards the framers' failure to expressly include scire facias as a
rejection of that practice, whereas Berger reaches the opposite conclusion
by interpreting the framers' failure to exclude the practice as an express
acceptahce.143 Although Berger maintains that the framers paid little
attention to the problem of how to remove judges, he insists their few
remarks on the subject indicate that the phrase "during good Behaviour"
grants life tenure to federalt judges and provides a method for removal in
addition to impeachment. " Thus, Ziskind's study is hardly as authoritative as Kurland suggests.
Second, both Ziskind's and Kurland's readings of history exclude
one major piece of legislation, the Act of 1790,141 which undermines
their singular view that original intent indicates impeachment was the
exclusive means for removing federal judges. Indeed, almost without exception, commentators arguing that impeachment is the exclusive means
for removing federal judges fail to discuss the incontrovertible fact that
the First Congress itself rejected any notion that impeachment was intended as the sole means of removing federal judges.146 In the Act of
142. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted); seealso id. at 145 n.104 (noting that "tiln England an Address
was a formal request made by both Houses of Parliament to the King, asking him to perform some
act[, and that by) the Act of Settlement (1700). judges were made removable by the Crown only
upon an Address by both Houses").
143. Seeid. at 145-47.
144. See id. at 177-80.
145. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1847). For a discussion of the Act's subsequent
history, seeinfra note 147.
146. See. e.g.. Broderick, supra note 116, at 205 (arguing that impeachment is the exclusive
means of removal and urging that citizens should become more involved in the political process,
including impeachment); Burbank, supra note 92, at 674-94 (noting that impeachment is the exclusive means of removal of federal judges for misconduct, although not for disability, because of the
need to protect the independence of the judiciary); Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RuTGERs L.J. 103, 112-14, 118 (1986) (arguing that imprisonment before impeachment is
de facto removal of a judge and is therefore unconstitutional); Fenton. The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 719, 745-47 (suggesting that impeachment is exclusive and only for
serious crimes); Kurland, supra note 14. at 668, 697-98 (noting that impeachment is exclusive and
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179'), the First Congress provided that upon conviction in federal court
for bribery, a judge shall "forever be disqualified to hold any office." 147
Berger himself relies on this Act as providing the strongest case for the
view that impeachment is.not the exclusive means for removing federal
judges. He argues that:
[s]ince the impeachment clause provides for disqualification upon
impeachment and conviction, the Act is unconstitutional if the
clause indeed provides the "exclusive" method of disqualification.
The First Congress will scarcely be charged with misconstruing the
Constitution; hence the 1790 statute must be regarded as a construction that the impeachment clause does not constitute the
"only" means for the disqualification of judges. As with "disqualification" so with "removal," for the two stand on a par in the impeachment provision. And the statute also illustrates the familiar
proposition that broad dicta . . . respecting a situation not
presented for determination cannot be conclusive when the situation is actually presented. What the First Congress did when it
had to deal with "disqualification" of judges thus speaks against
reliance upon some earlier utterances by a few of its members when
the removal of judges was not involved.14
It is difficult to understand how Kurland and Ziskind can question the
relevance or authority of the Act of 1790 in light of the fact that interprethat any change in the procedure set forth in the Constitution requires a constitutional
amendment);
Stevens, Reflections on the RemovalofSitting Judges, 13 STETSON L.
REv. 215, 215-20 (1984) (noting that impeachment of federal judges for high crimes and misdemeanors
was the only means of
protecting judicial independence); Stoltz, supra note 14. at 659-70 (calling
impeachment exclusive
but also calling for improvements in the impeachment process); Ziskind,
supra note 140, at 147-51
(concluding that the framers intended to have the independence of the judiciary
limited only through
the impeachment process); Note, In Defense ofStandard, supra note
12,at 460-63
Judicial Disability Act of 1980 is unconstitutional because it allows the judiciary (arguing that the
to strip judges of
their office by refusing to assign them cases and that imprisonment prior
judges of their offices and is, therefore, unconstitutional). But seeErvin, to impeachment strips
supra note 21, at 114-27
(rejecting&rgument of nonexclusivity of impeachment based on the
Act of 1790 by noting that the
Act was never enforced); Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra note 21,
at 1131 n.86 (rejecting
argument of nonexclusivity of impeachment based on the Act of 1790,
which provided for disqualification of judges upon conviction of bribery, because "the issue is removal
and not disqualification").
147. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9. § 21, I Stat. 112 (1845). Even though,
in 1793, the preface to
the statute on crimes of the United States stated that the Act of
April 30, 1790, was deemed repealed, the statutory language remained the same. In the 1878
codification and revision of the
United States statutes, the language of the Act of 1790 remained essentially
the same as it always had
been. but the fine for accepting a bribe was set at three times the amount of
the bribe, and imprisonment was limited to three years. Rev. Stat. § 5501 (2d ed. 1878). In 1909,
Congress again amended
the statute. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 32 1, § 117.35 Stat. 1109-10 (1909). In
1948 Congress amended
18 U.S.C. §§201-223 again to make the ine S20,000. Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645, § 207. 62 Stat.
692-93 (1948). These provisions were amended again in 1962. Act of
Oct. 23, 1962, P.L. 87-849, §
201(e), 76 Stat. 1119 (1962). The current statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. applies
to all government officials. Today the sanctions for violating the Act include "(ines ofl not
more than three times the
monetary equivalent of the thing of value, or imprisontment] for not more
than fifteen years, or both,
and (offenders] may be disqualified from holding any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the
United States." 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(4) (Supp. V 1987).
148. R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 150 (footnotes omitted).
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tivists as well as the Supreme Court have expressed the view that actions
relating to constitutional decision making by the First Congress-many
of whose members attended the Constitutional Convention or participated in the ratification campaign-are highly probative of the framers'
intent. 149
Yet, Berger fails to address an important issue raised by the Act of
1790. The Act speaks explicitly only of "disqualification" not of "removal." In light of the rule of interpretation that each and every word of
the Constitution and congressional enactments must be given meaning,
one commentator argues that the Act should not be cited as authority for
the proposition that the Congress provided for both removal and disqualificatioi of federal judges upon their conviction for bribery, because the
Act expressly provides only for disqualification and, thus, says nothing
about whether impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
judges.s 0 This commentator argues that, at most, the Act indicates that
impeachment is not the5t sole means of disqualifying federal judges from
holding future offices.'
What this commentator fails to do, however, is identify the practice
under that statute and the necessary implications of its language. First,
the Act was construed during the time of its operation as both removing
and disqualifying federal judges convicted of bribery. 52 Second, the Act,
which explicitly applies only to sitting federal judges, directs unambiguously that once convicted, they are disqualified from ever holding office
in the future. 1" This directive implies that a federal judge, once convicted of bribery, is also necessarily removed from office. Giving meaning to each word of a statute or the Constitution also requires not
interpreting the statute or Constitution to mandate absurd results. If
149. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724 n.3 (1986) (listing 20 members of the First Congress who were also delegates at the Constitutional Convention); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
790-91 (1983) (holding that legislative chaplaincy does not violate the establishment clause because
the First Congress appointed a chaplain for itself); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 411-12 (1928) (holding that the actions of the First Congress support the power of Congress to lay import taxes for the purpose of protecting domestic industry); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of the national bank in part
because the First Congress had carefully considered the issue prior to creating a national bank). But
seeMarbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (holding unconstitutional a portion of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. passed by the First Congress, because it increased the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court beyond what was expressly provided by the Constitution).
150. See Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra note 21, at 1131 n.86.
151, See id.
152. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 150; see also Note, supra note 10, at 1390, 1396 n.44
(arguing that the Act of 1790 proved impeachment is not the only means of removing federal judges
since disqualification necessarily includes removal). But see Ervin, supra note 21, at 118 & n.43
(claiming that impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal judges and dismissing the
Act of 1790 because it was never invoked).
153. See supra note 147.
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someone is disqualified from ever holding office in the future, the plain
implication is that the person may no longer occupy the office presently
held; in short, the person is effectively removed.
B.

Problems with Informalist Approacles to Impeachment
1. General Problems with Informalism.-Informalists have two

distinguishing characteristics as a group: (1) rejecting history as the primary guide to interpreting the impeachment clauses and (2) failing to
suggest any substitute arguably more legitimate or reliable than history
54
as a guide to interpreting the impeachment clauses.' The one way in
which the informalists resemble the formalists, however, is that neither
group can reach any consensus on how its approach to constitutional
interpretation may be applied to the impeachment clauses.
The ad hoc analysis applied to the impeachment clauses by the informalists has two interrelated problems. First, infolmalists articulate no
guiding or organizing principle for interpreting the impeachment clauses.
Such an approach runs contrary to the notion that constitutional interpretation normally makes sense only if, in those circumstances in which
it must depart from the language or structure of the Constitution, it does
so with reference to something generally recognized or accepted as legitimate or authoritative. As a general matter, theories of constitutional law
are helpful because they make constitutional interpretation predictable
through the systematic use of some guiding or organizing principle.ss
By failing to posit any point of reference other than the non-self-defining
language of the Constitution and by failing to articulate any guiding principle for constitutional interpretation, informalists propose no standard
154. See.e.g., 1. BRANT, supra note 22, at 3-23 (selectively relying on history and structural
indications and personal preferences to conclude that impeachment is the only alternative); Fenton,
supra mtte 146, at 745-74 (using historical arguments without explaining their methodological
soundness to conclude that impeachment is the exclusive means of removal); Firmage & Mangrum,
supra note 22, at 1102-08 (applying informal method of analysis to impeachment of the President);
Franklin, supra note 22, at 339-41 (arguing that Berger's formalist approach is flawed); Havighurst,
supra note 10,at 223-37 (applying informalist arguments to support a parliamentary form of govern.
(rejecting historical interpretamcini is an alteriiaiive io impeachment); Linde, supra tiote 10. passimn
tion and applying informal arguments to support ajoint congressional resolution as an alternative to
the present system of impeachment); Thompson & Polliti, supra note 23, at 118-21 (relying without
explanation on congressional practices to argue that impeachment is an effective tool); Note, supra
note 10, at 1391-407 (arguing that impeachment is ineffective and inefficient); Comment, supra note
10, passim (using informalist arguments to support the proposition that federal judges have the
power to remove other federal judges).
155. SeeSandalow, Constitutional interpretation. 79 Micit. L. RtvY. 1033, 1068 (arguing that
constitutional law is "a process by which each generation gives formal expression to the values it
holds fundamental in the operations of government"); Simon. The Authority of the Constitution and
Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 630-36
(arguing that without normative theories about the source and nature of constitutional authority, we
have no justification for ascribing any particular set of meanings to the Constitution).
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or theory by which to judge their own Work. Their studies provide no
helpful guide for making their interpretation of the impeachment clauses
or other constitutional provisions predictable or even understandable.
This lack of an organizing principle to govern their constitutional
interpretation includes a failure to articulate any systematic justification
for their limited use of history or other evidence in their analyses of the
impeachment clauses. Informalists fail to explain how their use-of a
patchwork of historical and other kinds of evidence to explain impeachment, including their choices to give different pieces of evidence different
weight, is any more legitimate than the formalists' strict adherence to
history as a primary guide.'5 6 In addition, when informalists do turn to
history, their reading of history is often either incomplete or incorrect. '
Second, the unarticulated starting point for many informalists is
often the inconvenience of or dissatisfaction with the constitutional procedure they are analyzing.' 58 The problem with this approach is that, as
the Supreme Court once warned,
[clonvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the
hallmarks-of democratic government.
... [P]olicy arguments supporting even purposeful "political
inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which
defines powers and . . . sets obt just how those powers are to be

exercised. 59
Part of the unarticulated disagreement between the formalists and
the informalists is the extent to which politics is or should be a part of
constitutional decision making. Informalists proceed as if there is no
problem with incorporating politics, either because of efficiency or con156. See. e.g.,Havighurst, supra note 10, at 223-37 (arguing for parliamentary government as an
alternative to impeachment without legitimizing informalist arguments); Shartel, supra note 10. at
884-91 (concluding that, despite the fact that jurisdiction to oust federal judges for misconduct or
neglect of duty has never been exercised by any federal court or statutorily conferred by Congress on
any judicial tribunal, the supervisory nature and justiciable character of such a proceeding make it a
logical and necessary extension of the judicial power granted by the Constitution): Note, supra note
10, at 1397-98 (seeking to establish the propriety ofjudicial removal of federal judges by arguing that
such authority is implicit in the notions of due process and separation of powers).
157. See e.g..Havighurst. supra note 10, at 229-33 (claiming that the framers were most concerned with having a strong executive); Sharel, supra note 10,at 889-909 (arguing that there is no
limit to congressional ability to define what constitutes "good Behaviour"); seealso Stevens. supra
note 146, at 215-17 (recounting that prior to the Constitution the King could simply remove any
judges who disagreed with him); Comment, supra note 10,at 1164-90 (stating that presidential removal of impeachable officials violates the congressional power to impeach); cf Stoltz, supra note
14, at 662 (refuting Shartel's reading of the "good Behaviour" clause asa reminder that judges did
not serve simply at the king's pleasure, as they had done before the Act of Settlement in 1700).
I158. See,e.g.. Havighurst, supra note 10. at 224-29 (discussing the political difficulty of impeach.
ment); Linde, supra note 10, at 384 (discussing the difficulty of proof as a barrier to impeachment).
159. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 944 (1983); see also Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra
note 21, at 1141(applying the Court's admonition against convenience to the congressional short-cut
procedure for impeaching federal judges).
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veniencd, into their analysis of constitutional law. Formalists, on the
other hand, want to limit the role that politics may play in constitutional
decision making. Formalists implicitly view constitutional law as transcending politics, which they understand as petty, self-serving, and, ultimately, an illegitimate guide to constitutional interpretation.
Both the informalists and the formalists fail to recognize that constitutional law is itself a peculiar form of politics. The Constitution is,
above all else, a political document that reflects the political choices the
framers elevated to the status of law. Contemporary debates about the
meaning of the Constitution are conducted, as they always have been, in
and through the political process. It is naive to separate politics artificially from constitutional law. As Justice Frankfurter observed, constitutional law is not at all a science, but "applied politics, using the word in
its noblest sense."t1o Neither the informalists nor the formalists attempt
to answer the critical question: Where does constitutional mandate end
and political judgment begin?
No fine line exists between constitutional mandate and politics, precisely because constitutional law derives from and is shaped and informed by politics, as that term is broadly understood. Certain
constitutional provisions blend the constitutional and the political more
clearly than others, and the impeachment clauses may be the clearest
example of a constitutional procedure structured to accommodate political dialogue. Even though informalists may accept this proposition,
they fail to acknowledge that they are incorporating politics in the form
of either convenience or efficiency into their constitutional interpreta-

tions. Formalists may reject informalist interpretations because they
view convenience as hiving no relevance to or value in making determinations of constitutionality, or they may reject convenience merely as an
unseemly basis for constitutional decision making. In other words, formalists may view as illegitimate the inclusion of anything smacking of the
political as a guide to constitutional interpretation. Formalists fail to understand, however, that convenience is not the equivalent of illegitimacy;
convenience is simply a less authoritative (less persuasive) basis for constitutional decision making, a process that formalist political decision
inakers, including judges, prefer to ground in something that appears
more noble of more ennobling.161
This debate over convenience or something grander as a guide to
constitutional interpretation is central to constitutional law, because con160. Bickel, Applied Politics and the Science ofLaw: Writings of the Harvard Period, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 164. 166 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
16' See infra note 166.
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stitutional interpretation frequently requires commentators to go beyond
the language, structure, or history of the Constitution to give meaning to
or to explain a particular constitutional issue.' 6 1 Indeed, theory eiters
the picture at this juncture. Constitutional theory is most useful as a
guide to understanding a constitutional question not readily answered by
the language, structure, or history of the Constitution.
Modern theories of constitutional interpretation suffer, however,
from a variety of problems, including their implicit reinforcement of the
values or biases of the theorists employing them and the natural elusiveness and difficult interpretative problems of the Constitution's history
and language.163 Thecries are desirable because most provisions of the
Constitution are not self-defining; they require the interpreter to look
beyond the language of the Constitution for the key to their particular
meaning.'" Theories are also desirable because they impose limitations
on and provide guidance to both judges and legislatures in construing the
Constitution.' 6 5 Such uses of theory, however, are inevitably linked to
certain theorists' desires for constitutional interpretation to move in directions dependent on the theorists' undisclosed political or personal
preferences.
Ultimately, the real test of the legitimacy and effectiveness of a theory of constitutional interpretation is the degree to which it is methodologically sound and coherent. A viable theory must also be compatible
with the constitutional provisions to which it is applied. In addition, the
theory must be faithful to what society regards as legitimate and controlling, including the language, structure, purposes, and history of the Constitution, as well as to public values for which there is general societal
consensus.' 66
162. SeeSimon, supro note 155, at 603-04 (noting that although for some constitutional provisions the meaning is clear, for others "the language . . . is sovague, ambiguous, and open-tcxtured
that they might be understood to mean almost anything").
163. Seegenerally M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 179-80. 313 (discussing general problems with
liberal theories of constitutional law).
164. Seesupra note 162; seealso George & Porth, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Exami.
nation ofthe Establishment Clause. 90 W. VA. L. REv. 109, 120 (1987) (recognizing that "the meanings of various elements of the Constitution are not immediately plain and that. . . courts arc
required to make authoritative choices").
165. SeeGeorge & Porth, supra note 164 (noting that "certain constitutional theories usefully
guide the choice and action of the constitutional interpreter").
166. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 10-13 (conceiving of the judicial function asan attempt to reveal
or elaborate the meaning of constitutional values through the dialogue of adjudication); Michelman.
supra note 19,at 18-19 (characterizing proponents of republicanism as favoring participatory politics
wherein "civic virtue" develops from citizen dialogue in pursuit of values that should control public
and private life); Michelman, supra note 18, at 509 (regarding politics asan indispensable process by
which social beings choose the terms of coexistence-both the rules of social cooperation and the
"moral ambience" of the social world); Monaghan. Third Party Standing, 84 COLum. L. REV. 277,
279-80 (1984) (observing that "the process of constitutional adjudication now operates as one in
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Constitutional theories are nothing more than points of reference
that theorists use to resolve ambiguities, gaps, or conflicts in constitutional language or history. The legitimacy of these points of reference,
however, ultimately depends on the degree to which they are themselves
derived from other legititilate points of reference.' 6' While legitimacy
may be a malleable concept, dependent more often than not on the preferences and values of the decision maker, it may nevertheless be reflected
for the purposes of constitutional law either in the values or freedoms
protected by the Constitution or in the public values defining a
community.' 68
2

Specific Problems with Informalism.-A critical analysis of spe-

cific informalist attempts to interpret the impeachment clauses illustrates
the problems of informalism. For example, Irving Brant, an informalist,
rejects 'the history of impeachment in England and original intent as
guides to defining impeachable offenses and to determining the permissibility of judicial review of impeachments.169 Brant construes the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" as making criminality a requirement
for an impeachable offense, but concludes, somewhat confusingly, that
indictable offenses as well as violations of the oath of office constitute
impeachable offenses.o
Brant's reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is problematic
for three reasons. First, making the oath of office a standard limiting
impeachable conduct is an invention out of whole cloth. There simply is
which courts discharge a special function: declaring and enforcing public norms"); Seidman, Public
Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006. 1007 (1987) (commenting that "instead ofoffering reconciliation, constitutional law allows us to live with contradiction by establishing a shifting, uncertain, and contested
boundary between distinct public and private spheres within which conflicting values can be separately nujtred"); Sunstein. Public Values. Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
Sup. Cr.' Rsv. 127, 165 (concluding that, according to the Supreme Court, the equal protection
clause aiins at the evil of classifying groups of people for disparate treatment without a view to
promoting a public value).
167. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 363, 581 (1982)
(arguing that the pervasive presence of "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" in contract and tort law
enable practitioners and judges to manipulate those areas according to personal, political, or economic preference). As Professor Kennedy well knows, the presence of "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguitics" is not restricted to contract and tort law, but extends throughout other areas of law, including
constitutional law, whose "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" practitioners, judges, and commentators
may manipulate to further their own personal or political preferences. The critical point is that in
constitutional law the "gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities" should be resolved in terms of public values.
Seesupra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 166; seealso Sandalow, supra note 155, at 1054-55 (remarking that constitutional law "emerges not as exegesis, but as a process by which each generation gives formal expression to the values it holds fundamental in the operations of government").
169. See I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 21-23.
170. See id. at 180-81.
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no support in the structure, language, or history of the impeachment
clauses for Brant's inclusion of violations of oaths as impeachable offenses. Like Berger, Brant is concerned that a broad definition of impeachable offenses would enable Congress to abuse the impeachment
process to invade judicial independence. Consequently, Brant substitutes
his own partisan preferences for a narrow range of impeachable offenses
instead of interpreting the impeachment clauses. In addition, the- language of the oath taken by the civil officers of the United States is so
broad that "limiting" impeachable offenses to violations of the oath
neither clarifies nor effectively narrows the range of impeachable
offenses.' 7'
Second, the language in the Constitution regarding impeachable offenses is not as clear as Brant believes. Based on the language setting
forth the impeachment procedure, Berger rejects Brant's inference that
72
Unlike
the Constitution makes impeachment a criminal process.
proceimpeachment
the
of
Brant, Berger acknowledges that only some
dure set forth in the Constitution resembles actual criminal process. For
example, the absence of criminal penalties as punishment for impeachment undermines Brant's assertion that impeachment is essentially a
criminal procedure. 73
Third, Brant ignores a great deal of relevant history, particularly
when it undermines his view of impeachment. Brant bases his understanding of the scope of impeachable offenses solely on the structure of
the Constitution. In doing so, Brant not only summarily rejects the English precedents but also ignores the colonial experiences with impeachment, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification campaign." 4
For example, Brant agrees with Berger that impeachment was a criminal
process in England, yet ignores the fact that in England people could be
impeached for noncriminal acts. Although Brant rejects the history of
171. Seeid. at 181 (Brant asked, with respect to identifying possible violations of oath of office,
"what is 'serious dereliction from public duty' unconnected with office, as presented in (Congressman] Ford's concept? It is anything that can beconjured up, imagined, or falsely charged, or anything that conflicts with prevailing ideas of decorum.").
172. SeeR. BERGER, supra note 14, at 78*85.
173. See.e.g.,U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6-7 (referring to the ability of the Senate "to try"
impeachments and that "no Person shall beconvicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present"); id. at art. II. § 2. cl. I (providing that the President shall have the power to
pardon except in the case of impeachment); id. at art. II, § 4 (providing that "the President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"); id. at art. Ill,
§ 2. cl. 3 (referring to "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachments"). Brant argues
that the Constitution's repeated use of words most often used in the criminal context to describe or
to refer to impeachment indicates that impeachment was intended to be used only for criminal offenses. Seet. BRANT, supra note 22, at 23.
174. I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 11-13; seealso Book Note. supra note 116, at 916.
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impeachment in England as a relevant or meaningful inquiry, he substitutesnothing for it other than his own personal preference to protect the
federal judiciary by "criminalizing" impeachable offenses.
Brant fails to acknowledge even the critical historical fact that, during the Constitutional Convention and the ratification campaign, the
framers did not limit their comments regarding acts they considered impeachable to acts that would have been criminal under existing statutes.'
Brant's preference for characterizing impeachment proceedings
as criminal can be traced not to history or even to the language or structure of the impeachment clauses in the Constitution but rather to Brant's
personal concern that the federal judiciary needs heightened protection
against the possibility that Congress may overzealously exercise the impeachment process against federal judges.176 That the Constitution's impeachment process has only some characteristics resembling criminal
trials and that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention cited noncriminal examples as impeachable offenses plainly suggest that impeachment is not strictly a criminal proceeding. Instead, it is a unique hybrid
of civil and criminal proceedings for use against certain political officials.
Brant's analysis of the propriety of the judicial review of impeachment fares no better than his reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors." His primary argument for judicial review of impeachment is that of
the defenders of President Andrew Johnson during his impeachment:

when impeachment exceeds its constitutional bounds, it becomes a bill of
77

attainder and at that point, just as with a bill of attainder, it should be
subject to judicial nullification.' 78 This analysis has two flaws. First,
Brant's characterization of an unconstitutional impeachment as a bill of
attainder confuses the natures of the two procedures. Bills of attainder
are enactments by a legislature passed for the purpose of punishing one
individual;" they are expressly prohibited because they deprive the target of a fair hearing.s 0 By their nature, impeachments are directed only

175. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text. Further, Madison indicated that the President
would render himself impeachable if he summoned only a few Senators to ratify a treaty. See R.
BERGER,
supra note 14, at 89. Moreover, bribery, a specifically enumerated impeachable offense,
was not made a statutory offense until 1790, two years after the Constitution's ratification. See id. at
76 n.118 (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112 (1845)).
176. Brant feared that the judiciary may besubject to legislative tyranny through congressional
power to impeach. See I. BRANT, supra note 22. at 11-23. He also feared congressional attempts to
pass bills of attainder under the guise of impeachment. See id. at 188-200; infra notes 177-78.
177. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 9,cl. 3 provides that "No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed."
178. See I. BRANT. supra note 22. at 133-54. 181-200; seealso U.S. CoNsT. art. 1. § 9, cl. 3.
179. See United States v. Lovett. 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (noting that bills of attainder apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group).
180. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442, 445 (1965); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315.
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at a certain class of individuals and have only some of the characteristics
of trials. The fact that an impeachment may exceed its constitutional
boundaries does not, by itself, transform it into a bill of attainder. Once
an impeachment exceeds its bounds, it becomes neither more nor less
than an unconstitutional impeachment. Second, Brant confuses the determination of constitutionality with the determination of reviewability.
The Constitution sets forth impeachment as a political procedure for removing certain federal officials. Although impeachment has its constitutional boundaries, it is a mistake to assume that any movement beyond
those boundaries transforms impeachment into a judicially reviewable
question of political decision making.
Former Representative Frank Thompson and Professor Dan Pollitt,
also informalists, rely exclusively on congressional practices to define impeachable offenses. 8' They argue that only indictable offenses constitute
impeachable offenses, basing their conclusion solely on the observation
that, as of the date of their study, the only examples of successful impeachment and removal' from federal office involved indictable offenses.18 2 Thompson and Pollitt never explain why congressional
practices should dominate our understanding of impeachable offenses,
even though their methodology is at least consistent with the view once
espoused by Justice Brandeis that a "persistent legislative practice which
involves a delimitation of the respective powers of Congress and the President, and which has been so established and maintained, should be
deemed tantamount to judicial construction, in the absence of any decision by any court to the contrary."' 83
Accepting past congressional practice as authoritative is problematic because there is no sound reason to equate what Congress consistently does with what is constitutional. Simply because Congress
consistently does something does not, in and of itself, mean that the practice is constitutional. Thompson and Pollitt fail to understand that the
most past congressional impeachment practices indicate is that it is easier
to obtain a conviction from the Senate in a removal trial if the offense
was indictable. The recent impeachment proceedings against Judge Alcee Hastings confirm that it is easier to impeach a person for committing
an indictable offense even though he has been acquitted of the underlying
crime for which the impeachment has been brought. 84
181. See Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 23, at 107-08. 117-18.
182. See id. at 106, 117-18.
183. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 283 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915)).
184. Interestingly, the House overwhelmingly voted to impeach Judge Hastings for conduct underlying the misconduct for which he was previously acquitted in federal court. Although Judge
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Professors Edwin Firmage and R. Collin Mangrum are also informalists who propose applying general notions of due process to impeachment trials.taa Even though they acknowledge that the fifth
amendment's guarantee of due process applies only to court and agency
adjudications, Firmage and Mangrum argue that a general notion of due
process inherent in the American system of justice should pervade all
trial-like proceedings, including impeachments." These commentators
undoubtedly want fairness to be part of an impeachment proceeding, but
they lack any constitutional authorization for its inclusion. Although the
Constitution does require that Senators participate in impeachment pro87
this provision requires at
ceedings only upon "oath or affirmation,"
most that individual Senators be prepared to deliberate carefully during
an impeachment trial. The "oath or affirmation" requirement is a safeguard included in the Constitution to encourage Senators to take removal
proceedings seriously and to prevent the Senate from acting hastily or
intemperately.' 88 Careful consideration of an issue is an element of fairness, but it is not the sole component.
Although Firmage and Mangrum acknowledge that impeachments
are essentially political proceedings with few constitutional constraints,
they fail to confine their own constitutional interpretation within these
constraints.' t 9 They fail to understand that while the Constitution does
not require fairness to be part of impeachment proceedings, prudent politics cautions Senators to conduct impeachments as fairly as possible. Indeed, the Senate's accountability to the people (through the seventeenth
amendment' 90 ) constrains the Senate, as a matter of politics but not conHastings argued that general notions of fairness should have led the House and the Senate to give
some deference to the jury's decision not to convict him on some of the same evidence presented
against him during his impeachment proceedings, the Senate appointed a special trial committee to
receive evidence pertaining to Judge Hastings' removal and consider any evidence it deemed relevant
to the charges against Judge Hastings in his removal proceedings. See Edwards, Regulating Judicial
Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior"for Federal Judges, 87 Micti. L. Rev. 765. 768-69 (1989)
(noting that "Hastings was impeached by the House of Representatives on seventeen articles of
impeachment, covering, among other things, the bribery and perjury charges of which he was acquitted in 1983").
185. See Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 22. at 1073, 1076.
186. See id. at 1073-75.
187. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation." U.S. CoNsT. art. I.§ 3, cl. 6.
188. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 730.
189. SeeFirmage & Mangrum, supra note 22, at 1051 (acknowledging that "[oln balance ...
American precedent reflects the basic understanding that the impeachment process is fundamentally
political").
190. The seventeenth amendment provides in pertinent part that "(tlhe Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years. . . ." U.S. CONsT., amend. XVl, cl. 1. Prior to the enactment of the seventeenth amendment,
Senators were selected by their respective state legislatures.
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stitutional law, to make impeachment proceedings as fair as possible.
C. Beyond Formalism and Informalism
9
Very few constitutional interpretation cases are easy,' ' and many
fear that unprincipled constitutional interpretation-particularly by
courts-leads to unprincipled results. The central problem with constiwhich are not
tutional interpretation is a need for systematic approaches,
92
impeachThe
motivated.'
politically
or
flawed
inherently
themselves
ment clauses, however, make systematic analysis difficult. The first step
in sound analysis is to identify the particular characteristics that make a
certain constitutional provision difficult to interpret and apply. For example, the constitutional provision designating impeachable offenses as
193
is not self-defining,
including "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
nor does it indisputably invoke, imply, or trigger any contemporary concepts. The delegates at the Constitutional Convention debated the inclusion of this phrase in the Constitution but failed to categorize the offenses
that it would include. Only after isolating those characteristics making
interpretation of a particular provision difficult is it appropriate to assess
the compatibility of that provision with a particular theory of constitutional law.
A useful goal is to find a middle ground between historical and ad
hoc interpretation of the impeachment clauses. A more sensible and less
manipulative approach to impeachment than either formalism or informalism consists of three steps: (1) identifying the linguistic and historical limits of the impeachment clauses, (2) understanding how the
Constitution may accommodate innovations and deviations from the allocation of powers within the Constitution, and (3) understanding what
the interpretation of the impeachment clauses suggests about constitutional interpretation in general.
The first step in interpreting the impeachment clauses is to identify
the limits of what logically defines the contexts of those clauses-language and history. Unfortunately, the Constitution offers very few self191. Compare M. TUSHNET, sUpra note 18, at 52-56, 68-69 (on the difficulty of avoiding judicial
over-involvement) with Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. Rev. 399, 408-10, 427 (1985) (on distinguishing hard and easycases).

192. Professor Tushnet argues that:

the liberal tradition makes constitutional theory both necessary and impossible. It is necessary because it provides the restraints that the liberal tradition requires us to place on those
in power, legislators and judges as well. It is impossible because no available approach to
constitutional law can effectively restrain both legislators and judges: It we restrain the
judges we leave legislators unconstrained; if we restrain the legislators we let the judges do
what they want.
M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 313.
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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raises but fails
defining clauses. The language in the Constitution often
94
Consequently,
t.' answer questions about the scope of a provision.'
ambiguiresolving
of
task
formidable
the
face
commentators frequently
95
Comstructure.'
or
language
constitutional
in
conflicts
or
ties, gaps,
mentators may not be confined by particular constitutional language, but
they are confined to the language. For example, interpreting the constitutional language "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" requires looking outside the Constitution itself for definition, but that search is limited
to the clarification of those particular terms. To identify which concepts
are consistent or compatible with particular constitutional language,
commentators may turn to history, which, within certain limits, provides
a perspective to aid in understanding constitutional provisions-such as
the impeachment clauses-that do not explain themselves to the modern
commentator. Although the meaning of "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is not readily apparent, history helps provide a frame of reference that gives the phrase meaning. The goal is to use history not as an
end in itself but only as an additional guide in the search for the meaning
of an ambiguous constitutional provision.
The first step also requires identifying the limits to our knowledge of
t e meaning of the impeachment clauses. On the one hand, certain aspects of impeachment are beyond reasonable dispute. For example, the
language of the impeachment clauses suggests that impeachment is a hybrid of both civil and criminal proceedings: the House and the Senate
have separate responsibilities regarding impeachment, there are unique
punishments for impeachments, only certain officials in the federal government are impeachable, and there is a set of offenses that are not selfdefining but may nevertheless serve as the bases for impeachments. In
addition, it is undisputed that the First Congress sought to automatically
disqualify, through the Act of 1790, any federal judges convicted of bribery.. Such an enactment suggests that at least under certain circum194. See,e.g., id. art. 1, §2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty-live Years. and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, bean Inhabitant of that State in which he shall bechosen."); id. art. 1,
§ 3,cl. 3 ("No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, bean Inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen."); id. art. II, §I1,cl. I ("[The President) shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years .... "). But seeid. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several States."); id. art. I. § g, cl. 18
("The Congress shall have Power [:] . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). Compare M.
TusNtivr, supra note 18,at 68-69 (on the defects of textualisni) with Schauer.supra note 191.at 408.
10 (on finding an "easy case").
195. See supro note 167.
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stances' 96 the First Congress did not regard impeachment as the sole
means of removing federal judges. It is also largely undisputed that Constitutional Convention delegates, primarily concerned with removal of
the President through impeachment as opposed to removal of any other
officers of the United States, proceeded as if impeachable offenses were
not limited to indictable offenses. Further, the delegates regarded the
Senate as the appropriate body to conduct removal trials because of its
implications of
purportedly unique capabilities to appreciate the political
issues.
political
important
on
carefully
deliberate
to
impeachments and
systemdefy
virtually
clauses
impeachmeit
On the other hand, the
atic analysis, because the framers designed impeachment primarily as a
political proceeding but did not address all the issues now raised under
these clauses. Neither the delegates at the Constitutional Convention nor
th-ratifiers definitively addressed whether impeachment is the exclusive
means of removing federal judges, which specific procedures should be
followed during impeachment hearings and trials, whether nonindictable
offenses should be included as impeachable offenses, whether impeachments of federal judges must precede their prosecutions and imprisonment, and whether an official may be impeached even after resignation
from office. The interpretive problem that remains is to determine what
to do once language and history have been exhausted or demonstrated as
inconclusive.
The second step in interpreting the impeachment clauses is to understand how the Constitution may accommodate innovations to or deviations from the Constitution's allocation of powers. This step consists of
two parts. First, commentators should identify those aspects of our constitutional separation of powers scheme that are immutable in the absence of constitutional amendments. Second, commentators should
define and explain how the three branches of government may deal with
the mutable aspects of separation of powers.
In defining the immutable aspects of separation of powers, one
should remember that separation of powers is a subset of checks and
balances, a system that limits the three branches to their assigned responsibilities so that no branch may grow too powerful or infringe on individual liberties.' 97 The actual scheme of checks and balances in the
196. It may be constitutional for Congress to combine its powers under the necessary and proper
clause and the impeachment clauses to disqualify federal judges once they have been convicted of
bribery. See R. BERGER. supra note 14, at 150-53.
of the doctrine of separa197. See.e.g.,Ervin, supro note 21, at 13-19 (claiming that the essence
Shartel, supra note 10. at 893tion of powers isa part of the framers' plan for balanced government);check
on other branches of the
94 (arguing that the framers intended impeachment to be a legislative
government).
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Constitution, however, is incomplete. History reveals that the framers
defined the checks and balances for each branch of government only at
its apex. The framers left the task of structuring the lower parts of
branches to subsequent generations because they understood that the de-nands on government would change over time and realized that an immutable structure of government from top to bottom would hinder
progress. 198

Any deviations from the immutable allocation of powers within the
Constitution are plainly unconstitutional. Not surprisingly, the major
debates in separation of powers cases are over the scope of the so-called
immutable allocation of powers within the Constitution.99 The three
branches may, however, tinker with the mutable aspects of separation of
powers. Any deviations from the Constitution's mutable allocation of
power are not unconstitutional per se; they do, however, raise the question whether they should be treated with a presumption of constitutionality by the other branches.
Congressional innovation with constitutionally mutable allocation
of power is not boundless, because innovation may still violate values or
principles that the original allocation of powers was structured to protect
and preserve. For example, assuming arguendo that impeachment is not
the sole constitutional means for removing federal judges, any other
means for such removal must still preserve both individual and collective
198. See Koukoutchos. Constitutional Kinetics: The Independent Counsel Case and
the Separa.

tion ofPowers, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 666-67 (1988).
199. When the Supreme Court finds that the Constitution forbids an encroachment
by one
branch on the powers of another, it does not hesitate to forbid the encroachment. See. e.g..
Bowsher
v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding that Congress could not hold the power of removal
except by impeachment over an officer exercising purely executive functions); INS v. Chadha,
462
U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that Congress violated the presentment and veto clauses of
the Consti.
tution in enacting a one house veto over the decision of an executive officer); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (holding that Congress could not
assign article III powers in the Bankruptcy Act to judges who did not have life tenure and protection
against salry diminution); Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. I. 143 (1976) (holding that Congress violated
the appointments clause when it retained the power to appoint members of the Federal Election
Commission); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that Congress could not
condition the removal of a purely executive officer without violating the appointments clause).
However, when actions are not specifically forbidden in the Constitution or do not impinge upon the
ability of a branch to carry out its constitutionally assigned functions, the Court will uphold the
constitutionality of the action. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ci. 2597, 2611 (1988) (holding
that Congress could delegate appointment of an independent counsel to the judiciary since the counsel as a minor official and the removal pow er remained to a significati
degree within the executive
branch, thereby not seriously impinging upon the power or the President to carry out his constitutionally assigned functions); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (holding that the
President could not claim executive privilege over nonmilitary and nondiplomatic documents without impinging upon the powers of the judiciary under article Ill and criminal defendants under the
sixth amendment); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935) (holding that
Congress tuld place conditions on the removal power of the President when the officer performed
quasi-egislative and quasi-judicial functions).
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judicial independence-the goals of the constitutional guarantees of life
tenure and undiminished compensation for federal judges.20 Consequently, congressional innovations with the Constitution's mutable allocation of powers should be entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
This presumption may be rebutted only when the congressional deviation
from the mutable checks and balances contravenes values or principles
that the original structure was erected to protect.20 This approach allows for deference by the President and the judiciary to the constitutional
interpretations of Congress and for experimentation in government precisely where the innovation does not undermine values or principles that
the original checks and balances were erected to protect. A rebuttable
presumption of constitutionality avoids constitutional inertia by preventing the structure at the top from blinding constitutional interpretation to
the realities of government and to the possibilities of change not envisioned or addressed by the framers but still consistent with their handi-

work. Finally, the presumption avoids unbounded congressional
deviations by delineating the outer limits of permissible tinkering with
the structure of government short of the amendment process.
The third step in interpreting the impeachment clauses is to understand what, if anything, such interpretation suggests about constitutional
interpretation in general. Interpreting the impeachment clauses demonstrates the limits of superimposing certain theories on particular constitutional provisions. Common sense suggests that before manipulating a
particular constitutional provision to fit a particular theory of constitutional interpretation, it is better first to assess whether a particular constitutional provision is compatible with any preexisting theory of
constitutional interpretation. If a theory does not fit or cannot explain
the nuances of a particular constitutional provision, then that theory
should not be used to explain that particular provision. Commentators
should interpret each constitutional provision on its own terms, recognizing the provision's particular historical and structural contexts. Such
contextual interpretation requires the use of different techniques to interpret different constitutional provisions. 202 Although this methodology
200. See infra notes 274-91 and accompanying text.

201. See generally Strauss. Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488. 492, 499 (1987) (focusing on the overall
framework of relationships between branches of govcrnment, rather than on particular relationships,
because administrative agencies perform all three constitutional functions); Strauss. The Place of
Agencies in Government, Separation ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUm. L. REV. 573, 667
(1984) (same).
202. See, e.g.. C. BLACK. DECiSioN ACCORDING TO LAw 65-66, 71-76 (1981) (arguing that
originalism will work for first amendment analysis but that something more is needed for privacy
and gender discrimination); J. ELY, supra note 100, at 76 (arguing that "interpretivism is iicomplete:
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will not make constitutional interpretation as predictable or as easy as it
is under a theory attempting to organize the entirety of constitutional
law, the virtue of this approach is that it reduces the possibilities of distortion or manipulation through constitutional interpretation by treating
constitutional provisions on ,their own 'terms as opposed to the terms of
an unrelated or inappropriate theory. Thus, the important thing to ask
with respect to each provision of the Constitution, including the impeachment clauses, is whether there is an appropriate guiding principle
for its particular interpretation.
IV.

Making Sense of Impeachment

A. The Nonexclusive Nature of Impeachment as a Means of Removal
Perhaps the single most troublesome question under the impeachment clauses is whether impeachment is the exclusive means for removing "all Civil Officers of the United States," 203 including federal judges.
This question raises a series of interrelated problems. First, which federal officials may be impeached? While it is clear that the constitutional
provision that "all Civil Officers of the United States" includes the President and federal judges, commentators split on whether this provision
2
also includes legislators. 04
The second problem is to determine the extent to which other
branches' powers to discipline and remove their members should influence whether the judiciary should be able to discipline and remove its
own members. To answer this question, one must determine whether the
basis for allowing the other branches to discipline and remove their officers is equally applicable to the judiciary. This inquiry should help to
illuminate the constitutionally permissible ways for removing impeachathere are provisions in the Constitution that call for more"); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
1212, 1251-53 (1984) (defending balancing methodology in first amendment cases); Shiffrin. Liberalism. Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103, 1211 (1983) (arguing that the
"wisdom" of judicial balancing requires that legal scholars expose complexity and "clarify intuitions" in advocating accommodation of diverse values). But seeM. TUSHNET, supra note 19, at
182-87 (criticizing balancing as failing to restrain judicial tyranny, as providing no criteria by which
to evaluate judicial decisions, and as allowing the worst political decisions to bevalidated).
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, §4.
204. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 215 n.10, 220-23 (arguing that legislators may be
impeached but not for their legislative acts); Rotunda, supra note 13, at 715-16 (arguing that the
term "all civil Officers" excludes only military officers and, therefore, that "judges. . . . legislators
and all executive officials, whether in 'the highest or in the lowest departments' of the national
government, are subject to impeachments" (quoting J. STORY, supra note 72, §402, at 285-86)). But
seeL. TRIBE, supro note 13, at 290 (concluding without any supporting citation that members of
Congress are not civil officers of the United States).
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ble officials, particularly with respect to the exclusivity of impeachment
as a means of removing federal judges.
Interestingly, the judiciary has the least power of any of the three
20
The Constitution
branches to discipline and remove its own members.
expressly grants Congress the power to expel its own members.206
Although the Constitution provides for impeachment and removal of
certain federal officials by Congress, there is little doubt that officers
without life tenure may be removed in other ways. For example, under
2 07
the doctrine of Myers v. United States and Humphrey's Executor v.
20
United States, s the President, incident to his power to appoint and to
his constitutional duty to faithfully execute' the laws, may remove
subordinate officers who perform executive functions and who are also
subject to impeachment. Other executive or quasi-executive officers who
are not appointed[by the President are removable by the person or
with their appointment, subject to the regulations of
agency 20s 2entrusted
10
Congress.
The third problem is whether any deviation from the Constitution's
explicit procedure for removing federal judges by impeachment violates
the principles or values the procedure was erected to protect. This problem underscores the system of checks and balances as the context for
discussions regarding removal of federal judges. To evaluate the permissibility of deviation, one must understand how the allocation of removal
power within and between certain branches relates to the protections that
the allocation was intended or structured to achieve. The constitutional
allocation of removal power is a critical element of the structural relationships established by the Constitution to protect certain values or
functions; therefore, any deviation from the structure erected by the Constitution, including a deviation in the removal power, implicates what the
structure was designed to protect.
The fourth problem is explaining the proper relationship between
205. See Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 330, 332 (1937).
206. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CoNST. art. 1,§ 5.
cl. 2.
207. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
208. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
209.
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Oncers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, 2, cl. 2.
210. See Hlumphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. 602, 629; Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901);
United States v. Perkins. 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
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the constitutional provisions governing the impeachment process and the
constitutional clause concerning judges' good behavior. 21 The question
is whether the provision that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour" 2t2 merely defines the length of their tenure or creates an additional basis for removal. Analyzing the good behavior clause
also leads to an evaluation of the constitutionality of the Judicial Disability Act, which empowers judges to monitor other judges for possible impeachable offenses and, thereby, raises questions about whether such
innovations in the impeachment procedure violate separation of powers.
If impeachment is the exclusive means for removing federal judges,
then a fifth problem arises: whether indictment, prosecution, and imprisonment of sitting federal judges may precede an impeachment, even
though such practices may be tantamount to removal. This problem requires determining whether federal judges are entitled to special immunity from criminal prosecution unless and until they are removed from
office by impeachment.
1. The Limits of Analogizing Legislative and Executive Removal
Power to Judicial Removal Power.-In determining whether impeach-

ment is the exclusive means for removing federal judges, one must first
understand whether impeachment serves different purposes, depending
upon the officials against whom the power is exercised. The first step in
this analysis is to determine which officials are subject to impeachment.
The major difficulty presented by the constitutional provision making
"all Civil Officers of the United States" subject to impeachment is
whether it includes legislators as well as the President and all federal
judges. This interpretive problem, however, rarely receives serious attention from scholars. For example, Professor Ronald Rotunda relies on an
isnexplained citation to Justice Story to support his otherwise bald assertion that all executive officials, federal judges, and legislators are impeachable, 2t 3 whereas Professor Laurence Tribe makes the contrary
2t 4
assertion without any explanation or support.
Three clauses of the Constitution suggest that legislators are not officers of the United States and are, therefore, not subject to removal by
211. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
212. Id.
9 0
213. SeeRotunda, supra note 13. at 716 & nn.3 -4 (suggesting that only military officers are
excluded from the term "civil officers" and, therefore, that legislators may also beimpeached (citing
J. STORY, supra note 72)); seealso R. BERGER, Supra note 14,at 215 n.10 (suggesting that the use of
"civil Office" in article 1,section 6 was intended not to exclude members of Congress from the scope
of that phrase but to draw a line that would bar members of other governmental branches from
membership in Congress).
214. See L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 290.
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impeachment. First, article II, section 3 provides that the President is to
commission "all the officers"; and members of Congress are obviously
not so commissioned.215 Second, article I, section 6-the incompatibility
clause-provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall also be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office." 2 16 This clause suggests that legislators and officers of the United
States are mutually exclusive for constitutional purposes. Third, article
I, section 5 provides that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members .... Each House
may . . . punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the

217
It would have been ilConcurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."
logical for the framers to have given Congress two separate methods to
expel its own members.218 Therefore, the expulsion power given to Congress seems to be the congressional analogue to impeachment for the purpose of removing its own -members.
The expulsion power of Congress over its own members also provides important insights into the limits of relying on an analogy to congressional or presidential power to remove members within a branch as
the basis for arguing for judicial power to remove judges. First, if legislators are not impeachable officers, then the fact that Congress has the
power to expel its own members sheds no light on the propriety of allowing judges to remove other judges. The Constitution grants the fedcral government only one method for the removal of legislators.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry, addressed in the next section, is whether
the reasons for granting the President power to remove impeachable officials within the executive branch apply to the federal judiciary.
Second, one may infer that if the framers intended members of one
branch to have the power to remove other similarly situated or equally
powerful members within the same branch, then the framers would have
made this desire explicit. The most that the power of Congress to expel
its own members suggests is that Congress may discipline its members
through a procedure analogous (but not identical) to impeachment. Ex215. In pertinent part, the President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. II. § 3.
216. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 6.
217. Id. art. I, § 5.
218. But see Rotunda, supra note 13, at 717 (discussing the impeachment proceeding against
former Senator William Blount in 1797). Senator Blount's lawyer argued that no jurisdiction existed, because the Senate had already expelled Blount for "having been guilty of a high misdemeanor,
entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator.- Id. Nevertheless, the House still
impeached him. Although the Senate ultimately dismissed the charges against Blount, it is unclear
whether dismissal occurred because there was no jurisdiction or because no impeachable offense
existed even if jurisdiction had existed. See id.
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plicitly granting Congress expulsion power further suggests Congress
n -'ld not have this power absent a constitutional grant. Similarly, the
absence of any grant of expulsion power to the judiciary at least raises
the inference that federal judges do not have an impeachment-like power
to remove each other because the Constitution fails to grant this power.
who help the
The President's removal power extends to subordinates,
219
in a branch
however,
duties;
constitutional
discharge
to
President
without unified power, each official-wields the same power as every other
member of the branch. In such nonunified branches, the Constitution
appears to grant monitoring power only explicitly. In short, the framers
may have felt that a grant of such removal power to some members of
Congress over equally powerful members of the same branch was so unusual and potentially divisive that it required explicit language.
Third, judges differ from the President, Congress, and other members of their respective branches, because only the judiciary has life tenure. Of course, life tenure alone does not suggest that federal judges are
removable only by impeachment. It does suggest, however, that federal
officials with radically different tenure from the President and members
of Congress may well have to be treated differently for removal purposes.
The question is whether popularly elected and life-tenured officials
should be treated the same under the Constitution for purposes of removal. In other words, do the differences in selection and tenure of
popularly elected and life-tenured officials support exclusivity of impeachment as a means of removing federal judges? The answer, spelled
out in the next section, suggests that allowing federal judges to remove
themselves or even to participate formally in the process of removal
would most likely undermine the Constitution's attempts to make judicial status unique.
J 2. Separation of Powers, Removal, and the Exclusivity of Impeachment as a Means of Removing Executive Officials.-Understanding removal power, wherever it may be located, requires an understanding that
it may be the most critical element of the separation of powers. Whoever
exercises the power to remove may also have control over the actions of
the officials subject to that power. The impeachment power of Congress
arguably enables it to exercise extraordinary influence over the President,
federal judges, and certain other officials. Similarly, the President's ability to remove executive officials enables the President alone to direct
them in the exercise of their executive functions. The specter raised by
219. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
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220. The argument is that the presumption makes it
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to manipulate and undermine the Constitution's original and Representatives . . . and the Mem221. In pertinent part, article VI states: "The Senators
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" U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3. As specified by statute, members
of the United States against all
solemnly swear. . [to] support and defend the Constitution
the same; [to] take this
to
enemies, foreign and domestic; (to) bear true faith and allegiance
or purpose of evasion; and (to] well and
any mental reservation
obligation freely, without
faithfully discharge the duties of [their] office.
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63
$ U.S.C. §3331 (1982). Seealso Fisher, Constituional office members of Congrcss must take is
of
oath
the
that
(arguing
(1985)
718-722
707.
N.C.L. REv.
of members of Congress to interpret the
partial evidence of the authority and competence
Constitution).
222. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 718-22.
Defend the Constitution?.61 N.C.L. REv.
223. SeeMikva, How Well Does Congress Support and
the institutional and political capacity to
587, 590 (s983)(arguing that Congress does not have
deiiberation as federal courts).
engagein the same kind of intensive and thorough constitutional
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,Second, the presumption preserves judicial review, which is the judiciary's power to measure the consistency and compatibility of congressional enactments with the language, spirit, and structure of the
Constitution. The major difficulty with judicial review is conceding
Chief Justice John Marshall's pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison 224
that federal judges have a broad eonstitutional power to interpret the
Constitution,225 and that the other two branches are also charged as
a
practical matter with interpreting the Constitution in discharging their
own particular constitutional duties. Members of the judiciary are
not
necessarily any more qualified, gifted, or knowledgeable than Congress
or the President to say what the Constitution means.21 6 History
suggests, contrary to Justice Jackson's assertion that Supreme Court justices
"are not final because [they] are infallible, but [they)
are infallible only
because [they] are final,"227 that no one branch has any final say regarding the meaning of the Constitution.a28 As a practical matter, the
three
branches frequently engage in dialogues regarding constitutional
interpretation.2 29 As this dialogue unfolds, each branch inevitably tries to
eggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches. An effective
way
to guard against judicial aggrandizement (or judicial tyranny) and
to protect judicial review is the use of a presumption that requires the judiciary
to respect congressional innovations in the allocation of powers unless
those innovations violate what the structure was erected to protect. 230
The political question doctrine may serve the same ends by requiring
the
Supreme Court to abstain from interfering with or answering questions
entrusted to the sole discretion of some other branch.
The Supreme Court most recently explored the relationship between
inpeachment and presidential removal power in Morrison v. O/son.231
In
224. 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137(1803)
22i. See id. at 162-68.
226. See M. TUSHNET, supro note 18, at 112, 147, 160, 164-66.
James Madison stated:
ITIhe great security against a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others. . .. Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must
be
connected
with the
constitutional rights of the place.
TiE FiDERALtST No. 51,at 321-22 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961).
227. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443. 540 (1953) (Jackson. I.,
concurring).
228. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 746.
229. See id.
230. See supro note 200 and accompanying text.
231. 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2599 (1988). Morrison involved an investigation
of Theodore Olson, by
Independent Counsel Alexisa Morrison, former head of the Office
of Legal Counsel in President
Reagan's Justice Department. Ms. Morrison had been duly appointed
ant to the Independent Counsel Act to investigate whether Olson Independent Counsel pursuhad perjured himself before a
House subcommittee investigating the Justice Department's role in
a decision by the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency to withhold certain
documents regarding the Agency's
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23 2
the
upholding the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act,
Supreme Court did not adhere to a notion of unalterable, strict separation of powers that arguably dominated the Court's decisions in certain
significant separation of powers and removal cases from the early twentieth century through the 1980s.2 3 3 Instead, demonstrating deference to
congressional deviations from the separation of powers set forth in the
Constitution, the Court balanced the important purposes underlying the
Independent Counsel Act against what the Court perceived as the inconsequential inroads the Act made on presidential control over
prosecutions.
Morrison is significant for at least two ieasons. 234 First, it gave the

enforcement of the Superfund statute (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. J 9601-9675) (establishing complex legislation authorizing the fedcral government to investigate, enforce, and supervise the cleanup of the most dangerous toxic waste
sites in the United States) on the basis of executive privilege. During Independent Counsel Morrison's investigation, Olson refused to comply with certain subpoenas from the Independent Counsel
partly on the basis that the Independent Counsel Act itself was unconstitutional.
232. Ethics in Government Act. 28 U.S.C. 1 591-599 (Supp. V 1987). The Act was first enacted
in 1978 and has been reenacted twice, most recently in 1987. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, P.L. 100-191, 101Stat. 1293 (1987).
The constitutional challenges to the Independent Counsel Act turned on the Act's operation.
Passed in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Congress designed the act to allow an independent
counsel to prosecute certain high-level executive branch officials. The act is triggered "whenever the
Attorney General receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any
person described in subsection (b) may have violated any Federal criminal law." 28 U.S.C. § 591(a)
(Supp. V 1987). The enumerated officials include the President, the Vice President, the Attorney
General, assistant attorneys general, various people working in the Executive Office of the President,
the director and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Seeid. § 591(b).
If the Attorney General finds "no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted," id. § $92(b)(1), the matter is terminated. If the Attorney General conducts such an
investigation and linds "reasoniable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted." id.
J 592(c)(1)(A), then the Attorney General must apply to a special district court to appoint a special
prosecutor. The special court is also authorized to define the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the special
prosecutor. The special prosecutor in turn has "with respect to all matters" in his or her
"prosecutorial jurisdiction . . . , full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative
functions and powers of the Department of Justice land] the Attorney General." Id. § 594(a). The
special prosecutor may be removed by impeachment or by the Attorney General "only for good
cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties." Id. J 596(a)(1).
233. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that "Congress cannot reserve for
itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-51 (1983) (holding that Congress could not bypass the
constitutional requirement of a bicameral veto by reserving a unicameral veto over the decisions of
an agency of the executive branch); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602. 624 (1935)
(holding that Congress could limit for good cause the President's power of removal of an official of a
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative agency); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 107 (1926) (holding
that Congress could not participate in the removal of a postmaster, an executive official).
234. Aforrison is also significant for other reasons, including but not limited to its discussion of
"inferior officers" for purposes of appointments pursuant to the appointment clause. The Court held
that Morrison was an "inferior" officer because (1) she was subject to removal by a higher executive
branch official (the Attorney General), (2) she was confined to limited duties (the investigation and
prosecution of a certain executive branch official), (3) her office was limited in jurisdiction (only to
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Court a rare opportunity to comment on the role of impeachment. Since
no court has permitted judicial review of an impeachment, the Supreme
35
Court has had few opportunities to interpret the impeachment clauses.
Second, and even more iniportant, the Court adopted an informal approach to the separation of powers'cases that may simplify and clarify
the analysis applicable to future disputes between the branches regarding
congressional innovations in separation of powers.
The Court in Morrison addressed impeachment because the Solicitor
General argued, inter alia, that the Independent Counsel Act is unconstitutional because it enables Congress to assert pressure on the Presidentpressure that the Constitution permits only through the impeachment
power. 23 6 According to the Solicitor General, the Act was a congrescertain officers and asspecifically instructed by the special court). and (4) her office was limited in
duration (only as long as the investigation and prosecution necessitated). Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at
2608-11.
235. See,e.g., Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293. 300 (1936). cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668
(1937) (dismissing suit of a judge who contended that the Senate had tried him for nonimpeachable
offenses: "the Senate was the sole tribunal that could take jurisdiction of the articles of impeach.
ment presented to that body against the plaintiff and its decision is final").
236. In fact, Olson, the Reagan Justice Department, and several amici directed live major arguments against the Independent Counsel Act. First, they argued, the Act deprived the President of
supervisory authority over inherently executive functions. They argued that prosecution is a core
element of the President's constitutional duty to enforce the laws faithfully. Without the ability to
control all prosecutions, the President isessentially stripped of critical article 11powers and hindered
in discharging his constitutional duty. They argued further that this defect was not eliminated by
the Act's grant of authority to the Attorney General to conduct an investigation and to request
appointment of a special prosecutor assuming the existence of a reasonable ground for further investigation.
Second, Olson and others argued that the Act impermissibly interjected the judiciary into the
performance of executive functions. According to the Act's critics, the case-or-controversy requirement of article III necessarily excludes any general judicial authority to supervise the execution of
the laws. Olson and others argued that the Act itself contravened this limiting principle by assigning
to the special court the power to demand from an independent counsel an accounting of his conduct
in offick, to determine whether the counsel has completed the assigned duties, and, most importantly. to assign the special prosecutor duties in the first place through the nonjudicial acts of defining or redefining the jurisdiction or of assigning new matters to investigate.
Third. those challenging the Act argued that the Act impermissibly granted supervisory authority over executive functions to the legislative branch. Given that the Constitution, with few explicit
exceptions, grants Congress only the authority to legislate upon specified subjects, they argued that
the Act's provisions granting the House and the Senate Judiciary Committee a role in the initiation
of the independent counsel process, as well as requiring independent counsel to report to Congress
and to cooperate with congressional oversight, impermissibly assigned an executive role to Congress.
Fourth, Olson and others argued Ihat the appointment of an independent counsel by a court
violated both the appointments clause and the separation-of-powers principles it embodies. On the
one hand, they argued that the Act's appointment procedure violated the appointments clause bec jse the court's appointment of the independent counsel is permissible only if the counsels are
"nferior officers," which, they argued, they are not. The major reason counsels are not inferior
officers is that they have no superior. On the other hand, those opposing the Act argued that even if
independent counsels could beclassified as inferior officers it would not necessarily follow that their
appointment properly could be vested in a court. They referred to the Court's earlier decision in Ex
Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), suggesting that congressional decision to vest the appointment
power in the courts would be improper if there were some "incongruity" between the functions
normally performed by courts and the performance of their duty to appoint. See id. at 398. They
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sional attempt " 'to bypass the impeachment process that the Framers
designed to [ensure] that high officers of government could be investigated and removed from power.' "23 In the same vein, Justice Scalia
remarked "[h]ow much easier for Congress, instead of accepting the
political damage attendant to the commencement of the impeachment
proceedings against the President on trivial grounds ... simply to trigger
criminal investigation of the Chief Executive under- this
a debilitating
23
law." 8
Characterizing the Act as an illegitimate bypass of the impeachment
process, however, is inaccurate for three reasons. First, Congress has no
power under the Act to "trigger" an investigation by a special prosecutor.239 The Act gives the Attorney General unreviewable discretion to
deny any request by Congress to initiate an investigation. 240 Indeed,
Congress has the same power under the Act to request an investigation
by the Attorney General as it would have in the absence of the statute to
informally pressure the Attorney General to commence an investigation.
In addition, although the Act requires that the special prosecutor turn
over evidence that Congress could then use as grounds for an impeachment, the Act is not an expansion of congressional power to impeach
because it is merely a reporting device rather than a substitute for an
impeachment proceeding.
Second, the provisions in the Act authorizing investigation and
prosecution of impeachable executive officials are neither novel nor
unique. Federal prosecution of impeachable officials within the execuargued that the appointment clause's proviso that the appointment of inferior officers bevested "in
the Courts of Law" should not be construed to contradict the framers' admonition that the separation of powers would becompromised if the other branches could appoint executive officers. See id.
at 397-98.
Lastly. Olson and others argued that the statutory provisions concerning the removal of independent counsels impermissibly interfered with executive prerogatives. First, the opponents argued that the Act unconstitutionally restricted the President's removal power, reasoning that an
unfettered removal power is the essential trump card that enables the President to maintain sway
over those executing the laws. Myers. 272 U.S. at 122. Second, the opponents argued that the Act
vested the judicial branch with unprecedented removal powers over an executive officer, reasoning
that legislation placing removal power over executive officials outside the executive branch creates
subservience to the court making the appointment and, thus, creates a serious separation of powers
problems. One such problem isthat the independence of the executive branch is seriously undermined by allowing another branch to have the potential of using removal power to thwart the execution of executive powers.
237. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appeliees 47. Morrison. 108 S. Ct.
at 2597 (No. 87-1279). quoted in Koukoutchos. supra note 198. at 710.
238. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. The Judiciary Committee of the House or Senate. a majority of the majority party members
of either House. or a majority of all majority party members of either such committee. may request
(but not require) in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independent
counsel. See 28 U.S.C. §592(g) (Supp. V 1987).
240. See id. §592(b)(1).
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tive branch did not begin with the Independent Counsel Act. Federal
prosecutors in the Department of Justice have prosecuted impeachable
officials for years. In addition, prior to enactment of the Independent
Counsel Act, the President and the-Attorney General frequently named
special prosecutors pursuant to regulations or statutes that put constraints on the President's removal powers.2 4 ' In short, the Independent
Counsel Act does not interfere with the impeachment process any more
than "these more mundane law enforcement regimes,"142 whose constitutionality has never been seriously challenged.
Third, the Independent Counsel Act and impeachment are not directed at the same class of individuals. The class subject to independent
counsel investigation is both broader and narrower than the class of officers subject to impeachment. The Act covers a broader range of officials than the range of officials subject to impeachment because the Act
requires the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate former
senior administration officials, senior officials of the President's political
campaign, and any other person with respect to whom the Department
of Justice has a conflict of interest. Conversely, only certain high-ranking executive officials are impeachable. The scope of the Act is narrower
in the sense that, absent an extraordinary finding of a conflict of interest,
it does not apply to the vast majority of government officers, including
those in the executive branch, whereas the impeachment power by its
terms applies to "all Civil Officers of the United States," including federal judges.
In addressing the separation of powers, the Court in Morrison used a
balancing test to resolve the dispute between Congress and the President
over the Act's usurpation of certain executive power from the President.UJ The Court focused on whether the Act's restrictions on the At241. See Koukoutchos, supra note 198,at 711 & nn.430-31 (noting prosecutions of two former
Attorneys General, federal judges, and the ABSCAM prosecution of legislators); seealso Government and Gen. Research Div., Congressional Research Serv., Library of Congress, Historical Uses
of a Special Prosecution: The Administrations of Presidents Grant, Coolidge and Truman (Nov. 23.
1973) (D. Logan) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Texas Law Review) (discussing the St.
Louis Whiskey Ring and Teapot Dome prosecutions and the scandal-induced prosecutions of vari.
ous officers of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Internal Revenue Bureau).
242. Koukoutchos, supra note 198. at 711.
243. Significantly, the Court rejected two important constitutional challenges to the Independent
Counsel Act. First, the Court rejected the argument that the special prosecutors were not inferior
officers and that even if they were inferior officers there was an incongruity between the court's
appointment power and the functions of a court. Without explaining the differences between superior and inferior officers. the Court found that the special prosecutors are inferior officers because (1)
they are subject to removal by a higher executive official (the Attorney General, except in cases
involving the investigation of the Attorney General); (2) special prosecutors have only limited duties
under the Act, consisting primarily of investigating alleged violations of federal laws; (3) the office of
special prosecutors is limited in jurisdiction; and (4) the special prosecutor's "office is limited in
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torney General's ability to remove the independent
counsel unduly
interfered with the President's exercise of his constitutionally designated
duties and on whether the Act violated the separation of powers
by limiting the President's control over the independent counsel's prosecution
powers.
The Court gave three reasons why the restrictions
on the Attorney
General's ability to remove the independent counsel did not unduly
interfere with the-President's ability to discharge his constitutional
duties. 2"
First, the Court observed that the constitutionality of limitations
on the
President's removal power depends on the extent to which the
limitations
interfere with the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duties
rather than on the particular functions performed
by
the
official
subject
to the removal power.245 Second, the Court "d[id] not see
how the President's need to control the exercise of [the special prosecutor's]
discretion
is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to
require as a
matter of constitutional law that the counsel be
terminable at will by the
President."246 Third, the Court found that the Act permitted
the President to retain sufficient authority over the special prosecutor's
performance by being able to. remove her for "good cause."247
The Court also cited two reasons for rejecting the argument
that the
Act as a whole violated separation of powers by
unduly interfering with
the constitutional role of the executive branch. First, the
Court
read the Act as aggrandizing either Congress or the judiciary did not
at the expense of the President.248 Second, the Court found that, in light of the
President's ability to discharge the independent
counsel for "good
tenure." Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-09. On the other
hand, the Court found that even if the
special prosecutor were an inferior officer there was no incongruity
in the interbranch appointment
in light of the Court's earlier decision, in Young v. United
exerel. Vuttton, 481 U.S. 787, 793
(1987), allowing appointment of private attorneys by courtsStates
to investigate contempt charges and in
light of congressional objective to eliminate conflicts of interest
Second. the Court refused to find that article III absolutelyfrom certain investigations.
prevented Congress from vesting
certain powers of a nonjudicial nature to the courts of law. In
particular,
the Court observed that
most of the powers given to the courts under the Act
were "ministerial" in nature and did not
include any superisry power over the special prosecutor's investigation.
SeeMorrison, 108 . Ct.
at 2612.13. The Court also found that the special court'a
ability to terminate the special prosecutor
did not constitute an impetmissible encroachment by the
courts
on
executive
power, because the
power to terminate would only betriggered when the special
prosecutors completed their duties. See
id. at 2614-1 S. The Court further found that the special court's
powers
did
not
seriously
threaten the
traditional function of the courts to adjudicate fairly and
impartially any claims arising from the
investigation because the Act not only failed to give the special
court jurisdiction for judicial rcview,
but specifically prohibited the special court from exercising
any power to review legal questions
arising from an investigation. See id. at 2615.
244. See Morrison, 108S. Ct. at 2619-20.
245. See id. at 2619.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 2620-21.
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cause,"'the Act did not significantly interfere with the President's gencral constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws or with the Presi249
dent's control over prosecutions.
The major thrust of Justice Scalia's lone dissent, as summarized by
one commentator, was that he preferred that separation of powers issues
be
resolve[d not through the majority's balancing test but rather] by
identifying particular acts or duties as partaking of no more than
one of the three characteristic powers-legislative, executive, or judicial-and then denouncing any blending of these powers as a
corruption, not necessarily of any particular express provision of
the Constitution or even the text considered as a whole, but of the
perceive as
spirit of the separation of powers that [he and others]
25 0
animating the structure created by that document.
Relying on a construction of article II, section 1, clause Iof the Constitution2s5 as vesting all executive power in the President, Justice Scalia argued that the lower court's opinion striking down the Act must be
upheld only if criminal prosecutions constitute the exercise of purely executive power and if the Act deprives the President of exclusive control
over criminal prosecutions. Justice Scalia answered each of these questions in the affirmative: he described a criminal prosecution as a
"quintessentially executive activity" and found that the entire purpose of
the Act was to take exclusive control over certain criminal prosecutions
25 2
from the President, that is, to usurp certain purely executive power.
After demonstrating that the Act violated strict separation of powScalia turned to a critique of the Court's methodology, which
Justice
erd,
he viewed as striking at the heart of the President's removal power and
thereby seriously undermining the President's ability to perform his constitutional duties. Unlike the majority, he read the Court's earlier decisions iq Myers v. United States and Humphrey's Executor v. United States
as establishing that the President has the power to remove federal officers
performing purely executive functions. According to Justice Scalia, the
doctrine set forth in these cases is consistent with the framers' attempt to
allow " 'ambition [to] counteract ambition' " through the allocation of
253
He characterized
separate powers to each of three distinct branches.
the majority's decision-allowing Congress to deprive the President of
249. Seeid. at 2621.
250. Koukoutchos, supra note 198,at 640-41.
251. "The executive Power shall bevested in a President of the United States of America." U.S.
CONST. art. 11, § I, cl. 1.
252. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THL FEDERALtST No. 5I, at
322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
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some executive powfer as long as the President still retained sufficient
ability to perform his constitutional duties-as failing to identify the limits of judicial or congressional interferences with the President's removal
powers and, more important as failing to appreciate "what the separation
254

of powers ... is all about."

According to Justice Scalia, the framers constructed strict separation of powers and unified executive power within the President tt en255
sure "efficient government" and to protect "individual freedom."
Justice Scalia explained that the strict allocation of powers streamlines
governmental exercise of power by ensuring that each branch knows with
absolute certainty the scope of its particular responsibilities and by requiring as a matter of practice that each branch perform one primary
function. Justice Scalia explained that a unified executive ensures that
there is uniform application of all laws and that the President, as the
unified executive, is accountable for executing the laws under the Constitution. For Justice Scalia, the appropriate check on execution of the laws
is not through special enforcement of the criminal law but rather through
the political process, so that the President remains responsible for all
decisions regarding prosecution or nonprosecution. Based on his view of
separation of powers, Justice Scalia rejected the balancing test the majority used to uphold the Act as an exercise of its own ad hoc judgment.
According to Justice Scalia, the majority's unpardonable and unjustifiable error was its rejection of the framers' judgments to vest all executive
power in the President and to allocate powers among the branches in a
strict, unalterable fashion that would protect individual liberties and ensure efficient government.
Justice Scalia's criticisms of the majority's separation of powers
methodology are misplaced. 256 First, Justice Scalia overstated the nov254. Morrison. 108 5. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
255. Id.
256. Justice Scalia leveled two criticisms at the majority that do have merit. First, the justices
failed to stress a primary aim of the Act. In particular, the Act addressed "a fundamental, institutional conflict of interest that would otherwise undermine even the most incorruptible (Presidents]
enforcement of the law." Koukoutchos, supra note 198. at 677. The Act sought to eliminate the
appearance and the reality of conflicts of interest both motivating and hindering certain prosecutions. Such conflicts are inevitable as long as the President controls the removal of the very officers
deciding whether to investigate. Unfortunately, the majority mentioned the conflicts problem only
once, Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611, and even Justice Scalia "shunned both the phrase and the problem. so that he might praise a regime wherein a presidential aide suspected of breaking the law could
beassured that his conduct would be reviewed in a 'sympathetic forum . . . attuned to the interest
and policies of the Presidency.'" Koukoutchos. supro note 198, at 677 (quoting Morrison, 108 S. Ct.
at 2611 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). As one commentator observed, the Act was designed to eliminate
"conflicts of interest before they tainted the [presidency]" and, by doing so,facilitate rather than
hinder the President's ability to execute the law. Id. at 678.
Second. the majority failed to articulate a standard for determining "inferior officers." The
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to address the Act's asserted
elty of the majority's use of a balancing test
in a long
threat to the presidency. The Court has applied a balancing test
case,
seizure
steel
the
including
line of separation of powers decisions,,

and continuing through more
Youngstown Sheet &'Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"'
and judicial

recent decisions upholding limitations on both presidential
Court used the
authority.258 Moreover, within one year of Morrison, the
United
decision,
powers
of
separation
same balancing test in another
259 to uphold the constitutionality of a congressional
States v. Mistretta,
and to determine
delegation of authority to draft sentencing guidelines
over the United
power
removal
the composition of and presidential
2
60
States Sentencing Commission.
Second, Justice Scalia was mistaken in charging that the majority's
from the
approach in Morrison represents an unauthorized departure
of
separation
to
approaches
Court's arguably more rigid and formalistic
rulings
Those
Synar.
v.
Bowsher
powers issues in INS v. Chadha and
with executive
struck down statutes permitting Congress to 26interfere
in
participating
by
regulations ' or
functions by vetoing administrative
2
as
opinions
those
read
Scalia
Justice
the removal of executive officers.
her inferior are Of little help to future
majority's list of the special prosecutor's attributes making
For example. the majority notes that the
courts trying to distinguish superior from inferior officers.
almost every argu ably superior federal
special prosecutor's tenure is limited in duration; however,
how this attribute, among others, should be
officer serves with limited duration. Thus, it is unclear
used to distinguish superior from inferior officers.
a bright line test for making the
Unfortunately, the majority missed the opportunity to adopt
any federal officer not de.
"inferior"
as
defining
officers:
inferior
and
superior
distinction between
with this approach is that
problem
only
The
687.
at
id.
See
superior.
as
Constitutioti
fined in the
new offices, but this problem may be remake
to
Constitution
the
under
power
the
has
Congress
the Constitution already treats as superior.
solved by simply analogizing the new office to those
257. 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952).
of the Com
25g. See.e.g.. CFTC v. Schur, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) (limiting the jurisdiction
from violations of the CEA or CFTC
*modity Futures Trading Commission to counterclaims arising U.S. 425. 484 (1977) (placing limits on
433
regulations). Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.
713 (1974) (placing limits on the exerthe executive branch); United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683,
cise of executive privilege).
259. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
260. See id. at 659. According to Justice Blackmun.
of differentiated governmental
Justice Jackson summarized the pragmatic. flexible view
power the better to secure
power to which we are heir: "While the Constitution diffuses
dispersed powers into a workaliberty, it also contemplates t hat practice will integrate the but interdependence, autonomy
ble government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness
but reciprocity."
have recogIn adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers, we simply
tyranny-the accumulation of
nized Madison's teaching that the greatest security againsthermetic
the
between
division
a
in
excessive authority in a single branch-lies not
and balanced power within each
branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked
Branch.
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
concurring)).
(Jackson, J..
261. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
262. See Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986).
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indicating that the President retained near absolute authority over executive officers. The plain implication of this reading is that any legislation
personnel
conditioning presidential removal power over executive branch
2 63 The Court,
Act.
Service
would be unconstitutional, including the Civil
and
however, seems to have rejected any such reading by reaffirming

Executor
restating in Morrison the Court's earlier holding in Humphrey's

that inroads on presidential control over executive officers are permissido not
ble so long as they do not unduly restrict presidential power and 2
"
Congress.
by
authority
executive
of
involve the direct assumption

for appraisal for persons in
263. See 5 U.S.C. J§ 43114313 (1982) (establishing a special system
of executive branch
Senior Executive Service); id. § 7542 (setting forth the procedure for removal
the
employees).
264. Not only is Justice Scalia mistaken about the compatibility of the Court's analysis in Morriare also four reasons that
son with the Court's prior analyses in separation of powers cases, but there
of powers cases, his
support the majority's rejection of Justice Scalia's strict adherence to separation and the connection
executive branch,Justice Scalia's view
underlying the structure ofofthe
understanding of the purposes
First.
liberties.
civil
protection
the
and
between the structure of the executive
of separation of
of separation of powers is inconsistent with the eighteenth century understanding
of the Massachusetts
powers. For example, Justice Scalia began his opinion by quoting article XXX the Congress violated
Constitution, which embodied the strict separation of powers that he believed and giving it to the
President
by taking the power to appoint a special prosecutor away from the
of the mystical tradition
courts. This quote is consistent with Justice Scalia's view "characteristic
by the degree to which it
[to] judge the manifestation (for example, the Independent Counsel Act)
the more appropriate parareflects the higher reality." Koukoutchos, supra note 198, at 650. Yet
tradition," id. at 641-42,
digm for understanding the structure of the Constitution is the "mechanical
as "liberating." Id. at
which envisioned machinery in general and human machinery in particular
was not, as viewed
651. The framers' real purpose in establishing a system of checks and balances but rather,
government,
by Justice Scalia, to create three hermetically scaled departments of
bethe very impetus
(to] devise[ a means by which the personalities of office-holders would
in the joints
that would keep the entire apparatus moving, and . . . they left sufficient play amendment
the
of the machine so that its substructures could be returned without resort to
process for a complete overhaul.

Id. at 653.

reflects the framers'
Justice Scalia failed, however, to acknowledge that the Constitution only
of government
substructures
the
left
framers
The
government.
federal
new
the
of
top
the
design of
the understanding of the
to be shaped by subsequent generations so that "as times change, so must
Execution' the
congressionally-created institutions that are necessary and proper for 'carrying into
668 (footnote omitted);
powers ceded by the people to the government of the United States." Id. at
only a very general
see also C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 2 (observing that the framers "put in place
questions open to honest
framework, leaving it to the future to fill in details, and leaving many
to do, that the Constitudifference of opinion."). The point is not to assume, as Justice Scalia seems
federal government.
tion sets forth the limits to both the top and the substructure for the entire
Rather,
if not excluthe separation of powers established by the Constitution speaks primarily,
equilibration of
sively, to the President, not to the executive branch. The separation and of federal law
organs
the
with
powers may well be implicated by congressional tinkering
President, whatever
enforcement, but the interpretive rules and standards that apply to the President's
men.
they may be,do not necessarily apply with the same rigor to all the
Koukoutchos, supra note 198. at 669.
understanding of the
Second, there is little historical support for Justice Scalia's articulated
Scalia does not acunified executive. In fact, history points to a different understanding. Justice
Counsel
knowledge the large number and variety of congressional attempts prior to the Independentaddressed
Congress
First
the
Act to eliminate conflicts of interest in law enforcement. For example,
to appoint certain
the problem of conflicting interests in federal law enforcement by vesting power
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Those criticizing Morrison by relying on Bowsher and Chadha also
miss an important principle that unifies the Court's removal decisions
from Myers through Morrison and Mistretta. Those cases may each be
explained by the principle that congressional innovations are presumed
constitutional unless they violate what the structure was erected to
"executive" officials in the courts of law. See id. at 681. Anticipating the problem of occasional
conflicts of interest on the part of United States marshals appointed with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the federal courts to "specially appoint" a temporary marshal whenever "the marshal or his deputy is not an indifferent person or is interested in the
event of the cause." Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789. ch. 20, §29, 1 Stat. 88 (1789).
Similarly, there is little, if any, historical support for Justice Scalia's view that all executive
power should be under the complete control of the President. See Koukoutchos, supro note 198, at
681. The long history of congressional control over the appointment of inferior officers also indicates that it has not at all been uncommon to find shared exercises of power below the apex of
government. See id. at 692-93.
Third, there is little, if any, support for Justice Scalia's view that there should not be any presumptions of constitutionality for congressional enactments affecting presidential powers. According to Justice Scalia, Congress is not entitled to the "benefit of the doubt" in separation of powers
cases because Congress is no less interested than the President in the constitutionality of its intrusions on presidential power. Justice Scalia's view on this point is wrong for two reasons. First, there
is an explicit commitment in the Constitution to Congress to delegate, if it so chooses, appointment
power of inferior officers to the courts of law. At the very least, this language suggests that a court
of law should show some deference to congressional delegations of such appointments to the courts.
Second, the Court has long operated with the understanding that congressional enactments even in
the area of separation of powers should be treated with a presumption of constitutionality. See
United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647, 661 (1989) (describing the flexible approach the Court has
frequently used in separation of powers cases). Justice Scalia stands alone without any precedents to
support his attempt to aggrandize the judiciary at the expense of Congress in a matter in which
Congress itself has nothing less than explicit authority to operate under the Constitution.
Lastly, there is an odd contradiction between Justice Scalia's strict adherence to original intent
in Morrison and other constitutional cases. see Mistretta. 109 S. Ct. at 682-83 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).

and his critique of strict adherence to conventional legislative history in statutory interpretation
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protect.2 65
For example, in Morrison, the Independent Council Act did not violate what Justice Scalia argued the unified executive was originally structured to protect.2 66 First, the Act does not undermine the Executive's
central responsibility to enforce the laws uniformly. Justice Scalia failed
to acknowledge the principal reason for the Act: Congress established
the Act to ensure uniform application of the laws by eliminating certain
conflicts of interest arising in investigations or prosecutions of-high level
executive officials-conflicts that prevented the executive branch from
67
uniformly applying the laws in those investigations or prosecutions.
Congress passed the Act in large part to ensure uniform application of
the laws even in those sensitive situations in which high level executive
personnel are investigated by their own branch.
Second, the Attorney General's power under the Act to remove a
special prosecutor for "good cause" 268 protects the individual liberties of
those being investigated by an independent counsel. Surely there is no
better cause for removal than prosecutorial misconduct that seriously
threatens individual liberties. Those being investigated by an independent counsel also have their individual liberties protected under the Act in
the same way as any criminal defendant: they may challenge in court the
decisions of the prosecutor.
Third, the Act does not threaten the individual liberties of the general citizenry. These liberties remain protected through the President's
constitutional duties to apply the laws uniformly and to enforce the laws
69
faithfully and through access to the courts for vindication.2

cases. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard. 472 U.S. 578, 625-26 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Interestingly,

Justice Scalia has argued elsewhere that it is futile to identify any definitive legislative history on a
particular enactment because, for exanple, it is unctear how many legistators must agree oil the
purpose of an enactment in order to make that consensus controlling, many enactments are the
product of compromise, legislators may often make statements about an enactment that are selfserving and do not necessarily reflect their real intent, and it may bedifficult to distinguish real from
apparent purpose. Cf id. at 625-26. Justice Scalia has urged statutory construction should be restricted to the language, structure, and purpose of particular legislation, even though this inquiry
requires some search into the history of legislation and, at the same time, aggrandizes the judiciary at
the expense of the legislature by freeing the judiciary from confining its statutory construction to the
historical context of particular legislation. Yet he never has explained how these and other problems
with conventional legislative history, seeid. at 619, are avoided in constitutional cases in which he
inconsistently advocates strict adherence to the understanding of the framers as well as the language,
structure, and purpose of the Constitution. See, e.g.,Mistretta, 109 S. Ci. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Madison "would beaghast" to discover that the Supreme Court has disregarded
the "carefully designed structure" of the three branches of the federal government); Morrison, 108 S.
Ci. 2597, at 2622-23, 2637-38, 2641 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the purpose of the
framers and advocating reliance on the "judgment of the wise men who constructed our system"). It
seems likely that the same problems plague both legislative and constitutional historiography; Justice
Scalia, however, is content to denounce them in legislative history but to ignore (or discount) them
in constitutional interpretation.

265. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980); Rostker v. Goldberg. 453 U.S. 57, 64
(1981).
266. See Morrison, 108S. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the unitary Executive
was designed to preserve individual freedom). There are, however, two reasons undermining Justice
Scalia's understanding of the structure of the executive branch, including what it was intended to
protect. First, there is little historical support for Justice Scalia's view that all executive power was
intended to be unified only in the President. From the beginning of the Republic, there has been
considerable shared power among the substructures of the three branches. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
300-08 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Second, Justice Scalia overstated the extent to which the
structure or the presidency was designed to protect civil liberties. As a matter of fact, courts have
historically been the principal forum under the Constitution for the vindication of civil liberties. See
L. BAUM. THE SUPREME COURT 167. 180-83 (1985).
267. See Morrison, 108S. Ct. at 2621-22.
268. 28 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1).
269. Chadha and Bowsher may be analyzed in the same fashion. For example, in Chadha. the
Court specifically held that Congress may not bypass constitutional requirements for lawmaking in
order to make laws that strike down executive actions. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45. The main
problem with the legislative veto was that in bypassing the requirements of the bicameral and presentment clauses, both of which must be satisfied in order for a congressional act to become law,
Congress aggrandized itself at the expense of the President and the people. See id. at 951, 954-55.
The reason this aggrandizement is unconstitutional is that by bypassing the constitutional structure

Texas Law Review

Vol. 68:1, 1989

lessons for the inIn summary, Morrison suggests several important
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not apply to judicial removal of judges. Although the President needs
removal power to ensure uniform application of the laws, to protect the
civil liberties of all citizens, and to ensure the laws are faithfully executed, the judiciary does not need removal power to discipline its own
members or to discharge its particular constitutional duties.
Fourth, Morrison suggests that a balancing test may resolve disputes
between Congress and the President regarding possible inroads by Congress on the President's prosecution power. This balancing test reflects
deference to congressional innovations with the mutable allocation of
powers set forth in the Constitution.
Finally, the decision indicates that the constitutionality of congressional innovations with mutable allocation of powers within the Constitution may be judged by whether they violate what the original allocation
was structured to protect. Ultimately, it is possible to determine the extent to which impeachment is the exclusive means for removing federal
judges only by determining whether allowing the federal judiciary to discipline and remove its own members in addition to or as an alternative to
the impeachment procedure violates any of the fundamental principles or
values the third branch was structured to protect.
3. Reading the "Good Behaviour" and the Impeachment Clauses
Together.
(a) The meaning of hfe tenure.-The first step in determining

what the judiciary was specifically structured to protect is determining
how to read the impeachment clauses in conjunction with the constitutional provision that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour."2 4 Constitutional commentators have read these clauses two
ways. First, some commentators maintain that the good behavior clause
does not create a basis for removal other than those specified in the im2
clause6
peachment clauses. 7s To these commentators, the goodofbehavior
life tenure."
simply provides federal judges with the special status
These commentators then read the impeachment clauses as adding that
the life tenure of a federal judge may be prematurely interrupted or
ended only by removal for an impeachable offense, not misbehavior. Secin various state
274. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §I. The phrase "during good Behaviour" appeared
Supra note 14,at
constitutions as well as the first draft of the federal constitution. SeeR. BERGER,
147-49, 152 n.137.
275. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 159-65.
and Mandatory
276. Seeid. at 161; cf. Kramer & Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal
Good Behavior." 35 GEO.
Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of "During
commentators that
wASH. L. REv. 455, 458.59 (1967) (summarizing the opinions of several
rid of").
"[ilmpeachment is the only means by which a Federal judge can be got
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ond, other commentators argue that the good behavior and impeachment
clauses make sense only if they are collectively read as providing that
federal judges may serve for life subject to removal for an impeachable
offense or for having engaged in misbehavior. " Essentially, these commentators maintain that federal judges are subject to a loose impeachment standard because they are removable for misbehavior while all
other impeachable officials are removable-by impeachment--only for
278
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
The major problem with the second reading of the good behavior
and impeachment clauses is that it is inconsistent with the historical and
structural contexts of these clauses. First, history indicates that the
framers included the phrase "during good Behaviour" in the Constitution to contrast the unlimited term of federal judges with the fixed terms
of the President, Vice President, and members of Congress. 279 Under the
more historically accurate view of the good behavior clause, both federal
judges with unfixed terms and high-level officials with fixed terms may
have their terms of office ended prematurely if there is a Senate conviction for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
As one commentator explains, "no evidence exists that the framers desired to compromise the independence of federal judges by making it easier to remove them."no
Second, there was never any serious dispute before, during, or after
the Constitutional Convention about whether federal judges would have
life tenure or whether life tenure was crucial to the independence of the
federal judiciary.28 I At the Constitutional Convention, the framers never
277. See.e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 11913 (1970) (statement of then-Congressman Gerald Ford, in
connection with the attempted impeachment of Justice Douglas, that "an impeachable offense is
whtever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it) to be at a given moment in histoy"); M. OTts. A PROPOSEDTRIBUNAL: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL? 37 (1939) (asserting that "[a)
judge may be impeached for any misbehavior or misconduct which terminates his right to continue
in office").
278. For example, the President and other executive officers may not be removed simply for
misconduct or misbehavior; they may only be removed for having committed one of the serious
impeachable offenses specified in the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. I1. § 4.
279. Although the Constitution provides that federal judges may serve during good behavior, the
Constitution puts limits on the terms of the President and the Vice President and members of Congrcss: the President may serve no more than two terms of four years each and must be elected
separately for each term he serves. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, I 1;id. amend. XXII. The Vice President serves for only four year terms at the pleasure of the President who chooses him. See id.
Members of the House of Representatives must run for re-election every two years, see id. art. I, § 2.
and members of the Senate must run for re-election every six years, seeid. art. 1, § 3. In contrast to
all of these, federal judges, once they are confirmed by the Senate. are allowed to serve for life. See
id. at art. III, § I.
280. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 720.
281. SeeU.S. CONsT. art. Ill. §1.See also Garvey, Foreword: Judicial Discipline and Inpeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 633, 637 (1988) (observing that "judicial independence is first and foremost an
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wavered from their desire to eliminate the problem they had experienced
in the colonies of having judges who simply did what the king told them
to do and who lacked the courage or latitude to do what was right or
just. In article III, the framers solved this problem by giving federal
judges life tenure and a guarantee of undiminished compensation, measures that the framers considered integral to preserving the judiciary's
2
place in the new government's system of checks and balances? " The
framers recognized that life tenure and irreducible compensation were
necessary if federal judges were to have the freedom and power to exercise judicial review as intended. As Alexander Hamilton later explained,
the federal judiciary should serve as a necessary bulwark against legislative aggrandizement and majoritarian tyranny. 283 The framers envisioned the federal courts as a safe haven for people trying to protect their
civil liberties against actions by either the President or Congress. In
short, there was never any serious question at, during, or after the Constitutional Convention that the federal judiciary's role in the new system
of checks and balances was to protect the people from the excesses of
other branches.
The relevance of article III's guarantees of an independent judiciary
and the impeachment clauses to the judiciary's removal of its members
for misconduct has been vigorously debated for years.284 The key to identifying the relevance is determining (1) whether the constitutional guarantees of life tenure and undiminished compensation protect the
independence of federal judges both individually and collectively and (2)
if the constitutional guarantee of independence was meant to protect
judges individually, whether protecting federal judges from discipline or
removal by their peers is necessary for judicial independence. The constitutional guarantees of life tenure and undiminished compensation
plainly pertain to individual judges. Judicial independence must be protected from internal as well as external attack; otherwise, the external
protections the judiciary enjoys could be easily undermined from within.
As Judge Harry Edwards has observed, "it seems obvious that judicial
independence may 'just as easily be eroded by powerful hierarchies
within the judiciary itself as by outside pressures from the legislative and
aspect of separation of powers. The tenure and compensation provisions of Article Ill protect federal judges against Congress and the President, because that is where the danger lies.").
282. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-72 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiler ed. 1961).
283. See id. at 467-70.
284. See Hastings v.Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1106 & n. 10 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing arguments for and against the proposition that the
judiciary may constitutionally discipline its own members).
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executive branches of the government.' "25
Even though the language, structure, and history of the impeachment clauses arguably support the view that impeachment is the sole
means for removing federal judges, this conclusion must somehow be
squared with the Act of 1790, which automatically disqualified any federal judge convicted of bribery. The Act of 1790 aimed to achieve at
least three objectives. First, it sought to streamline the Constitution's
impeachment procedure by automatically disqualifying from office a
judge convicted of a listed impeachable offense-bribery. In effect, Congress tried to save itself the time and trouble of conducting impeachment
trials and removal proceedings for federal judges convicted of bribery
when Congress was convinced that it would have removed and disqualified such judges. Congress may streamline impeachment in this manner
by combining its powers under the necessary and proper clause 286 and
the impeachment clauses.287
Second, in the Act, Congress partially delegated its impeachment
authority to criminal juries. This delegation, however, actually worked
to the advantage of federal judges. The framers took great pains to distinguish impeachment proceedings from criminal trials, 288 and Congress
declared through the Act of 1790 that only federal judges found beyond a
reasonable doubt to have violated the bribery laws would be automatically removed and disqualified from office. In a typical impeachment
proceeding, there is no reason to believe that impeachable officials are
entitled to a standard of proof as high as beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a unanimous fact-finder.289
Third, the Act's delegation of impeachment authority is constitutional because it rests on the notion that judges are not immune from and
must comply with the criminal law. The Act of 1790 did not threaten
205. Id. at 1107 (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting Ervin, supra note 21, at 125).
286. The necessary and proper clause provides that the Congress shall have the power "to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8 (18).
287. See L. TRIBE, supra note 13,at 301. Professor Tribe observed that the necessary and proper
clause
remains important as an explicit incorporation within the language of the Constitution of
the doctrine of implied power: The exercise by Congress ofpower ancillaryto an enumerated source of national authority isconstitutionally valid. so long as the ancillarypower does
not conflict with external limitations such as those of the Bill of Rights and offederalism.
Id.

288. SeeU.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3.
289. The Constitution provides for no specific burden of proof applicable to impeachment proceedings; the unusual nature of an impeachment proceeding, however, combining characteristics of
both criminal and civil trials suggests that the burden of persuasion in a typical impeachment proceeding should beless than beyond a reasonable doubt. SeeC. BLACK, supra note 13, at 16-19.
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judicial independence because the Act was not directed at any essential
judicial activity. Rather, the Act focused on specific criminal misconduct by federal judges. The Act did not threaten judicial independence,
because it did not punish or prohibit any conduct central to the performance of a judge's constitutional obligations. The constitutional duties
and responsibilities of a federal judge neither require nor necessitate any
criminal misconduct. In short, the Act of 1790 demonstrated that carefully tailored legislation passed pursuant to the constitutional authority
of Congress, directed at no essential judicial conduct, and preserving the
independence of federal judges individually and collectively is an additional method of removing federal judges. Thus, impeachment is the
traditional but not the only means for removing federal judges.
The good behavior clause meant to guarantee that federal judges
receive life tenure, that they may not be removed from office under a
looser standard than the President or other impeachable officials, and
that they may not be removed simply for "misbehavior." Federal judges,
however, may be removed from office on a different basis from other
impeachable officials. The different responsibilities of various officials
under the Constitution justify different reasons or bases for the impeachment and removal of those officials. 29 Impeachable offenses involve
abuses against the state, but abuses against the state or serious misconduct in office are not necessarily the same for all impeachable officials.
For example, a federal judge might be impeached and removed for lying
about his law school performance, but an executive official probably
would not be. 291 Although such behavior in a judge undermines respect
for the office and the authority of the judge, the lie about law school
performance does not have as serious an effect on an executive official.
The differences in the officials' responsibilities and the degree to which
290. See Book Note, supra note 116. at 913-14.
291. In 1803, District Judge John Pickering was removed from office for drunkenness and blasphemy, which the Congress found to be inappropriate for a federal judge. However, Congress has
never impeached, much less removed, any executive official for such behavior. The difference may
possibly be explained by the fact that such behavior (which included insanity in Judge Pickering's
case) is particularly unseemly for a federal judge, who may be disciplined primarily through impcachment, while the executive oficial may be disciplined either by the President (who may fire
him), the head of his departinent (if the person is not himself the head of a department), or impeachment, which is the most cumbersome of all the methods. The Senate's recent rejection of Senator
John Tower as President Bush's Secretary of Defense was. no doubt, based in part on his prior
history of drunkenness. See Church, Is This Goodbye? A Senate Committee Stuns Bush by Rcjecuing
Tower's Nomination. TIME. Mar. 6, 1989. at 18. However, the Senate has an easier standard to meet

for rejecting nominees than for removing officials after confirmation. Rejecting a nominee requires
only a simple majority vote, whereas removing an executive official requires at least two-thirds of the
members present. It is likely that had such behavior continued or manifested itself after Senator
Tower had been confirmed he would have been subjected to considerable public (if not presidential)
pressure to reform and remove himself that would have made use of the impeachment process
unnecessary.
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the offensive conduct reflects a violation of those responsibilities explain
the different results.
(b) The constitutionality of alternatives to impeachment for removing federal judges
(i) Chandler.-Even though the Act of 1790 suggested
that impeachment is not the exclusive means for removing federal judges,
it is unclear what other methods are available to remove federal judges.
The answer depends entirely on whether the alternative means for removal threatens or violates the independence of the federal judiciary indi idually or collectively. With respect to judges disciplining or
removing other judges, the question virtually suggests the answer: there
is little doubt that giving judges this power threatens federal judges' independence not only from other branches but also from other federal
judges.
Over the years, Congress has made many attempts to involve judges
92
in monitoring, disciplining, and sometimes removing their peers.
More often than not, these attempts have involved the judicial councils,
groups of sitting judges originally established by Congress to deal with
administrative problems within the court system, which the judges properly administer.293 The two major constitutional questions that have
emerged regarding the judicial councils are, first, whether they constitutionally may monitor caseloads and discipline poor judicial performance
29 4
as an administrative matter, and second, whether they constitutionally
to Congress remay investigate, discipline, and make recommendations
29 5
misconduct.
judicial
certain
for
impeachment
garding
One of the first.and most heated debates about the constitutionality
of allowing judges to discipline other judges arose in Chandler v.Judicial
296
Acting pursuant to a 1948 law empowerCouncil of the Tenth Circuit.
292. See. e.g.,S. 1506. 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (attempting to create a five-judge commission
in Kurthat would remove a judge after a formal hearing subject to Supreme Court review), noted
of Mar. 8.
land, supra note 14. at 665; Act of Feb. 13. 1801,ch. 4. 2 Stat. 89 (1850) (repealed by Act
ques1802, Ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1850)) (creating an alternate means of removing a judge but raising
at 670.
tions of constitutionality that eventually led to repeal), noted in Kurland, supra note 14,
(1982))
332
§
U.S.C.
28
293. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902 (1948) (codified at
organization of a
(setting forth the procedure to befollowed in each circuit for the establishment and
of the
judicial council to make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration
courts within each circuit).
294. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit. 398 U.S. 74, 85 (1970) (asserting that
judicial
"if one judge in any system refuses to abide by such reasonable procedures (for conducting
business] it can hardly be that the extraordinary machinery of impeachment is the only recourse").
295. See 28 U.S.C. §372(c) (1982).
of the fact
296. 398 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (dismissing second appeal for lack of jurisdiction in light
Chandler v.
that Judge Chandler may have still had other avenues of relief available to him); seealso
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1966) (miscellaneous order) (characteriz-
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ing it to make appropriate rules for tle proper administration of its court
business,2 97 the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit determined that
Judge Stephen Chandler, then Chief Judge of the Western District of
Oklahoma, was "unable or unwilling to discharge efficiently the duties of
his office." 298 The Council ordered him to take no further action in any
pending case, distributed his caseload to the remaining judges of the district, and directed that no new cases be assigned to him until further
notice. 9 9 Judge Chandler challenged the Council's actions, but the
Supreme Court denied his application for a stay of the Council's order,
characterizing the Council's action as "entirely interlocutory in character" pending prompt inquiry by the Council into the administration of
judicial business in the Tenth Circuit.3 After a hearing, the Council
ordered that Judge Chandler could retain some of his original caseload.
On a second appeal, the Supreme Court decided that because Judge
Chandler might have had other avenues of relief left open to him, the
Court 0was relieved from having to review the merits of the Council's
order.A
Dissenting, Justices Black and Douglas asserted that the Constitution established Congress, "acting under its limited power of impeachment," as the sole agency of government that may hold a federal judge
accountable for the administration of his court and effectively deprive
him of his office, even temporarily. 302 Providing only marginal support
for their assertion, Justices Black and Douglas argued that full judicial
independence could be maintained only by recognizing impeachment as
the exclusive means of removing or disciplining individual federal
judges.303

The problem with the Chandler dissent is that claiming impeachment, with the exception of the Act of 1790 or like measures, to be the
exclusive means for removing federal judges is not inconsistent with allowing the judicial councils broad power to deal with administrative matters within their jurisdictions.304 No doubt, the judicial councils could
ing the Judicial Council's initial order to suspend Judge Chandler temporarily until a full hearing as
interlocutory and a basis for dismissing his first appeal).
297. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §332, 62 Stat. 902 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332
(1982)).
298. Chandler, 382 U.S. at 1004 (miscellaneous order) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the judicial council of the Tenth Circuit in its order directing that Judge Chandler take no action in any case
or proceeding now or hereafter pending).
299. See id.
300. Id. at 1003.
301. See Chandler. 398 U.S. at 86.
302. Chandler, 382 U.S. at 1006 (miscellaneous order) (Black, J., dissenting).
303. See Chandler, 398 U.S. at 136, 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
304. See id. at 89, 119 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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rearrange or even reschedule much of a judge's caseload if the judge were
either slow or critically ill. As a matter of American common law, as
well as English common law-which the framers never evidenced any
intent to abrogate-judges have historically had the power to make administrative decisions regqrding the operation of the courts that they supervise.30 It logically follows that if a judge suffers from some infirmity
such as a heart attack, then the appropriate judicial council has the
power to transfer that judge's caseload, at least temporarily, to someone
else. For all practical purposes, the Judicial Council for the Tenth Circuit did just this by temporarily depriving Judge Chandler of his caseload
because of his persistent failure to diminish his backlog.
The key for reconciling Chandler with the Act of 1790 and for finding what the Judicial Council did in Chandlerconstitutional is to recognize what removal means. Removal results in the permanent loss of the
judge's power to decide cases or controversies and the forfeiture of any
pension, benefits, and opportunity to serve on judicially related panels
such as the Judicial Council.3 06 Removing a caseload because of illness
or a backlog is not the same as permanent removal and disqualification
as the result of a successful impeachment and conviction. Acknowledging that judicial councils have the ability to make administrative decisions curtailing a judge's responsibilities does not mean that judges either
lose their titles or have been rendered permanently disabled from discharging their constitutional duties as judges. Judicial councils simply
have administrative responsibility for the smooth functioning of a court
system, and the councils' administrative responsibilities must necessarily
include the power to move caseloads and occasionally diminish them for
the sake of orderly administration. Although it may be difficult to draw
the line between administrative convenience and outright removal, it is
clear that removal through impeachment has a precise meaning and that
w' at;happened to Judge Chandler was not, in intent or effect, removal
through impeachment.
Equally important, the administrative power wielded by the judicial
councils does not threaten or violate judicial independence. Although
the framers seemed to explicitly discuss only the problem of judicial independence from the other branches, real judicial independence also rests
on freedom from coercion or intimidation by one's fellow judges. Undesirable coercion can come as easily from within as from without. Granting sitting judges the power to evaluate the suitability of allowing other
judges to retain their offices injects an element of intimidation that, no
305. SeeR. BERGER, supra note 14, at 174-80.
306. SeeU.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 1.
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doubt, would threaten not only collegiality among judges but also in30
dependent judicial decision making itself. ' The point is that the power
to remove or even the power to initiate a removal injects insecurity
among those targeted by such power, and once those targeted feel compromised by the exercise of removal power, judicial independence is chilled, if not directly violated.
An appellate court's power to review lower court rulings is quite
different from an appellate court's power to make decisions about
whether a lower court judge can remain in office. The appellate court's
review of lower court rulings merely directs lower courts on the proper
application or interpretation of the law, but the appellate court's removal
power inevitably suggests that it can retaliate for anything arguably improper the lower court judge has personally or professionally done. Consequently, the administrative action undertaken by the Tenth Circuit
Judicial Council in Chandler was constitutional because the power
wielded by the Council did not send a signal to other judges in the Circuit that personal animosity or disagreements might lead to disciplinary
actions. The Council's action merely indicated that sometimes a drastic
but temporary action must be taken to ensure the speedy, efficient, and
timely disposition of a district's caseload.
(ii) The JudicialDisability Act.-The passage of the Judicial Disability Act sparked considerable controversy over the constitutionally permissible role of the federal judiciary in investigating and
disciplining its own members. The Act provides that anyone can file a
complaint against a judge with the clerk of the appropriate court of appeals. 3 0 8 A special committee investigates complaints that cannot be resolved by the chief judge. 3 0 When the special committee concludes
3
there is merit to a complaint, the judicial council lo is then directed to
take appropriate action, which may include censure, reprimand, tempo3
rary suspension, and transfer of cases, but not removal from office. '' If
the judicial council believes that it has uncovered grounds for impeachment, the council is empowered to report its findings to the Judicial Con307. Collegiality should not be underestimated as something important to the orderly process of
judicial decision making. After all, circuit judges and Supreme Court justices must serve together on
the samerespective panels, presumably for many years. Even federal district judges are aided by
collegiality because they occasionally sit as designated judges on appellate panels and must work
with other district judges either in conferences or in administering the affairs of their particular
districts. Seegenerally Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681. 716 (1979)
(arguing that "{tlhe only way to protect judicial independence isto provide judges secure tenure").
308. See 28 U.S.C. *372 (c)(1) (1982).
309. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)-(5) (1982).
310. See28 U.S.C 372(c)(6) (1982).
31I. See28 U.S.C. 372 (c)(6) (1982).
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(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) Kaufman. The Essence of Judicial Intdependence, 80
pressure or intimidate the nonconformist"); supranote 307. at 713.
Kaufman.
COLUm. L. REV. 671, 700 (1980);
note 307.
314. SeeKaufman, sup~ra
(D.C.
of the United States. 829 F.2d 91. 103-08
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United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d
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784, 790-96 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding
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316. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c)(6)(B)(iv) (1982).
J., concurring).
317. Hastings, 770 F.2d at 1108 (Edwards,
318. Seeid. at 1108-09.
319. Seesupro note 315.
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Without judicial review, the target pf an investigation must hope that the
judicial council is not motivated by prejudice or personal animosity.
Those who defend the Act argue that, because the judicial councils
lack the power to remove the target of an investigation, the Act provides
curbing judicial
at most "a method of controlling judicial ethics without 320
They argue
review."
judicial
threatens
that
way
a
in
independence
that, as far as impeachment and removal are concerned, the Act does not
provide for anything that would not exist in the absence of the Act. Even
if there were no Act, judges still would have the power available to any
citizen to complain to the House of Representatives that there are
grounds for impeachment against a partibular judge. Thus, the defenders
argue, if the Act merely codifies something that would otherwise exist
without constitutional infringement, then the Act in no way violates the
Constitution. Moreover, they maintain that the Constitution does not
require that the House alone perform all investigatory work regarding an
impeachment.32 1 As with the Independent Counsel Act's provisions, the
Judicial Disability Act simply provides a reporting mechanism rather
than a substitute for impeachment.
Defenders also dismiss the particular constitutional challenges
against the Act. For example, they argue that the investigatory tasks
given to the judges under the Act, including the subpoena power, are
administrative-not executive-in nature; therefore, Chandler controls
against the Act's delegation of
disposition of any constitutional claims
32
Defenders also dismiss the claim
investigatory power to the judiciary.
that the complaint procedure threatens judicial independence because (1)
Congress could have reasonably determined that granting federal judges
the power to investigate complaints against fellow judges was in the public interest and helped to maintain the independence of the judiciary, (2)
judges are likely to be particularly respectful of other judges' independence because they are in a position to appreciate the meaning of judicial
independence, and (3) many of the actions under the Act depend upon
and do not, therefore, include or
the voluntary compliance of the judge 323
judiciary.
the
within
promote coercion
Notwithstanding the arguments of the Act's defenders, by delegat320. Garvey, supra note 281. at 638.
321. SeeTuttle & Russel, Preserving JudicialIntegrity: Some Comments on the Role of the Judiparticiciary Under the "Blending" ofPowers, 37 EMORY L.J. 586, 610 (1988) (arguing that judicial
pation in investigation merely takes advantage of "the Framers' blending of governmental powers");
can
process
impeachment
Note, Unnecessary and Improper, supra note 21, at 1140 (asserting that the
be greatly streamlined by having subcommittees perform preliminary functions subject to approval
by the full House or Senate).
322. See Hastings, 783 F.2d at 1504-05.
323. Seeid. at 1507-08.
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ing the.House's constitutional power to investigate impeachments to the
judiciary, the Act impermissibly threatens the independence of judges
both individually and collectively.' Article Ill's guarantees of life tenure
and undiminished compensation protect the independence of the federal
judiciary from the other branches. 24 At the same time, the guarantee of
independence runs to individual judges. As Judge Harry Edwards has
observed, the constitutional
assurances of life tenure and undiminished salaries pertain directly
to individual judges. . . [H]ow could the underlying purpose of
those assurances-to foster independent decisionmaking-be
achieved other than by protecting the independence of individual
decisionmakers? Even when judges sit in panels, our confidence in
their collective decisionmaking is predicated on the assumption
that each judge will make an independent and reasoned evaluation
325

of the issues.

In other words, to be meaningful, article III's guarantees must protect
judges not only collectively from other branches, but also individually
from harassment by other judges (even for misconduct that may arguably
be the basis for an impeachment). Absent protection for the independence of individual federal judges from coercion from within as well as
from without the judiciary, judicial independence becomes highly unlikely. By empowering federal judges to initiate complaints and investigations against other federal judges and by formalizing the complaint
procedure, the Act increases the potential for some federal judges to intimidate and harass others. Indeed, many sitting judges have expressed
their concern "that the provisions of the Act might be subject to abusethat they might be misused to pressure or intimidate the nonconformist,
the judge whose judicial style or legal philosophy are [sic] repugnant to
the majority of his or her colleagues."326
The Act allows judges to initiate investigations against other judges
324. See. e.g..THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 79,
at 472-74; seealso 2 CONVENTION RECORDs. supra note 1. at 34 (noting the delegates' interest in
maintaining judicial independence). See generally Fratcher, The Independence of the Judiciary
Under the Constitution of 1787. 53 Mo. L. REV. I (1988).
325. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093. 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Edwards, J., concurring). But seeEdwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good
Behavior"for Federal Judges, 87 Mica. L. REv. 765. 785 (1989) (qualifying Judge Edwards' earlier
view to acknowledge his current "beliel[ that individual judges are subject to some measure of
control by their peers with respect to behavior or infirmity that adversely altects the work of the
court and that does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct."). The problem with Judge Edwards' revised view that judges should monitor themselves with respect to misconduct falling short
of impeachable conduct is that there is no clear line between what constitutes impeachable conduct
and misbehavior falling short of it. The process of such line-drawing is beller left to the branch
entrusted by the Constitution to define impeachable conduct-Congress. See infra notes 361-397
and accompanying text.
326. Hastings, 770 F.2d at 1107 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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for misconduct that does not approach specific violations of laws. It
would be a different case if Congress had passed a law under which on its
own initiative Congress could delegate to judicial councils
the
to investigate whether certain judges violated certain laws. authority
This Act,
however, rests on the unrealistic assumption that
judges can complain
against, investigate, make disciplinary recommendations, and discipline
other judges without risking the independence each judge must have
in
order to make decisions without fear of reprisal or harassment.27
The
Act, thus, impermissibly violates the independence guaranteed to individual federal judges by article III. Informal complaints by some
federal
judges against others, however, do not run the risk of stigmatizing
or
lending the kind of prestige or aura of implirtiality that normally
attaches
to formal, collective judicial decision making.
4. The Permissibility of Allowing Prosecution, Indictment, or Imprisonment of Federal Judges Prior to Impeachment.-On three occasions, federal appellate courts have rejected arguments that impeachment
of federal judges must precede their indictment,328 prosecution,29
or imprisonment.33o The unsuccessful arguments rest on the belief that indictment, prosecution, or imprisonment of federal judges should be
prohibited prior to an impeachment because the targeted judges are effectively removed in violation of the constitutional principle that impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal
judges.
United States v. Isaacs33' was the first case in which a
defendant
asserted that indictment and prosecution prior to impeachment
were tantamount to removal without an impeachment
conviction. Denying
Judge Otto Kerner's application to stay his prosecution for conspiracy,
tax evasion, and perjury, the Seventh Circuit in Isaacs held
that federal
judges could be indicted and prosecuted before impeachment because the
Constitution did not expressly forbid the criminal prosecution
of federal
judges and because precedent established that Senators could be criminally prosecuted prior to their expulsion from the Senate. 3 2 The Seventh Circuit found no justification for disparate treatment
for Senators
327. See id. at 1105-11.
328. SeeUnited States v.Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
329. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United
States 829 F.2d 91, 99-100 (D.C. Cir.
1987);
United States v.Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 848-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984);
Isaacs, 493 F.2di at 1124.
330. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 842.
331. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.). cer. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
332. Id. at 1143-44.
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and federal judges with respect to indictment and prosecution."'
3 4
In the more recent case of United States v. Claiborne, 1 the Ninth
Circuit rejected Judge Harry Claiborne's claim that conviction and impending imprisonment prior to his impeachment were unconstitutional
because they violated the constitutional prohibition against removal of
federal judges through any means other than impeachment.", Judge
Claiborne buttressed his claim with two major arguments. First, he relied on article I, section 3, clause 7, which provides that "the Party convicted [by the Senate] shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
6
Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment, according to law."
Judge Claiborne suggested that the "Party convicted" language presupposes that any disruption of an article III judge's life tenure should occur
first through impeachment and only subsequently through criminal prosecution; otherwise, the past tense "convicted" has no meaning. 3 7
The problem with Judge Claiborne's first argument is that it ignores
both history and the plain meaning of the relevant constitutional language. The Constitution suggests through unambiguous language and
structure that impeachment and criminal prosecution are separate proceedings and thus are not mutually exclusive.338 Constitutional language
and structure indicate that the framers included the "Party convicted"
language to preclude the argument that the doctrine of double jeopardy
saves the offender from an impeachment or removal trial.339 Nothing in
the Constitution mandates impeachment before criminal prosecution or
prohibits criminal prosecution prior to or after impeachment; rather, the

Constitution reflects the framers' vision of separate proceedings unfolding in no particular order. As Professor Steven Burbank has
explained,
the impeachment process and the criminal process serve different
purpopes, albeit the jurisdictions sometimes overlap. In such a
schenie, principles of double jeopardy have no role to play. Just as
conduct need not be criminal to justify impeachment and removal,
so the fact that conduct does not justify impeachment and removal
does not mean that it is not criminal. It is inconceivable to me, as
it was to Justice Story, that the framers intended to bar the prosecution of one impeached but not convicted and thus inconceivable
that the Constitution should be read to require removal before
333.
334.
denied,
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
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See id. at I144.
765 F.2d 784 (9th Citr. 1985), appeal denied, 781 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.), stay of execution
790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Claiborne. 727 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 829 (1984).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.cl. 7.
See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 845-46.
SeeU.S. CONsT. art. 1. § 3, cl. 7; id. art. 111,§ 2, cl. 3.
See Burbank, supra note 92, at 667-70.
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3

prosecution.34 o
Judge Claiborne's second, more powerful argument was that imprisoning him while he was still an article III judge amounted to depriving
him of his office.3 4 He argued that depriving him of his office before
impeachment not only skirted the constitutionally mandated procedural
safeguards for removal, but also created a "constitutional . . . collision

between two branches of our government" by compelling a sitting article
III judge "to surrender to the custody of the Attorney General, an officer
of the executive branch; . . . [and to] be confined outside his district,

disenabled from performing judicial functions 3'P To Judge Claiborne,
life tenure meant that "a judge has judicial authority unless and until
that power is stripped by congressional impeachment."33 In his view,
the legislature, not the Executive, has been charged with removing
judges; therefore, the Attorney General's bypass of the impeachment
process violated separation of powers principles.34 Judge Claiborne concluded that because criminal prosecution necessarily presupposes the potential for imprisonment (a de facto removal from office), prosecution
before impeachment must be prohibited. 3"
The Ninth Circuit found an unusual basis on which to reject Judge
Claiborne's second argument that impeachment of federal judges must
precede their prosecution and imprisonment. Maintaining that "federal
judges (can] be removed from office only by impeachment," the court
reasoned that because the Supreme Court had ruled in Isaacs that criminal prosecution and conviction of a Senator does not ipso facto "vacate
the seat of the convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or
to regard him as expelled by force alone of the judgment," neither were
judges automatically removed "by force alone of the judgment."346
Critics of Claiborne find this analogy unpersuasive because they do
not believe the analogy definitively answers the question whether imprisonment (as opposed to conviction) prior to impeachment is constitutionally permissible.347 In addition, they argue, the analogy disregards the
key protections uniquely conferred upon the judiciary collectively and
individually. Claiborne critics contend that the protections accorded by
340. Id. at 669-70 (footnotes omitted); see also Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 846 (construing
the relevant constitutional language as"assur[ing] that after impeachment a trial on criminal
charges isnot
foreclosed by the principle of double jeopardy").
341. SeeClaiborne, 727 F.2d at 846.
342. Claiborne, 790 F.2d at 1360 (Kozinski. J., dissenting).
343. Calt, supra note 146, at 109.
344. SeeClaiborne, 727 F.2d at 846-47.
345. See id.
346. Id. at 846.
347. See,e.g.,Note, In Defense ofStandard, supra note 12, at 457.
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same as removal. An imprisoned judge retains his title, salary, pension,
benefits, and, most important, the capacity to return to the bench with
full authority to decide cases and controversies. In fact, Judge Claiborne
continued to receive his salary as a federal judge during his incarceration.352 No doubt, imprisonment is an impediment to being a federal
judge, but it does not have the same effects as removal and disqualification through impeachment conviction. As Professor Burbank has
observed,
[i]n the case of "removal from office," the framers had in mind the
formal termination of a commission or .9f tenure in office. Yes,
they were very concerned about judicial independence and yes, the
Constitution should be interpreted so as to accommodate situations
unforeseen and unforeseeable in 1787. But criminal proceedings
were not a threat to judicial independence unknown to the framers,
and . . . they353
were not a threat the framers deemed serious enough

to foreclose.
Third, the Claiborne critics ignore a particularly significant piece of
evidence undermining their view, the Act of 1790. That Act automatically disqualified federal judges once they had been convicted of bribery."3 4 It was obviously premised on the idea that a prosecution and
imprisonment might precede impeachment. Thus, the Act indicates that
the First Congress anticipated and accounted for criminal prosecutions
preceding impeachments as well as allowed for removal other than by
formal impeachment and conviction.
Finally, the inconvenience and unseemliness of having a federal
judge waiting for impeachment while sitting in prison may be resolved
without misinterpreting the Constitution as requiring that impeachment
of federal judges must precede their prosecution. For example, suitable
amendments to title 18 would allow postponing sentences in cases involving convicted impeachable officials until the official is impeached and
removed. 55 In addition, prosecution before impeachment can produce a
record that may be used to expedite an impeachment. As Professor Burbank has suggested,
[i]f Congress did not view the conduct undergirding the conviction
as an impeachable offense, the judge could go free-as free as anyone who escapes confinement but not the rigors of the process that
may lead to it-and prosecutors would know that not every confirmed peccadillo of a federal judge would result in an empty
352.
353.
354.
355.

SeeClaiborne, 765 F.2d at 788.
Burbank, supra note 92, at 671-72 (footnote omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 285-91.
See id. at 670-71.
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bench, even temporarily. 5 6
Claiborne critics' analysis derives from two attitudes about impeachment, neither of which has any place in constitutional interpretation.
First, the Claiborne critics are disturbed by the embarrassing picture of a
federal judge sitting in jail collecting his salary while Congress is trying
to speed up its impeachment procedure to keep pace with the criminal
justice system. Second, they are reacting to what they perceive as the
inefficient and cumbersome impeachment process. Ironically, the First
Congress suggested a solution to both these problems. Following the
lead of the First Congress in passing the Act of 1790, Congress could
pass a law automatically disqualifying federal judges convicted of impeachable offenses. Such a law, clearly constitutional, would not only
allow prosecution to precede impeachment, but would also permit convictions to facilitate removal by impeachment.
B. The Scope of Impeachable Offenses
In attempting to persuade the House of Representatives to impeach
Justice William 0. Douglas in April of 1970, then-Congressman Gerald
Ford observed that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the
House of Representatives at any particular moment in time says it is.2"
Numerous commentators have taken issue with Ford's statement, which
candidly reveals that impeachments may be both motivated and resolved
by politics. 358 Ford's statement expresses the practical reality of impeachment far more closely than his critics' allegedly impartial analyses
of impeachable offenses; therefore, it is not surprising that his statement
spawned numerous attempts to circumscribe the scope of impeachable
offenses to reduce the influence of politics in initiating or propelling an
356. Id. at 671.
J 357. In April of 1970, then-Congressman Gerald Ford proposed initiating impeachment proceedings against Justice William o. Douglas. Ford catalogued various "offenses" Justice Douglas
allegedly committed, including associating with publishers of obscene publications and members of
the "new left." In addition. Ford suggested that Justice Douglas had failed to recuse himself in
several cases in which recusal would have been proper. 116 CONG. REc. 11.912 (1970). Ford
concluded
what then is an impeachable offense? The only honest answer is that impeachable offense
is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers 1it] to be at a given mo.
ment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the
other body considers to be sufliciently serious to require removal of the accused from
office.
Id. at 11.913.
358. See, e.g.,R. BERGER, supra note 14.at 159-65 (discussing the extent of misbehavior historically required as grounds for impeachment); Thompson & Pollitn, supra note 23, at 107(criticizing
Ford's statements and showing a series of unsuccessful attempts at politically motivated impeachment); Note, In Defense of Standards, supra note 12, at 444 n.135 (noting that the impeachment
proceedings called for by Ford were in retaliation for the rejection of two Nixon appointees to the
Supreme Court).
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impeachment. But attempts to limit the scope of impeachable offenses
have.rarely proposed limiting impeachable offenses only to indictable offenses. 359 Rather, the major disagreement among commentators
has
been over the range of nonindictable offenses for which someone
may be
impeached.360
The language and the history of the impeachment clauses provide
some useful insights into the scope of impeachable offenses.
First, the
Constitution offers a brief definition of the range of impeachable
offenses
by providing that "all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."3161 The Constitution
defines treason as "consistfing] only in levying War against
[the United
States), or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort."162 "Bribery" has also been understood as
encompassing an indictable crime, even though Congress did not make it an indictable
crime
until 1790.363 The Constitution does not, however, define
any of the
other impeachable offenses. Thus, the operative constitutional
language
is subject to at least two different interpretations: one may argue
either
that the term "high" modifies traditional categories of criminal
offenses
or that the inclusion of some indictable crimes such as treason
and bribery as impeachable offenses does not limit impeachable offenses to indictable crimes.3"
Second, in the English experience impeachment was primarily
a
political proceeding, and impeachable offenses were political crimes. For
instance, even though he ultimately shied away from the implications
of
his research, Raoul Berger observed that in the English experience
'[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors were a category of political crimes
against the state."36 Berger supports this observation with quotations
from relevant periods in which the speakers used terms equivalent
to
"political" and "against the state" to identify the distinguishing charac359. See.e.g. R. ERGER. sapra note 14.at 70.73 (discussing the
misconduct in eighteenth century England); 1. BRANT, stupra note 22. at boundaries of impeachable
I8O-SI1
(dividing impeachable offenses into two categories: criminal conduct and dereliction of
public duty). But seeThompson
& Pollit. supra note 23. at 107, 18 (asserting that the House is reluctant to impeach unless
anl
official is accused of a serious crime).
360. Cf. R. BERGER, supra note 14,at 70.71 (discusaing the eighteenth
century
English political
practice of impeaching the king's favorites for giving him bad advice);
Kurland, supra note 14. at 697
(asserting the unconstitutionality of legislation aimed at defining
the limits of good behavior).
361. U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 4.
362. Id. art. III, 3, cl. 1.
363. See id. art. 11, § 4; 1S U.S.C. ff 201-203 (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
seealso Act of Apr. 30,
1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 42 (1845) (establishing bribery for the first time as
a federal criminal
offense).
364. See R. BERGER, supra note 14. at 53-59.
365. Id. at 61.
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369. Bestor, supra note 13, at 263-64.
370. Id. at 265.
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part upon their understanding of impeachable offenses in England, individual delegates also gave examples of the types of conduct that they felt
justified impeachment. For instance, in an exchange at the Constitutional Convention between George Mason and James Madison, Mason
objected to limiting impeachment to treason and bribery, because he
thought impeachment should reach "attempts to subvert the Constitution."ns He recommended that the delegates include "maladministra74
Illustratively, Mason referred
tion" as an impeachable offense.
impeachment of Warren HasEnglish
contemporary
the
to
approvingly
tings-formerly the Governor-General of India-as being based on an
3
attempt to "subvert the Constitution. " Madison responded that "maladministration" was "so vague a term [as to] be equivalent to tenure dur76
Madison preferred the phrase "high
ing the pleasure of the Senate."
77
Crimes and Misdemeanors" as an alternative1 that would encompass
attempts to subvert the Constitution and other similarly dangerous offenses. The debates at the Convention confirmed that impeachable offenses were not limited to indictable offenses, but included abuses against
the state. Neither the debates nor the Constitution's language, however,
identifies the specific offenses that constitute impeachable abuses against
the state.
The ratification campaign also supports the conclusion that "other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were not limited to indictable offenses,
but rather included great offenses against the federal government. For
example, delegates to state ratification conventions often referred to impeachable offenses as "great" offenses (but not necessarily as criminal),
and they frequently spoke of how impeachment should lie if the official
" 'deviates from his duty' "378 or if he " 'dare to abuse the powers vested
in him by the people.' "3"
Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments in The Federalist,observing that
[t]he subject (of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial]
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
373.

2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at $50.

374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. According to Blackstone, "high misdemeanors" in British usageincluded "mal-administration of such high officers, as are in public trust and employment." Rotunda, supra note 13,at
723 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 368, at 121).
378. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 723 (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ONTHE
ADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (J. Elliott ed. 1836) (quoting A. MacLaine of South
Carolina)).
379. Id. (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FLD-

ERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (J. Elliott ed. 1836) (quoting S. Stillman of Massachusetts)).
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Supreme Court,
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political
to
characters,
political
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384 Justice Wilson essenpunishments."
political
to
and
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of
Story recognized the political nature
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as it respects injuthen, the power partakes of a political character,
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ries to the society in its political character.
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Justice Story also viewed the penalties of removal and
are peculiarly fit
as
redress,
of
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"limitipg the punishment to such
the public against
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will
as
and
administer,
to
tribunal
for a political
38 6 Justice Story understood "political injuries" to be
political injuries."
injure the commonwealth by
"[sluch kind of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly
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the abuse of high offices of trust."
In much the same manner as Hamilton, Justice Story understood
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
380. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamilton)
381. Id. at 398.

382. Id.
383. Id.
384. 1 J. WILSON, WORKS, supra note 16, at 426.
385. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 385, at 272-73.
386. Id. at 290.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
387. Bestor, supra note 13, at 263 (quoting 2 J.
OF THE UNITED STATES § 788, at 256 (Boston 1833)).
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that the framers proceeded as if there woqld be a federal common lav of
crimes from which future Congresses could draw a list of offenses for
which federal officials may be impeached and removed. Justice Story
explained that "no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct.""*8 Nor, in Justice Story's view, could
such a statute ever be drafted because "political offenses are of so various
and complex a character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified, that the task of positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were
not almost absurd to attempt it.""' The implicit understanding shared
by both Hamilton and Justice Story was that subsequent generations
would have to define on a case-by-case basis the political crimes serving
as contemporary impeachable offenses to replace the federal common
law of crimes that never developed.
The remaining problem is how to identify those nonindictable offenses for which certain high-level government officials may be impeached. Given that certain federal officials may be impeached and
removed for committing serious abuses against the state and that these
abuses are not confined to indictable offenses, the challenge is to find
contemporary analogues to the abuses against the state that authorities
such as Hamilton and Justices Wilson and Story viewed as suitable
grounds for impeachment. On the one hand, these abuses may be reflected in certain statutory crimes. Violations of federal criminal statutes, such as the bribery statute,390 represent abuses against the state
sufficient to subject the perpetrator to impeachment and removal, because bribery demonstrates serious lack of judgment and respect for the
law and because bribery lowers respect for the office. In other words,
there are certain statutory crimes that, if committed by public officials,
reflect such lapses of judgment, such disregard for the welfare of
the
state, and such lack of respect for the law and the office held that
the
occupant may be impeached and removed for lacking the minimal level
of integrity and judgment sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of
the office. On the other hand, Congress needs to be prepared, as thenCongressman Ford pointed out, to explain what nonindictable offenses
may be impeachable offenses by defining contemporary political crimes.
The boundaries of congressional power to define such political crimes
defy specification because they rest both on the circumstances underlying
a particular offense (including the actor, the forum, and the political
crime) and on the collective politicaljudgment of Congress.
388. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 405, at 288.
389.

Id. at 287 (citations omitted).

390. 18 U.S.C.

§ 201

(1982).
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Nevertheless, constitutional safeguards apply to the impeachment
process and should circumscribe congressional efforts to define those
political crimes. The Constitution includes several safeguards to ensure
that Congress will deliberate carefully prior to making any judgments in
an impeachment proceeding: (1) when the Senate sits as a court of im9t
(2) at least twopeachment, "they shall be on Oath or Affirmation,"
impeachment
the
for
removal
favor
thirds of the Senators present must
92
removal, the
presidential
of
case
special
the
(3)
in
to be successful, and
Chief Justice must preside so that the Vice President, who normally presides, is spared from presiding over the removal trial of the one person
39 3
Two other safeguards
who stands between him and the presidency.
seeking re-election
Congress
of
members
First,
nature.
in
are political
have a political incentive to avoid any abuse of impeachment power. The
knowledge that they may have to account to their constituency may
cause them to deliberate cautiously on impeachment questions. Second,
the cumbersome impeachment process makes it difficult for a faction
guided by base political motives to both impeach and remove. Thus,
these structural and political safeguards help ensure that the House and
the Senate conduct impeachment proceedings only if warranted: "[s]ome
type of wrongdoing must exist in order for an impeachment to lie-there
can be no impeachment for mere policy difference . . . ."39
The last problem in defining the scope of impeachable offenses is
determining whether an official may be impeached for conduct unrelated
to his office or committed before assuming office. Resolving this problem depends on understanding why political crimes or abuses against the
state are impeachable offenses. The answer seems to be that someone
who holds office also holds the people's trust, and an officeholder who
violates that trust effectively loses the confidence of the people and, con39
seqc9ently, must forfeit the office. s Of course, the ways in which impeachable officials may violate the people's trust vary from case to
case. 9 6 For example, wrongdoing committed before a person assumes
office may relate to the person's capacity and worthiness to hold office,
and to that person's ability to protect and deserve the people's trust.
391.
392.
393.
394.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
See id.
See id.
Rotunda, supra note 13, at 726.

395. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 263 (citing 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-

§ 810, at 278, § 788, at 256 (Boston 1833)) (commenting that the
TION OFTHE UNITED STATES
penalties for impeachment were designed to "secure the public against political injuries," and defining political injuries as "such kind of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the
abuse of high offices of trust.").
396. See Book Note, supra note 116. at 913.
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Similarly, conduct technically unrelated to the responsibilities of a particular office may still relate to an official's capacity to fulfill the functions
of that office and to hold the people's trust.
For example, ifthe people elected a President and the media later
revealed him to have been a Ku Klux Klan member who had committed
numerous civil rights violations in private life, then Congress could in
good faith determine that such conduct reflects the kind of disdain for
the law that no President should have.397 The same concept holds
true
for a President who, during his term and for personal reasons, murders
someone. Even if such a crime were unrelated to the President's constitutional duties, the President's commission of a murder considerably
cheapens the presidency and demonstrates disdain for the law, warranting a congressional determination that the President is no longer fit
to
preserve the people's trust. The situation is more complicated if incriminating information relating to embarrassing or even illegal conduct has
already been made public prior to the election. As a matter of common
sense and good policy-but not constitutional law-Congress may wish
to take this circumstance into consideration during its deliberation
on
impeachment, because its efforts to impeach the President for violation
of the public trust presume that Congress is acting in the best interests
of
the people, who may already have indicated tacit approval of the President's prior conduct.
C. The ProperProcedurefor Impeachment
Impeachment raises four major procedural questions: (1) whether
an impeachment is a criminal or civil proceeding; (2) whether any presidential privilege is applicable; (3) what rules of evidence, if any, should
be applicable; and (4) whether the Senate may appoint special trial
committees to receive evidence for removal proceedings."9* The debate
over
397. Shortly after Justice Hugo Black had been confirmed to the
Supreme Court, it was revealed
that during his younger days he had been a member of the Ku
Klux Klan. Justice Black addressed
this issue only once in a short public statement after there was
a public uproar over his earlier
membership in the Klan. His statement consisted of a short acknowledgement
that he had been a
member of the Ku Klux Klan only for a short while during his youth.
to die down. Even though there were threats of impeachment leveled It took a while for the uproar
against Justice Black, nothing
became of them. Se H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICESAND PRESIDNS:
A POLITICAL
ITORY O A'.
POINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 47-48 (2d ed. 1985); V. HAMILTON,
HUGO BLACK:;THE
ALABAMA YEARS 275, 278-79, 285, 291-92, 294-98 (1972). In all probability, reports
of affiliation
with the Ku Klux Klan would not only defeat any future nominations
would also bring forth retaliation in the form of impeachment proceedings to the federal bench but
against any sitting federal
judges or the President.
398. Less difficult questions include (1) whether the federal
official being impeached has had
reasonable notice that the offense he allegedly committed was,
in fact, an impeachable offense and
(2) whether impeachment proceedings should be public. See C. BLACK.
Supra note 13, at 18-20.
First, the problems encountered in defining impeachable offenses
may sometimes result in situations
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on the
whether impeachment is a civil or criminal proceeding centers
99 If improceedings.)
impeachment
burden of proof that should govern
peachment is considered a criminal proceeding, then those presenting the
that the
charges must persuade the Senate beyond a reasonable doubt
is
impeachment
If
charged official committed each impeachable offense.
establishfor
proof
of
burden
the
considered only a civil proceeding, then
of the
ing the guilt of the charged official is simply a preponderance
evidence.co
Both the language and the structure of the Constitution indicate
that impeachment is not strictly either a criminal or a civil proceeding.
The Constitution expressly limits the punishments for impeachment to
removal and disqualification from office, which are unavailable in any
other proceeding in our legal system.4'2 In addition, the target of an
the President may not pardon a
impeachment has no right to a jury,4
40 3
person convicted by impeachment, the federal rules of evidence do not
unaapply to an impeachment,4* and the Constitution does not require
impeachan
in
judgment
in
sitting
members
the
of
nimity among any
ment or removal proceeding.40 But the impeachment clauses do include
at least two serious crimes, treason and bribery, as impeachable ofoffense, if committed,
in which the impeached official may not be aware or certain that a particular conscientious senator
say is that a
is, in fact, impeachable. Under such circumstances, "all we can
official knew or should have
ought to insist upon being quite clearly convinced that the impeached
Second. it would seem
known the charged act waswrong, before he votes for conviction." Id. at 19.
that an impeachment proceeding should typically be public, because, arter all, the public ls an
otherwise holds
enormous concern about the removal of someone who has been duly electeditoriswho
not hard to envision
However,
his office after satisfying constitutional appointment procedures.
questions requiring confian impeachment proceeding of a President in which serious and sensitive to convene in executive
House or the Senate
dentiality arise. In such a case, it is reasonable for the
Once it has conducted its
session, holding confidential hearings on the sensitive subject matter.
whethcr any of the
executive session, the House or the Senate may use its discretion to determine
Congress
infor ation may be shared with the public. In all probability, the kind of information
relations interests, includshoiT bereluctant to divulge should relate to national security or foreign
as opposed to issues
ing but not limited to the protection of American and allied military personnel.
Other sensitive matrelating solely to the integrity or reputation of the official under impeachment.
in the subsection on the
ters include, for example, attorney-client privileges, which are considered
applicability of presidential privilege to impeachment proceedings.
the impeachment process ...
399. Professor Black identifies the real question as what "things in
need not be." Id. at 15.
should be treated like the same things in a criminal trial, and what things
advice. He fre400. Seeid. at 15. Interestingly, much of Professor Black's analysis is political
solution to a particquently speaks of what Senators "ought" to do or what would bea "reasonable"
interpretation should be both
ular dilemma. Seeid. at 16-17. While his caution in constitutional
constitutional interpretation
commended and emulated, he never explains where the line between
ends and political advice
and political advice should bedrawn-where constitutional interpretation
or wise policy begins.
401. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
the House); id.
402. Seeid. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (committing impeachments to the "sole Power" of
art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (committing removal trials to the "sole Power" of the Senate).
403. Seeid. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
404. Seeinfro notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
by the House require at least a
405. SeeU.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 5 (implying impeachments
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fenses." Further, impeachment is lumped together with other criminal
40
proceedings in other sections of the Constitution. 7
If impeachment is, as the constitutional language and structure suggest, a hybrid criminal and civil proceeding, then the burden of proof
required for an impeachment need not be the same as the criminal or
civil burden of proof. In addition, a hybrid of the criminal and-civil burdens of proof may be desirable, because neither a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard nor a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard neatly
fits the impeachment setting. Too lenien; a proof standard would allow
the Senate to impose the serious punishments for impeachment "even
though substantial doubt of guilt remained." 40s Too rigid a standard
might allow an official to remain in office even though the entire Senate
was convinced she had committed an impeachable offense."0
The solution to this dilemma is to balance these concerns. Professor
Charles Black has recommended that:
[t]he essential thing is that no part whatever be played by the natural human tendency to think the worst of a person of whom one
generally disapproves, and the verbalization of a high standard of
proof may serve as a constant reminder of this. Weighing the factors, I would be sure that one ought not to be satisfied, or anything
near satisfied, with the mere "preponderance" of an ordinary civil
trial, but perhaps must be satisfied with something a little less than
the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of the ordinary criminal
trial, in the full literal meaning of that standard. "Overwhelming
preponderance of the evidence" comes perhaps as close as 10
present
legal language can to denoting the desired legal standard.4
In short, the standard of proof in an impeachment should be a hybrid of
the standards of proof in civil and criminal trials to accommodate the
hybrid nature of impeachment proceedings.
The debate over whether the President should be allowed to invoke
any special privileges in an impeachment proceeding typically turns on
whether a strong or weak President is desirable. For example, Professor
Black suggests that even in an impeachment proceeding the President
should enjoy an absolute "privilege of withholding from other branches
of government the tenor and content of his own conversations with his
close advisors in the White House." 4ll Professor Black explains that the
majority vote); id. art. 1.§ 3, cl. 6 (requiring a vote of at least "two thirds of the Members present" in
the Senate for a removal conviction).
406. Seeid. art. II, § 4.
407. Seeid. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id, art. Ill. § 2, cl. 3.
408. C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 17.
409. Seeid. at 17.
410. Id
411. Id. at 20.
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President should have an absolute executive privilege applicable even to
an impeachment proceeding because "its upholding [is] essential to the
the presidency and to the free flow of
efficacious and dignified conduct4 1of
2
explains further that such a priviHe
candid advice to the President."
himself from overreaching
protect
to
President
the
lege would also allow
by either of the other two branchis.
Yet history and common sense suggest that an impeachment proceeding is precisely the context in which the President may not assert
superiority over Congress. The framers never evidenced any intent that
the President have the power to thwart an impeachment proceeding.
More importantly, meaningful separation of powers does not support an
absolute executive privilege in an impeachment proceeding. There is no
in
reason to suppose that executive privilege should operate differently
4 3
1 the
Nixon,
v.
States
United
In
contexts.
judicial
and
congressional
Supreme Court held that in a judicial proceeding the executive privilege
is qualified by the basis on which the President is asserting it.*'* The
privilege becomes stronger as the basis for the privilege becomes more
central to national security or the effective and efficient operation of the
executive branch. For example, as Professor Black concedes, a President
vill be on stronger ground in an impeachment proceeding resting his
claim for privilege on the imminent dangers that would result from the
disclosure of international or national security information rather than
on the possible impediment of uninhibited and energetic consultation
415
with the President.
In an impeachment hearing, the critical question is often whether
the President has the capacity, integrity, or competency to continue to
occupy the office, and there is no harm in expecting the President to
facilitate disposition of the proceeding by sharing with Congress or the
Chief Justice even the most sensitive information regarding the executive
brisnch. The President's concerns for national security and excessive
congressional oversight of the presidency may be alleviated by requiring
a showing of relevance prior to the President's divulging certain information. If the President declines to share information after Congress shows
relevance, he then risks being impeached for refusing to comply with a
congressional request or subpoena. If the President lacks confidence in
congressional procedures for maintaining the confidentiality of certain
information, he can ask Congress to adopt a different procedure. But the
412. Id. at 20-21.
413. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
414. Id. at 713.
415.
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President's lack of confidence in congressional ability to preserve confidential information is not a compelling reason for withholding information that Congress is entitled to consider in discharging its constitutional
duties to investigate and conduct impeachments.
By its very nature, the impeachment process is reserved for Congress to demand an accounting from the President regarding alleged
abuses of his powers. Allowing the President to assert an unsubstantiated claim of privilege is nonsense, particularly if Congress uses its best
efforts to maintain absolute secrecy. If the President is not above the
criminal law,"16 there is no sound reason for exempting him from accountability, especially in the impeachment process. The American
Revolution and the Constitution mean nothing if the President retains
office without a meaningful accounting authorized by the Constitution.
The high stakes of any clash between executive privilege and congressional impeachment power demand nothing less than the parties' working out a suitable arrangement regarding any assertedly sensitive
information.
There is no reason for making any particular rules of evidence applicable to impeachment proceedings. 4 17 Both state and federal courts require special rules of evidence to make trials more efficient and fair or to
keep certain evidence away from a jury, whose members might not understand or appreciate its reliability, credibility, or potentially prejudicial
effect.4 I8 The concerns leading to the use of special rules of evidence in
state and federal courts do not apply to impeachment proceedings. An
impeachment proceeding is not a typical trial, nor does it involve a typical jury. Rather, impeachment is an extraordinary hearing, whose success and effectiveness depend on the wisdom and judgment of a
sophisticated and politically savvy body, the Congress of the United
States. As Professor Black suggests,
[b]oth the House and the Senate ought to hear and consider all
evidence which seems relevant, without regard to technical rules.
Senators are in any case continually exposed to "hearsay" evidence; they cannot be sequestered and kept away from newspapers,
like a jury. If they cannot be trusted to weigh evidence, appropriately discounting for all the factors of unreliability that have led to

our keeping some evidence away from juries, then they are not
4 19 in
any way up to the job, and "rules of evidence" will not help.

416. Seegenerally L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 268-74 ("In general, there isno executive immunity-common law or otherwise-from criminal prosecution.").
417. For example, the House or Senate might choose to follow the federal rules of evidence.
418. SeeC. BLACK, supra note 13. at 18.
419. Id.

See C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 22.
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continuation of an impeachment. Although Congress has never conducted a successful impeachment against someone after resignation,'4 2
there is a surprising consensus among commentators that resignation
4 28
does not necessarily preclude impeachment and disqualification.
Upon closer inspection, there are several reasons that the prevailing practice in Congress "has no substantial historical foundation and is not supported by a single authoritative and unequivocal decision of recent
times. "429
First, impeachment in the English experience was not limited to officials still in office. For example, several Constitutional Convention delegates, including George Mason, acknowledged that in April of 1787 the
House of Commons had voted articles of impeachment against Warren
Hastings,
two years after he had resigned as the Governor-General of
43 0
India.
Second, prior to the Constitutional Convention, several states allowed impeachment of officials even after they left office. For example,
in 1776, Virginia and Delaware adopted constitutions that expressly allowed impeachment against their governors after they left office. 43I The
delegates at the Constitutional Convention indicated no intention to
abandon English practice or state constitutional provisions, which allowed post resignation impeachments.
Third, the Constitution does not restrict the time at which an impeachment proceeding may be brought and includes language consistent
with impeachments after departure from office. Although article II of
the Constitution refers to all civil officers, that language means only that
those who are still civil officers when convicted of the impeachment must
be removed. Article I does not refer to all civil officers and provides a
limitation on only the penalty in an impeachment proceeding rather than
a limitation on jurisdiction.4 12 According to the conventional rule of
constitutional interpretation to give meaning to each word of the Constitution, the inclusion of boih present removal and future disqualification
as penalties for impeachment suggests that they are two separate penal427. But see Bestor, supra note 13, at 280 (summarizing the Belknap case concerning the impeachment of the Secretary of War after his resignation); Rotunda, supra note 13,at 717 (describing
the Blount case concerning the impeachment of an expelled Senator).
428. Compare J. STORY, supra note 72, §400, at 283-84 (arguing that officers subject to impeachment may not be impeached after resignation) with Rotunda. supra note 13. at 716-18 (arguing
that resignation does not preclude impeachment and disqualification) and Firmage & Mangrum,
supra note 22, at 1091-92 (same).
429. Bestor, supra note 13, at 277.
430. See id.
431. Seeid.
432. See Rotunda. supra note 13, at 716.
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ties, which may be separately applied. If the punishments may be levied
apart, 'there is no logical barrier for Congress in disqualifying, whenever
it chooses, someone who was a civil officer of the United States.
Fourth, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention understood
that impeachment may take place after departure from office. On the
only occasion when the'timing of impeachment was discussed at the
Convention, most delegates proceeded as if the President would be impeachable after leaving office. 4 " The question that preoccupied the delegates was whether the President should also be impeachable while in
office. By a vote of eight to two, the Convention made the President
impeachable while in office, without giving the slightest indication that
this action constituted any grant of immunity after leaving office.434
Shortly after the Convention, two prominent commentators confirmed that resignation or departure from office did not preclude impeachment. In The Federalist No. 39, James Madison compared the
impeachment provisions of Virginia and Delaware with those in the new
Constitution, stressing that the latter extended rather than curtailed the
liability of the President by denying him immunity "during his continuance in office." 43 Similarly, in 1846, long after he had left the White
House, John Quincy Adams declared on the floor of Congress that "I
hold myself, so long as I have the breath of life in my body, amenable to
impeachment by this House for everything I did during the time I held
any public office." 4 36
The critical element guiding the timing of impeachments is that the
checks on impeachment are political, not constitutional. No doubt, there
are numerous reasons not to move for impeachment of an official after
resignation, but none of these are mandated by the Constitution. For
example, Congress may barely have sufficient support to impeach and
remove an official in office, and after the person resigns, Congress may
decide it would be futile to pursue a postresignation disqualification.
Congress may also conclude that healing political divisions after a controversial resignation is more important than its need for vindicating the
laws or principles violated by the resigned official.4 3 7
Justice Story made perhaps the best argument in favor of "confining
433. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 278-79.
434. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 1, at 64-69.
435. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
436. CoNG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., Ist Sess.641 (1846) (statement of J.Q. Adams), quoted in
Bestor, supra note 13, at 279.
437. SeeRotunda, supra note 13, at 717 ("Congress ... may not wish to initiate or to complete
impeachment of an officer who has resigned, but that decision is more a matter of prosecutorial
discretion than a constitutional lack of jurisdiction").
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the impeaching power to persons holding office,"438 but his argument
was misplaced. In context, Justice Story appeared to be concerned primarily with distinguishing American impeachment practice from contemporary British impeachment practice, which allowed impeachment
against private citizens, including all peers and commoners. 43 9 Moreover, one can accommodate Justice Story's concern without going so far
as to argue that impeachment after resignation is impermissible. The
Constitution's language makes clear that the framers rejected impeachment against private citizens for engaging in offenses against the federal
government,440 but accepted impeachment of private citizens for committing impeachable offenses while they-held office."'
E

JudicialReview of Impeachments

Commentators generally agree that federal courts may not review
any aspect of impeachment proceedings because the proceedings present
political questions." 2 A significant minority of commentators, however,
persist in arguing that there should be judicial review of impeachments
because there is no historical basis for the political question doctrine and
because prevailing concepts such as due process and judicial independence require judicial review of impeachment proceedings." 3
On balance, there are several reasons why the political question doctrine applies to the problem of impeachment. First, the Constitution's
language supports such a view. Article I states that the House "shall
have sole Power of Impeachment" and that the "Senate shall have the
sole power to try all Impeachments." 4 The speech or debate clause,"'
in another section of article I, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to protect from judicial review the legitimate activities of legislators act438. J. STORY, supra note 72, § 400, at 284 (explaining that the United States, unlike England,
confined impeachment to officeholders because citizens, who are relatively defenseless against the
government's impeachment power, should besecure from reprisal "for their conduct in exercising
their political rights and privileges").
439. See Rotunda, supra note 13, at 717.
440. Id.
441. See Franklin, supra note 22. at 313 (documenting that the framers wanted to reject impeachment infamy-impeachment primarily to raint
someone's reputation-in favor of impeachment triggered by misconduct either related to or committed while in office). In addition, there is no
sound basis for arguing that there should be a statute of limitations on impeaching someone after
resignation. The timing of an impeachment is simply not a problem turning on constitutional law.
The timing of an impeachment rests solely within the political judgment of the Congress.
442. See,e.g.,Rotunda. supra note 13, at 728 (noting that impeachment raises issues that satisfy
each of the elements of a political question as defined in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
443. See R. BERGER, supra note 14, at 103-21; I. BRANT, supra note 22, at 183-87; Feerick.
Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the ConstitutionalProvisions. 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 57
(1970).
444. U.S. CONST. art. I. §2, ci. 5; id. art. I, §3, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
445. Seesupra note 348.

. 97

Texas Law Review

Vol. 68:1, 1989

ing within their prescribed functions, including impeachment.'"
Although Raoul Berger argues that none of this language in article I
forecloses the possibility of appeals from impeachment trials," 7 "[tihe
most natural reading of this language appears to be a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department.' "448
Second, treating impeachments as nonreviewable is consistent with
the explicit decision of the delegates at the Convention to exclude any
role for the courts in an impeachment other than providing that the
Chief Justice would preside at the impeachment trial of the President." 9
For a variety of reasons, the framers preferred some body other than the
judiciary to make impeachment and removal decisions.4s 0 The framers
believed, for example, that the judiciary might be influenced by the difficult conflicts of interest of impeaching and removing either the person
who had appointed them or a fellow judge. In addition, allowing the
judiciary to sit both as part of the impeachment body and as the reviewing body would be inefficient and counterproductive, particularly if the
controversy involved a federal judge. The framers also substituted the
Chief Justice for the Vice President in the impeachment proceeding
against a President to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest of the
Vice President presiding over the removal trial.
Justice Story explained that the framers regarded Congress better
equipped than the judiciary to deal with the difficult political issues
raised by an impeachment proceeding. In particular, he noted that the
framers rejected the judiciary as the impeachment body because they believed that impeachment required "a very large discretion [that] must
unavoidably be vested in the court of impeachments."4' According to
Justice Story, the framers understood the power of impeachment as political in nature and vested the power solely with the House of Representatives, "where it should be, in the possession and power of the immediate
repiesentatives of the people." 452 Justice Story also regarded the sanctions available to the Senate in impeachment proceedings as "peculiarly
fit[ting] for a political tribunal to administer, and as will secure the pub446. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund. 421 U.S. 491, 501-05 (1975); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169. 180 (1966); In re
Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833 F.2d 1438, 1446 (1Ith Cir. 1987).
447. SeeR. BERGER, supra note 14, at 116-21.
448. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 728 (luoting Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186. 217 (1962)).
449. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS. supra note 1, at 500. 551.
450. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65. at 398 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
451. J. STORY, supra note 72, §396, at 280.
452. Id. §407, at 290.
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lic against political injuries."4S3

Third, the decision to impeach involves issues that are not judicial;
discoverable or that are difficult for judges to apply. For example,
bot
the House and the Senate eventually must agree, usually independentl
of each other, on what constitutes an impeachable offense. Yet, as Ju:
tice Story observed, impeachable offenses are "purely of a political
nu
ture"45 4 and defy definition or classification by statute. No statutes
c
common law doctrines set forth the impeachable offenses that court
may then interpret or apply. Thus, "[tihe very nature of an impeachabl
offense demonstrates that it fails another independent and alternative
tes
to determine when a legal question is justiciable; there
are 'a lack of judi
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving' the
issue."45
Fourth, judicial review of impeachments might lead
to embarrassin
conflicts between the Congress and the federal judiciary.
Allowing the
Chief Justice to participate in the judicial review of a President's
im
peachment after the Chief Justice had presided over it would be awk
ward. Moreover, it would be confusing and embarrassing if the Senat
voted to remove the President and then a federal court countermandec
that decision. In short, "[bjecause the framers placed the sole
power of
impeachment in two political bodies-the House and the Senate-it
would certainly appear that such an issue remains a political
question."456
The Supreme Court's decision in Powell Y.McCormick4" also indicates that there may be judicial review of any aspects of an impeachment
proceeding. In Powell, the Supreme Court held that whether the House
of Representatives followed the proper procedure in
excluding Adam
Clayton Powell from taking his seat in the House was not a political
question.45 8 The Powell Court also held that although Congress has the
dual powers to expel and to exclude its members, Congress
is not empowered to apply expulsion standards in proceedings to exclude a
9
representative.S
The lesson of Powell is that the Supreme Court may use judicial
review to determine whether Congress followed the proper
procedure for
making the political decision committed to it by the Constitution.
Powell
does not allow overly intrusive judicial review, but rather allows
review
453. Id.
454. Id. §406, at 289.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Rotunda, supra note 3, at 729 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Rotunda, supra note 13, at 732.
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 511-12.
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solely to ensure that Congress made the particular kind of political decision entrusted to it by the Constitution. In Powell, the Court could not
have, interfered with the decision by Congress to expel Representative
Powell if Congress had followed the constitutional standards for an expulsion;" 0 however, the Court could step in where Congress used a procedure to accomplish impermissible ends. Powell indicates that while
Congress has full, complete, and sole power to exclude, it does not have
the power to change expulsion into exclusion-to turn one constitutional
procedure into another. Also, under Powell the federal courts may decide whether Congress has chosen the correct procedure to accomplish
its asserted purposes. Thus, Powell indicates, first, that whether the matter is a political question depends on the fit between the actual procedure
chosen by Congress and the circumstances to which Congress attempts
to apply the procedure, and second, that the choice and application of a
procedure by Congress are reviewable by the federal courts to ensure that
Congress has done no more than the Constitution allows.
This interpretation of Powell clarifies at what points, if any, there
nay be judicial review of any part of an impeachment proceeding. For
example, Professor Rotunda has asked whether federal courts may intervene if Senators violate the Constitution by participating in a removal
trial without being on oath or affirmation.46' This question turns on the
critical distinction, made in all political question cases, between the constitutionality and the reviewability of an action. Although the Senate's
action in Professor Rotunda's hypothetical example is plainly unconstitutional, that determination does not answer whether the action is also
judicially reviewable. In the context of impeachment, which, by nature,
presents political questions, reviewability is limited to determining
whether Congress chose one procedure to accomplish something constitutionally permissible only in some other proceeding. Obviously, Congress made no such choice in Professor Rotunda's hypothetical. Instead,
Congress chose a procedure but did not follow all of its particular dictates. Under Powell, the latter situation is a classic political question and,
as such, is not reviewable by any federal court. Instead, its remedy rests
460. The Court framed

the issue as the scope of the

House's powers under article 1, section 2,cl.

2. which describes the three qualifications that must be met by a Representative, and article I, section 5, cl. 2, which provides that 'each House shall bethe Judge of the . .. Qualifications of its own

Members." The Court essentially reviewed the merits of and ultimately rejected the House's argument that its power to judge the qualifications of its members included the power to "exclude [Powell] from its membership" on grounds of misconduct. Id. at 550. Although the Court saw itself as
merely deciding the parameters of the House's power to exclude, this Article proposes the decision
be viewed more precisely as upholding the Court's power to distinguish the scope of the House's
dual powers to exclude and to expel, the latter of which is set forth in U.S. CONST. art. 1, §5,cl. 2.
461. SeeRotunda, supra note 13, at 730-31.
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with the Senate.462 By contrast, if the House tries to remove or if the
Senate tries to impeach, federal courts may review the procedure, because in this case either the Housq or the Senate is trying to transform
one constitutional procedure into another.
V. Conclusion: The Future of Impeachment
Impeachment is both awesome and perplexing. When Congress
conducts an impeachment hearing and trial, the Constitution's vitality is
reaffirmed, and when Congress exercises its removal powers, the high
stakes are apparent. Yet it is mystifying, given the volume of literature
on impeachment and the attention focused on Congress each time it tries
to exercise its impeachment power, that our understanding of impeachment has not advanced much from the first days of the Constitutional
Convention. Scholarship on impeachment, with too few exceptions,
leaves much to be desired.
In the face of the inadequate scholarship on impeachment, this Article argues that impeachment may be understood and may remain vital as
long as we recognize the real nature of impeachment and the limitations
of "grand" or formal theories of constitutional analysis. Impeachment
was conceived as a political proceeding involving certain political officials charged with political crimes and, if necessary, culminating in certain political punishments. Commentators often misunderstand or
ignore impeachment's political nature which makes the impeachment
clauses virtually immune to systematic analysis because politics itself is
difficult to analyze systematically.463 Nevertheless, impeachment may
make sense if we (1) use history only as the starting point for analysis, (2)
consider the structural role of impeachment in checking and balancing
the three branches, (3) appreciate the changes that have occurred within
the institutions responsible for impeachment, (4) presume the constitutionality of additions to or deviations from the impeachment procedure
(so long as those additions do not violate the values or principles impeachment and the federal judiciary were intended to protect), and (5)
bar judicial review of political questions except for judicial determinations of the contours of the political questions themselves.
As a solution to its current inefficiency, the impeachment process
462. SeeL. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 97-98, 106-07 (discussing the rationale for the political
question doctrine's leaving the decision as to the constitutionality of certain governmental actions to
branches other than the judiciary); see also Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165-66
(1803) (expressly contemplating that some seemingly "constitutional" issues would be committed to
political discretion).
463. SeeM. TUSHNET, supra note 18. at 70-72, 94. 99-107 (discussing the "complexity of modern American politics").
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impeachment process to initiate an,impeachment proceeding, as long as
the noncongressional investigation does not require the Congress to accept the facts or the findings of the investigation or force the investigating branch to go beyond its own constitutional limitations. No doubt,
Congress would stand on firmer constitutional ground if it at least initially directed some outside agency to investigate the alleged commissions of particular impeachable offenses in certain limited circumstances.
The Senate has already demonstrated in the removal trials of Judges
Harry Claiborne and Alcee Hastings that it is possible to streamline receipt of evidence regarding removal through special trial committees that
with tapes of hearings and neutral summaries of
provide the full Senate
467
submitted evidence.
In the final analysis, three important lessons regarding constitutional interpretation can be learned from the debates on impeachment.
First, no simple theory of constitutional interpretation answers all the
problems regarding the meaning of each and every constitutional provision. Impeachment is not one of the few self-defining constitutional provisions. With respect to ambiguous constitutional language or gaps in
the Constitution, constitutional theories may raise but do not definitively
answer important questions about the meaning of the Constitution.
Second, constitutional provisions grant each branch special power.
This power may include the responsibility to use creativity and common
sense to exercise the power-granting provision in the contemporary
world. Constitutional commentators should not forget that the judiciary
is not the only branch empowered to interpret the Constitution and that
the judiciary is no more capable or constitutionally compelled than the
other branches to give the Constitution meaning.
Third, constitutional law explicates what is permissible, but politics
dictates what should be done. We should recognize that simply because
some course of action is constitutional does not mean either that it is
prudent or that it must be pursued. Constitutional commentators spend
so much time debating the outer limits of constitutionally permissible
behavior by the different branches that they sometimes lose sight of the
that must be reimportant issues included within those limits-issues
68
Unless and until our
solved by making prudent political judgments.
467. See supra note 420.
468. The point is that constitutional interpretation sets the outermost boundaries on the exercise
of federal power but sets aminimum standard or floor for states. For example, Congress may regard
a measure such as the Act of 1790 as constitutional, but choose to forego it out of a sense of fairness
or to avoid any political difficulties its use might entail. It is important not to confuse these limits
with prudent politics, which sometimes may suggest stretching a particular branch's power to its
outermost limits or perhaps even beyond. It is also important not to lose sight of the constitutional

103

Texas Law Review

Vol. 68:1, 1989

notions of politics are elevated, however, constitutional commentators
will continue to tell the different branches of government-as they have
in the area of impeachment-what they must do as opposed to what they
may do after careful and thorough deliberation.
interpretations branches other than the judiciary must make. Commentators spend far too little time
analyzing the constitutional interpretations other branches must make as a function of their own
constitutional responsibilities. One purpose of this Article is to indicate that the Congress must
interpret the impeachment clauses as pan of its impeachment power and that much of the constitutional commentary on the meaning of the impeachment clauses is not so much constitutional interpretation as it is recommendations to Congress on how to resolve the political problems endemic to
impeachment.
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